



# CHANDLER GOOD GOVERNMENT INDEX 2022 REPORT



CHANDLER  
INSTITUTE OF GOVERNANCE





# CHANDLER GOOD GOVERNMENT INDEX

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# The Chandler Good Government Index® 2022

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MESSAGE FROM THE FOUNDER

# Good Governments Build Tall Ladders

**The Global Talent-Opportunity Mismatch**  
 “It was not lack of ability that limited my people,” Nelson Mandela wrote in his 1994 autobiography *Long Walk to Freedom*, “but lack of opportunity.” Mandela’s nearly 30-year-old diagnosis of South Africa could still characterise many countries today, where wealth and status often determine a person’s ability to rise beyond their education, skills, or work ethic.

Mandela, who was born in 1918 and passed away in 2013, witnessed the world make remarkable progress over the course of his lifetime: extreme-poverty rates plummeted, average lifespans lengthened. Yet it was progress purchased at great cost to the planet, and which was distributed unevenly between—and within its countries. That imbalance continues to widen, and can be seen in everything from education scores to healthcare outcomes, the distribution of wealth to COVID-19 vaccines.

“A nation should not be judged by how it treats its highest citizens,” Mandela wrote, “but its lowest ones.” His words echo in the worldwide calls to build fairer societies, ones that provide everyone—regardless of race, gender, or religion—with opportunities to be safe, healthy, and educated. People want the chance to hold jobs, own homes, and participate in a vibrant marketplace—they want, in other words, to be given the tools and opportunities to build better lives for themselves and their children. And they expect their governments to deliver both.



\* Each nation has its own identity and story anchored in heritage, culture, values, and traditions.

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***A nation should not be judged by how it treats its highest citizens but its lowest ones.***

**NELSON MANDELA**

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### **Helping People Rise: The Social Mobility Ladder**

The Chandler Prosperity Model (CPM) is a framework that encapsulates our understanding of building and broadening national prosperity. It is a way to visualise—and thereby better understand—prosperity and its many components, to glimpse how they are at once independent yet interrelated. The CPM encapsulates the simple big idea that governance, the marketplace, and community levels all have critical—and complementary—roles to play in creating prosperity, while offering specific areas of focus within each.

### **How Tall is Your Ladder?**

Standing to the left of the CPM is the Social Mobility Ladder. Countries that achieve broad and genuine equality of opportunities are building “tall ladders”—ones that allow anyone, regardless of how humble their starting point in life, to aspire, dream, and achieve success. Governments that build “short ladders”, on the other hand, neglect social mobility and allow social and economic divides to harden into class structures over time. In these countries, the poor largely stay poor and the wealthy remain wealthy.

As important as the ladder’s height is the spacing of its rungs. Large gaps between the rungs of opportunity make it difficult—or impossible—for people to climb. Smaller gaps put progress within reach at every level. Equal opportunity is central to social mobility.


If the challenge facing governments is to make the ladder sturdy, tall, and its rungs evenly spaced, then the challenge for individuals is to harness their heritage, dreams, talents, skills, and values to ascend to new heights. People cannot be dragged up a ladder, they have to climb it themselves.

## **The Social Mobility Ladder**

*Helping People Rise*




### Good Governance Goes Hand-in-Hand with Social Mobility



Sources: CGGI 2022; Global Social Mobility Index, 2020, World Economic Forum.

### Good Governance is Closely Related to Social Progress



Sources: CGGI 2022; Social Progress Index, 2021, Social Progress Imperative.

### The Link Between Good Governance and Social Mobility

The Chandler Good Government Index (CGGI) measures government capabilities and outcomes across 104 countries, or roughly 90% of the world's population. Among the insights that have emerged from this year's Index is the close relationship between good governance and social mobility. The countries that score highest on the CGGI also have the highest levels of social mobility.

There is a similarly strong link between the CGGI's rankings and the 2021 Social Progress Index, which looks at 53 separate indicators to measure "how well a society provides its people with the things they really care about".

### Honing the Tradecraft of Governance

Given the CGGI's focus on government capabilities—of the Index's 35 indicators, 26 speak to capabilities—these findings suggest the most capable governments are those that foster the greatest social mobility. This finding may sound unsurprising, yet it has important implications.

Discussions of social mobility often centre on ideologies or partisan interests, which can be divisive. Capabilities, on the other hand, are built on concrete skills, systems, and processes. These can be tracked, improved, and strengthened. To focus on government capabilities, in other words, is to focus on the areas within a government's control, that most practitioners agree are important, and which the data shows is linked with the best outcomes.

From COVID-19 to climate change, from the threat of nuclear war to plummeting trust, the challenges facing governments today are immense. Tackling them will require harnessing new talent, ideas, and innovations—the very resources that unequal, immobile societies squander.



Richard F. Chandler, January 2022.

The great challenge—and opportunity—for governments today is finding ways to enable people to participate fully in society, encouraging them to contribute their passions and creativity to solving the great issues of our time, and empowering them to decide for themselves how far their life will take them.

**Richard F. Chandler**

Founder, Chandler Institute of Governance

MESSAGE FROM THE CHAIRMAN

# Recognising Good Governance at a Time of Crisis

The inaugural publication of the Chandler Good Government Index last year was a key milestone in the roadmap of the Chandler Institute of Governance to support leaders and public institutions in addressing governance challenges around the world.

Following the release of the 2021 Index report, the team at the Chandler Institute of Governance has engaged governments in multiple countries to share insights gleaned from the Index. We have also presented the Index and its findings at various international conferences and forums, and continued working with experts around the world to refine the Index methodology.

The Index was reported in over 114 print and online articles in eight languages across 19 countries. I am glad that the Index has contributed to lively exchanges around the world, providing evidence-based discourse for what had in the past often been subjective or biased discussions about national governments.

The COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted the importance of accountability, inclusiveness, and honesty for good governance. Governments that have strong capabilities in strategic sensing, programme planning and implementation, communications, international cooperation, and fiscal management have been able to better engender public trust. It is this trust that has allowed them to better implement effective safe distancing measures, achieve good vaccination results, allocate limited healthcare resources, and provide sustainable fiscal support to manage the fallout of a prolonged pandemic.

As the conflict between Russia and Ukraine plays out, the ongoing importance of good governments contributing to regional and global peace and development cannot be underestimated.



Building on the success of the first report, we hope to expand the reach of the Index in this year's publication. Our aim is to enhance its usefulness to a broad range of stakeholders: including government leaders and officials, experts and commentators, organisations and businesses that consider the quality of governance a factor in their investment decisions, and citizens around the world who expect high levels of integrity, as well as effective and wise governance.

Finally, I would like to thank the esteemed members of the CGGI Global Advisory Panel for their expertise, feedback, and contributions which have enabled us to strengthen the Index to become a trusted index measuring government capabilities and outcomes.

**Lee Kok Fatt**  
Chairman, Chandler Institute of Governance

## MESSAGE FROM THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

# Our Journey in Measuring Good Governance

**A**bout three years ago, the Chandler Institute of Governance began its first steps towards an ambitious goal: to develop a sensible and practitioner-focused way to benchmark the capabilities and effectiveness of governments around the world.

The governance competition remains the most important one in the world today. Good governance is the deciding factor in whether a nation succeeds. Because governance is key, it is important to have a way to measure good government that is practical, relevant, and focused on capabilities.

The CGGI is a composite index, built by government practitioners, for government practitioners. It is designed to be a practical tool, offering a way for governments to understand and benchmark their capabilities and performance, and to have honest conversations about opportunities for progress.

We continue to be driven by the firm belief that capabilities matter, and governments with more effective and developed capabilities will generally achieve better outcomes for their citizens and businesses. The CGGI primarily measures government capabilities, rather than how a government chooses to use those capabilities. At the same time, we continue to see a robust relationship between a government's capabilities and the quality of its performance.

Capabilities—such as the ability of a government to plan, communicate and analyse data—are generally stable and robust once built. Regulatory or policymaking capabilities do not usually oscillate wildly from year to year, barring exceptional circumstances. This bakes a degree of stability into country scores and ranks. But ranking changes do occur, as governments invest in training, system engineering, and partnerships to enhance their capabilities, and use them to implement policies and programmes that improve lives.



Since the launch of the inaugural CGGI in 2021, we have seen a whirlwind of activity. We are grateful for our Global Advisory Panel, and the many experts and practitioners from over 20 countries who have come forward to engage with, offer feedback on, and express support for the CGGI and the larger mission behind what we do. I am also heartened by the interest that several government agencies have shown in using the CGGI as a practical and relevant way to benchmark their performance.

We will always embrace opportunities to tell stories about governance. It is these stories, and the lived experiences of fellow government practitioners, which make our Index come alive. This is why we have chosen in this year's Report to share the perspectives of ten governance practitioners from nine countries around the world. Their accounts and reflections bring the pillars and indicators of the CGGI to life, showing that governance and the work of governments is the product of actions, sacrifices, and insights of committed public servants everywhere, as they grapple with the most pressing challenges facing countries today.

In the face of an increasingly turbulent world, the CGGI shows why investing in strong government capabilities is vital to securing positive outcomes for people and businesses—especially as countries deal with COVID-19, armed conflict, and climate disasters. We offer the CGGI 2022 as a statement of our belief that good government matters, especially in the face of crises.

**Wu Wei Neng**

Executive Director, Chandler Institute of Governance

INDEX RESULTS & INSIGHTS







**CHANDLER  
GOOD GOVERNMENT  
INDEX**

**PILLARS**



**Leadership  
& Foresight**

- Anti-Corruption
- Long-Term Vision
- Adaptability
- Strategic  
Prioritisation
- Innovation

Ethical Leadership\*



**Robust Laws  
& Policies**

- Rule of Law
- Quality of  
Judiciary
- Transparency
- Regulatory  
Governance



**Strong  
Institutions**

- Coordination
- Data Capability
- Implementation
- Quality of  
Bureaucracy



**Financial  
Stewardship**

- Government Debt
- Country Budget  
Surplus
- Spending Efficiency
- Country Risk  
Premium



**Attractive  
Marketplace**

- Property Rights
- Macroeconomic  
Environment
- Attracting  
Investments
- Logistics  
Competence
- Stable Business  
Regulations

Tax Efficiency\*



**Global Influence  
& Reputation**

- International  
Trade
- International  
Diplomacy
- Nation Brand
- Passport Strength



**Helping  
People Rise**

- Education
- Health
- Satisfaction with  
Public Services
- Personal Safety
- Environmental  
Performance
- Income Equality
- Social Mobility
- Gender Gap
- Non-  
Discrimination

\* Indicators in blue are not included in this edition of the Index due to data issues, and will be considered for future editions.

# The Top 20 Countries





# Country Rankings



Overall Rank

Overall Rank	Country	Leadership & Foresight	Robust Laws & Policies	Strong Institutions	Financial Stewardship	Attractive Marketplace	Global Influence & Reputation	Helping People Rise
1	Finland	1	3	1	12	3	16	2
2	Switzerland	9	2	8	4	2	12	4
3	Singapore	3	18	13	1	1	29	1
4	Denmark	2	4	3	8	7	20	6
5	Netherlands	9	5	21	6	4	6	5
6	Norway	6	1	7	2	19	23	3
7	Sweden	4	7	5	9	11	11	7
8	Germany	23	15	11	3	5	2	11
9	New Zealand	5	6	4	7	13	37	21
10	United Kingdom	15	13	15	19	9	3	15
11	Ireland	7	17	17	16	6	21	12
12	Austria	20	13	25	22	8	14	9
13	Canada	11	9	6	14	22	22	17
14	Estonia	12	11	9	17	16	30	16
15	Japan	22	11	22	29	14	7	14
16	France	20	19	14	28	24	1	20
17	Australia	27	16	2	20	12	25	22
18	United States	14	10	28	13	10	8	32
19	South Korea	17	21	12	11	33	19	19
	Iceland	28	8	27	10	30	40	10
21	Belgium	32	20	29	25	17	17	13
22	Czech Republic	34	28	15	15	20	24	17
23	Slovenia	37	26	10	32	31	28	8
24	United Arab Emirates	8	33	34	5	18	46	29
25	Portugal	43	30	24	43	22	9	24
26	Spain	40	23	26	45	53	4	22

A shaded cell denotes that a country shares a joint pillar ranking.

Data cut-off for the 2022 Chandler Good Government Index was 1 December 2021.

# Country Rankings



## Overall Rank

Overall Rank	Country	Leadership & Foresight	Robust Laws & Policies	Strong Institutions	Financial Stewardship	Attractive Marketplace	Global Influence & Reputation	Helping People Rise
27	Israel	24	24	31	24	15	44	26
28	Poland	40	37	23	27	35	10	27
29	Lithuania	29	27	18	25	51	32	28
30	Latvia	31	44	20	33	54	35	25
31	Chile	13	32	18	34	21	31	55
32	Malaysia	19	31	36	18	26	38	54
33	Hungary	66	52	35	51	29	15	34
34	Italy	84	29	42	63	47	5	31
35	Bulgaria	53	35	40	30	50	27	41
36	Uruguay	26	36	33	50	32	51	39
37	Croatia	81	41	45	44	60	26	30
38	Mauritius	25	54	30	41	25	60	46
39	Romania	79	46	74	53	43	18	33
40	China	49	76	69	21	41	34	42
41	Georgia	45	34	32	59	37	49	49
42	Costa Rica	38	22	40	85	42	45	53
43	Russian Federation	73	45	70	35	77	39	40
44	Serbia	59	56	48	48	36	59	36
45	Kazakhstan	52	40	46	40	46	73	37
46	Thailand	75	43	68	30	47	55	46
47	Greece	88	48	38	71	102	13	35
48	Montenegro	30	42	51	76	39	68	50
49	Indonesia	36	47	59	36	45	54	73
50	Mexico	85	39	44	38	44	35	77
51	Panama	71	79	57	47	26	47	61
52	India	33	51	49	42	49	53	87

A shaded cell denotes that a country shares a joint pillar ranking.

Data cut-off for the 2022 Chandler Good Government Index was 1 December 2021.

# Country Rankings



Overall Rank

Overall Rank	Country	Leadership & Foresight	Robust Laws & Policies	Strong Institutions	Financial Stewardship	Attractive Marketplace	Global Influence & Reputation	Helping People Rise
53	Albania	48	69	55	62	56	65	45
54	Colombia	51	58	50	54	55	50	64
55	Rwanda	17	57	63	49	28	91	79
56	Vietnam	60	73	74	65	34	67	43
57	Armenia	42	38	64	67	75	75	52
58	Turkey	62	75	54	73	70	41	58
59	Ukraine	67	64	60	84	96	48	38
60	Botswana	16	71	43	23	81	72	86
61	Peru	82	66	56	37	59	41	83
	Jamaica	39	60	65	59	38	84	59
63	Philippines	56	63	52	39	61	69	71
64	Morocco	63	50	81	46	40	63	72
65	North Macedonia	69	67	52	64	80	69	48
66	Brazil	83	49	37	96	66	33	80
67	Argentina	46	72	39	99	98	43	57
68	Moldova	87	53	66	73	78	90	44
69	Jordan	55	55	78	77	71	94	50
70	South Africa	57	25	46	56	100	52	95
71	Senegal	35	78	72	66	51	95	84
72	Tunisia	70	68	71	83	94	77	62
73	Mongolia	90	59	61	92	82	82	65
	Ghana	47	74	62	89	57	89	90
	Egypt, Arab Rep.	60	83	77	90	66	62	81
76	El Salvador	95	91	58	94	83	57	63
77	Honduras	85	92	82	58	58	58	82
78	Namibia	44	62	79	75	83	79	92

A shaded cell denotes that a country shares a joint pillar ranking.

Data cut-off for the 2022 Chandler Good Government Index was 1 December 2021.

# Country Rankings



## Overall Rank

Overall Rank	Country	Leadership & Foresight	Robust Laws & Policies	Strong Institutions	Financial Stewardship	Attractive Marketplace	Global Influence & Reputation	Helping People Rise
79	Bosnia and Herzegovina	100	77	96	55	91	66	56
80	Kyrgyzstan	92	61	80	72	72	101	67
81	Sri Lanka	72	79	67	93	86	93	66
82	Kenya	54	65	85	81	66	78	93
83	Tanzania	57	95	90	52	74	76	91
	Ecuador	89	99	73	97	92	71	70
84	Uganda	65	69	76	82	63	86	99
	Tajikistan	49	81	103	70	69	103	74
87	Nicaragua	102	98	88	69	63	64	78
88	Algeria	78	101	84	94	94	86	60
89	Guatemala	103	87	86	68	88	56	85
90	Cambodia	96	100	99	57	65	96	75
91	Malawi	74	89	83	98	88	92	96
92	Madagascar	91	85	91	86	93	100	88
	Nepal	93	82	102	91	97	98	76
94	Pakistan	77	84	92	88	85	83	98
95	Lebanon	97	102	94	103	62	81	67
96	Burkina Faso	67	89	93	78	79	104	94
97	Ethiopia	64	97	95	61	90	99	101
98	Zambia	76	94	87	101	76	88	100
99	Mozambique	94	86	89	102	87	84	97
100	Iran, Islamic Rep.	101	103	97	79	103	80	69
101	Mali	80	93	99	79	72	102	103
102	Nigeria	98	87	101	86	99	74	104
103	Zimbabwe	98	96	98	100	101	97	102
104	Venezuela	104	104	104	104	104	61	89

A shaded cell denotes that a country shares a joint pillar ranking.

Data cut-off for the 2022 Chandler Good Government Index was 1 December 2021.

# Index Insights

*Strong links emerged in this year’s data between the CGGI’s rankings and COVID-19 outcomes, social mobility, and more.*

**T**he inaugural issue of the CGGI, published last year in the middle of the COVID-19 pandemic, was built on data that predated the pandemic. This year’s CGGI includes data that was captured from 104 countries during the pandemic, which means that comparing the two Indices offers a data-driven snapshot of how the pandemic has affected governments’ capabilities and outcomes.<sup>1</sup>

Such a range of data—the CGGI covers 104 countries, or roughly 90% of the world’s population—allows us to explore a variety of questions: How has COVID-19 affected certain government capabilities? Did countries with higher CGGI scores have better COVID-19 outcomes? What might this year’s results


tell us about the nature of good governance more broadly? Here’s what we found.

## Overall Country Rankings Were Relatively Stable—Despite a Volatile Year

Roughly one-third of countries in the CGGI (33) maintained the same overall ranking, including the top overall country (Finland) and the lowest-ranking (Venezuela). The biggest climbers were Mongolia and Ukraine, which each improved their overall ranking by eight places. The largest declines in the overall rankings occurred in Bosnia, Peru, and Zambia, which fell five spots from their 2021 rankings.

The relative stability of the overall rankings can be attributed partly to the CGGI’s focus on capabilities, rather than outcomes. When we refer to capabilities, we mean systems, institutions, processes, skills—elements that take years to build and develop, and which are more likely to gradually erode than abruptly collapse. This focus is by design: capabilities represent enduring foundations for excellence in governance; they are stable and lasting investments in the present and future. We do not expect to see country rankings soar and dip each year.


## Good Governments are Better Prepared for Pandemics



Sources: CGGI 2022; Preparedness ReadyScore, Prevent Epidemics.



## Good Governments Have Better Health Security



Sources: CGGI 2022; Global Health Security Index, 2021, Nuclear Threat Initiative and John Hopkins Center for Health Security.

### Good Governance and COVID-19

**1** *Good governance explains the difference in pandemic preparedness between countries better than GDP per capita*

According to the CGGI’s rankings, a country’s governance quality is a better predictor of whether it is prepared for pandemics than its income level. In other words, a well-governed country is more likely to be prepared for a pandemic than one which is simply wealthy.

A strong relationship emerged when we compared countries’ CGGI scores with their Prevent Epidemics ReadyScore, an assessment developed by Vital Strategies, a global public health organisation.

A similarly strong relationship was indicated when we compared countries’ overall CGGI scores with their rankings on the Global Health Security Index, an assessment developed by the Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security, the Nuclear Threat Initiative, and the Economist Intelligence Unit.

Such findings, while telling, might also be expected. Both the Global Health Security Index and the Prevent Epidemics ReadyScore assessments focus on preparedness, a kind of capability or capacity—just as the CGGI itself focuses on government capabilities.

As we shared in last year’s report and find once more in this year’s Index, there is a strong link between a government’s capabilities and the outcomes it produces. However, when it comes to COVID-19, the data below shows that the story is a little more complicated.

**2 There is a moderate relationship between good governance and COVID-19 outcomes**


When we compared a country’s overall CGGI score with the number of excess deaths per 100,000 people over 65 years old, a reasonably strong relationship appeared: **well-governed countries had fewer excess deaths from COVID-19 than poorly governed countries.**

Why did we choose excess deaths, rather than the official reported deaths—or why didn’t we choose another COVID-19 outcome altogether? For a number

of reasons, excess deaths are seen as a more accurate measure of a country’s COVID-19 response than its official reported deaths. Countries have different definitions of what constitutes an “official” COVID-related death. There is an important distinction, for instance, between someone dying from COVID-19 and someone dying with COVID-19. Excess deaths can also help account for demographic discrepancies between countries.


Among COVID-related outcomes, excess deaths are particularly robust and representative. Reported COVID-19 infection rates, for instance, depend heavily upon a country’s testing ability. Theoretically, a country that made testing readily available and accurately collected data would perform worse by that metric than a country that made no testing available or did not accurately collect the data. Overall assessment scores of a country’s pandemic response are often built on such data—not to mention that the nature of a “successful” response has changed as the virus has mutated and vaccines have become more available.

**Good Governments Tend to Have Better COVID-19 Outcomes**



Sources: CGGI 2022; Excess Deaths per 100,000 population over 65, The Economist.

## Good Governments Have the Capability to Perform More Tests



Sources: CGGI 2022; Total COVID-19 Tests per 1,000 People, Our World in Data.

As the chart shows, the relationship between good governance and COVID-19 outcomes is not as strong as the link between good governance and pandemic preparedness. This raises interesting questions not unique to COVID-19: why, and how, do capabilities translate—or fail to translate—into outcomes?

In this particular instance, part of the answer is unique to COVID-19. A successful pandemic response is complex and multi-faceted. It involves several factors: access and attitudes toward vaccinations, trust in government and public health bodies, leadership styles, and obesity rates, among many others. Not all of those are within a government’s control but can powerfully reinforce—or undercut—the effectiveness of a government’s response.

Another outcome that we analysed was COVID-19 testing per 1,000 people. Again, we found a fairly strong relationship with a government’s CGGI score: **good governments conducted more COVID-19 tests**. Given the CGGI’s focus on capabilities,

this suggests that well-governed countries have a higher institutional capability to manage, run, and coordinate tests.

### What Do This Year’s Findings Reveal About the Nature of Good Governance?

#### Three Capabilities Are Most Closely Correlated with Good Governance


The CGGI is built on 35 indicators drawn from more than 50 publicly available data sources. Of those 35 indicators, 26 focus on capabilities.

When we looked at the data this year, we found three capabilities in particular that were most closely correlated with a country’s overall CGGI score:

1. Rule of law
2. Property rights
3. Anti-corruption

These three capabilities are essential factors in determining good governance, and sturdy

## Good Governments Have Higher Social Mobility



Sources: CGGI 2022; Global Social Mobility Index, 2020, World Economic Forum.

foundations for national development and flourishing. Their presence suggests several other healthy behaviours and processes are being implemented—ones that prevent money from being siphoned, for instance, or the law being selectively applied. These are the cornerstones upon which trust-based societies and economies are built.

### The Outcome Most Closely Related with Good Governance: Social Mobility

While the CGGI is capability-focused, it also looks at nine equally weighted outcomes—because the outcomes a government produces clearly matter in assessing its performance. These nine outcomes comprise a pillar called “Helping People Rise”,

and range from education to healthcare, income inequality, and personal safety. They are vital components of human well-being and government performance, yet none was as closely related to good governance as social mobility, as measured by the World Economic Forum.

The CGGI defines social mobility as “the extent to which socio-economic circumstances at birth influence a person’s future status and prosperity.” Our findings suggest that good governance—not ideology, income-level, or geography—is what determines the extent to which countries create opportunities for their people to rise on the basis of their creativity, work ethic, and contribution.

# CGGI Data Process

The Chandler Good Government Index is a composite Index that measures the capability and effectiveness of governments. Our framework and dimensions (pillars) of good governance are derived from interviews and research on what capabilities and characteristics are most important for a government to perform its duties and succeed.

The 35 indicators are made up of more than 50 metrics—of which 31 metrics are qualitative data sources.

## METRICS 1

The Index uses the most relevant metrics for each indicator, as determined by government and data experts, research on the pillars, and a set of selection criteria:



The metric must be distributed in a free-to-access form in the public domain and online. This supports replicability and widespread use.



There must be a robust way to convert the data into a clear and relevant numerical format.




The metric should as far as possible be actionable and measure some quality or capability of governance that government leaders and officers can act on to improve performance.



The metric must provide data points for a large enough range of countries.

## TRANSFORMATION & NORMALISATION



Each metric is normalised to a 0-1 scale to create a standardised scale for comparison and aggregation. Indicators that comprise more than one metric are weighted equally, aggregated and rescaled again.

## 3




## IMPUTATION

Missing data from the metrics is imputed via several methods:

1. Looking for another indicator or study that measures a similar concept or theme.
2. Finding the average values of peer countries after filtering for geography and income.

This is a common step in many major global indices.

## 4 DATA AGGREGATION & RANKING



The final score of the Index is aggregated using a simple average of all 35 indicators. This means that each indicator in the Index has an equal weighting. Finally, countries are ranked.

THE PILLARS OF GOOD GOVERNANCE



# Leadership and Foresight

Leadership makes a difference. What public sector leaders decide, do, or say impacts public trust in government. Good leaders create and sustain cultures of integrity, competence and service. They have a clear sense of medium- and longer-term pathways for their government and country. They cultivate the foresight needed to anticipate emerging challenges and opportunities.



## Anti-Corruption

The control and prevention of the abuse of public power for private benefit



## Strategic Prioritisation

Developing longer-term plans and decision-making frameworks that focus on important goals and outcomes



## Long-Term Vision

The ability to develop and express the desired goals and destination for the nation over a longer period of time



## Innovation

The capacity for learning, and the generation, adaptation, and application of ideas



## Adaptability

Responding to various trends and changes with appropriate strategies, policies, and actions



## Ethical Leadership\*

Positive moral values and standards that leaders possess and demonstrate

\*Not included in 2022 rankings because of incomplete data. To be considered for inclusion in future years.

**Table 1.1 Leadership and Foresight Top Ten Countries**

Countries	Pillar Rank	Anti-Corruption	Long-Term Vision	Adaptability	Strategic Prioritisation	Innovation	CGGI Rank
Finland	1	3	8	4	2	2	1
Denmark	2	1	12	11	2	2	4
Singapore	3	3	1	1	56	60	3
Sweden	4	3	34	21	8	1	7
New Zealand	5	1	30	13	8	8	9
Norway	6	7	14	15	21	8	6
Ireland	7	18	13	20	21	2	11
United Arab Emirates	8	19	2	2	56	60	24
Switzerland	9	3	7	7	56	33	2
Netherlands	9	8	10	8	8	60	5

Similarly shaded cells indicate shared rankings in a given indicator.

# Robust Laws and Policies

Effective and consistent laws and public policies are essential to a well-functioning and prosperous country. Laws set the rules of the game for social and economic activities. A consistent, principled, accessible, and transparent justice system engenders investor confidence and public trust. Good governments have robust policymaking processes that are balanced, inclusive, and effective.



## Rule of Law

Whether laws are just and impartial, whether governments observe due process and are accountable to the laws, and whether justice is accessible to all



## Quality of Judiciary

Whether courts of law are efficient and independent from external influence



## Transparency



The public availability and accessibility of government information



## Regulatory Governance

The ability of governments to establish clear and representative policies and regulations

**Table 2.1 Robust Laws and Policies Top Ten Countries**

Countries	Pillar Rank	Rule of Law	Quality of Judiciary	Transparency	Regulatory Governance	CGGI Rank
 Norway	1	1	9	3	1	6
 Switzerland	2	3	2	14	1	2
 Finland	3	2	1	4	35	1
 Denmark	4	4	6	5	15	4
 Netherlands	5	8	3	7	15	5
 New Zealand	6	7	4	2	30	9
 Sweden	7	6	12	1	25	7
 Iceland	8	5	8	27	15	19
 Canada	9	12	14	15	1	13
 United States	10	22	10	9	1	18

Similarly shaded cells indicate shared rankings in a given indicator.





# Strong Institutions

Institutions, such as Ministries, public departments, and statutory agencies, are the cornerstones of a well-functioning government. Strong institutions are grounded in purpose, can coordinate and work effectively with others, analyse and act well on new information, and can translate plans and policies into concrete actions and programmes.



## Coordination

The ability to balance interests and objectives, and to ensure that multiple government agencies act coherently and in a collaborative manner



## Implementation

The degree to which a government can execute its own policies and meet its policy objectives



## Data Capability

The ability to gather and use data, and to provide quality digital and online services



## Quality of Bureaucracy

The capability and performance of the civil service, regardless of political and policy changes

**Table 3.1 Strong Institutions Top Ten Countries**

Countries	Pillar Rank	Coordination	Data Capability	Implementation	Quality of Bureaucracy	CGGI Rank
Finland	1	2	2	20	1	1
Australia	2	8	4	7	1	17
Denmark	3	6	3	7	7	4
New Zealand	4	5	12	7	7	9
Sweden	5	47	5	1	1	7
Canada	6	22	21	7	1	13
Norway	7	44	7	7	1	6
Switzerland	8	44	13	1	7	2
Estonia	9	9	9	1	23	14
Slovenia	10	9	15	7	20	23

Similarly shaded cells indicate shared rankings in a given indicator.

# Financial Stewardship

How governments acquire, allocate, and distribute public funds has far-reaching consequences for citizens and businesses. To sustain a country's prosperity, governments must ensure sound and prudent management of public revenue and expenditure. Those that manage and account for their spending well achieve better value for money. Good financial practices improve public trust in government. They also enhance confidence in a government's ability to repay debt, lowering the cost of sovereign borrowing.



## Government Debt

The debt dynamics and risk of a country, based on its debt-to-GDP levels, changes in debt, country credit ratings, and stage of economic development



## Country Budget Surplus

A government's average revenue and expenditure position, based on its fiscal balance, over a five-year period



## Spending Efficiency

The extent to which public spending translates into outcomes and services with minimal wastage



## Country Risk Premium

The risk of investing in a country due to its sovereign debt repayment ability and economic governance

**Table 4.1 Financial Stewardship Top Ten Countries**

Countries	Pillar Rank	Government Debt	Country Budget Surplus	Spending Efficiency	Country Risk Premium	CGGI Rank
Singapore	1	1	2	2	1	3
Norway	2	1	1	11	1	6
Germany	3	1	7	5	1	8
Switzerland	4	1	8	7	1	2
United Arab Emirates	5	1	26	1	14	24
Netherlands	6	1	10	8	1	5
New Zealand	7	1	15	6	1	9
Denmark	8	1	5	20	1	4
Sweden	9	1	9	16	1	7
Iceland	10	1	4	14	25	19

Similarly shaded cells indicate shared rankings in a given indicator.



# Attractive Marketplace

Competitive and attractive markets are essential for a flourishing economy and thriving nation. To cultivate them, governments must be able to secure and protect property rights, encourage and support domestic and cross-border economic activity, develop economic infrastructure, and design sound and stable regulations. Attractive marketplaces create jobs, innovation, and opportunities.



## Property Rights

The extent to which the legal rights to own and use physical and intellectual property are established and protected



## Macroeconomic Environment:

The maintenance of inflation and unemployment levels within optimal ranges, given the economic situation and needs



## Attracting Investments

The ability to attract foreign direct investment (FDI)



## Logistics Competence

The quality of logistics infrastructure and systems within a country



## Stable Business Regulations

The stability of policies and regulations concerning business activities



## Tax Efficiency\*

Whether taxes are set at reasonable levels, well-designed, and simple to comply with

\*Not included in 2022 rankings because of incomplete data. To be considered for inclusion in future years.

**Table 5.1 Attractive Marketplace Top Ten Countries**

Countries	Pillar Rank	Property Rights	Macro Environment	Attracting Investments	Logistics Competence	Stable Business Regulations	CGGI Rank
Singapore	1	2	32	3	7	2	3
Switzerland	2	3	8	8	12	1	2
Finland	3	1	76	32	10	3	1
Netherlands	4	5	27	47	6	5	5
Germany	5	19	4	34	1	12	8
Ireland	6	15	46	1	26	11	11
Denmark	7	6	10	63	8	7	4
Austria	8	4	3	82	4	4	12
United Kingdom	9	16	15	16	9	28	10
United States	10	14	9	46	13	10	18

Similarly shaded cells indicate shared rankings in a given indicator.

# Global Influence and Reputation

In a highly globalised world, a country depends on its international presence for trade, capital, information, opportunities, and international “space” to operate in. A government must effectively manage and safeguard its diplomatic networks, economic links, international partnerships, and country “brand”. While some countries may wield significant influence due to their size or strengths, others may benefit from their reputation as trusted and constructive global voices.



## International Trade

The freedom, access, and capabilities to buy and sell goods and services beyond national borders



## Passport Strength

The credibility of a nation’s passport, as measured by the number of visa-free arrangements that passport holders enjoy globally



## International Diplomacy

The extent of a nation’s diplomatic representation and presence abroad



## Nation Brand

The coherence of a country’s national tourism promotion, and its image and appeal to a variety of non-commercial stakeholders

**Table 6.1 Global Influence and Reputation Top Ten Countries**

Countries	Pillar Rank	International Trade	International Diplomacy	Passport Strength	Nation Brand	CGGI Rank
France	1	1	4	10	12	16
Germany	2	1	8	3	3	8
United Kingdom	3	24	6	18	17	10
Spain	4	1	11	5	8	26
Italy	5	1	9	5	16	34
Netherlands	6	1	17	10	5	5
Japan	7	39	1	1	24	15
United States	8	43	3	18	4	18
Portugal	9	1	27	10	2	25
Poland	10	1	22	26	14	28

Similarly shaded cells indicate shared rankings in a given indicator.



# Helping People Rise

Governments that use their capabilities to create conducive conditions for people from all walks of life to achieve their fullest potential are Helping People Rise. Good public outcomes mean enhanced opportunities and a better quality of life for people; these in turn improve trust in government. The CGGI measures outcomes that governments can have significant control over.



### Education

The literacy rate and years of schooling of the population



### Health

How long a newborn child can expect to live, given current health and mortality expectations



### Satisfaction with Public Services

Satisfaction with public transport, infrastructure, and education



### Personal Safety

The state's ability to protect its people from violent crime



### Environmental Performance

The safety and sustainability of a nation's ecosystems and environment



### Income Equality

The evenness of income distribution across the population



### Social Mobility

The extent to which socio-economic circumstances at birth influence a person's future status and prosperity



### Gender Gap

The extent to which both women and men can participate in, and benefit from, educational and economic opportunities



### Non-Discrimination

Freedom from discrimination, regardless of a person's socio-economic status, ethnicity, gender, identity, or faith

**Table 7.1 Helping People Rise Top Ten Countries**

Countries	Pillar Rank	Education	Health	Satisfaction with Public Services	Personal Safety	Environmental Performance	Income Equality	Social Mobility	Gender Gap	Non-Discrimination	CGGI Rank
Singapore	1	1	3	1	1	15	58	7	26	2	3
Finland	2	2	20	22	11	8	6	5	3	1	1
Norway	3	16	12	12	6	12	4	3	11	3	6
Switzerland	4	19	2	2	8	3	19	1	28	11	2
Netherlands	5	13	11	3	26	1	10	6	36	6	5
Denmark	6	14	25	10	13	4	11	2	22	8	4
Sweden	7	11	9	9	19	2	9	4	7	15	7
Slovenia	8	12	23	13	7	19	3	13	5	23	23
Austria	9	24	17	8	10	6	13	10	51	18	12
Iceland	10	22	5	25	5	42	1	12	1	10	19

Similarly shaded cells indicate shared rankings in a given indicator.



GOOD GOVERNANCE IN 2022: CHALLENGES AND THEMES



## COVID-19 and Its Impact

In the second year of the COVID-19 pandemic, global lockdowns and closed borders continued to be important means of containing the spread of the deadly coronavirus. As borders remained shut, industries such as tourism and hospitality struggled to recover. Education faced crisis as schools across the world shut down or shifted teaching online. Students lost valuable contact hours. Societies around the world were beset by soaring mental health challenges, exacerbated by isolation and affecting children and youth in particular. The rise in poverty and unemployment rates across the world contributed to the first-ever decline in the UN Sustainable Development Goals Index Score.<sup>1</sup>

While the proliferation of vaccines has helped reduce the risk of death, serious illness, and infection from the virus, vaccine inequality remains a major global concern. Even countries that had initial success in containing the virus have had to contend with widespread infections from new and more virulent variants. Many countries have adopted policies and approaches to manage living with the coronavirus as a fact of life.

The profound political, economic, and social challenges brought about by the pandemic have presented one of the greatest tests of governance today. To mitigate the most devastating impacts of the pandemic, countries have had to draw on capacities and principles represented by the CGGI Pillars of Good Governance. Sound Leadership and Foresight and dependable, Strong Institutions enabled countries to develop and

implement public health measures swiftly. Robust Laws and Policies and Financial Stewardship provided governments with the structures and resources to ameliorate the social and economic impacts of the pandemic, through financial assistance and other programmes targeted at businesses, households, and the vulnerable. Countries that handled the crisis effectively were able to keep borders relatively open, signalling that they remained an Attractive Marketplace with which to do business. In turn, this helped to maintain their Global Influence and Reputation. Prioritising people's lives and Helping People Rise as they continue to suffer from the pandemic have been crucial. These factors are critical in boosting public confidence and trust in government, and maintaining social resilience in a crisis.

### Adapting to the Crisis

One important aspect of good government is the ability of countries to anticipate shocks, adapt quickly, coordinate effectively, and communicate clearly in good time. Many countries that have coped well with COVID-19 had experienced epidemics in the past and could build on this knowledge; they had developed relatively strong epidemic response systems able to call on existing community structures and institutions to reach the grassroots. Given the broad-ranging impacts of the pandemic, effective inter-agency coordination, a component of Strong Institutions, stood governments in good stead. Some countries have even been able to improve their Global Influence and Reputation by bringing infections under relative control within their borders and by rendering assistance to other countries.

★ VIETNAM

Vietnam, praised widely for its ability to contain the pandemic in 2020, faced a surge of infections in 2021. The government ringfenced local outbreaks, set up an inter-agency taskforce to coordinate its pandemic response, and closed its border with China as early as February 2020.<sup>2</sup> Using a range of social media to spread knowledge about the virus, Vietnam’s authorities worked effectively to combat misinformation. The use of a loudspeaker system left over from the Vietnam War, supported by volunteer visits, ensured that healthcare information reached even those in isolated rural areas.

In addition to its strong centralised communication strategies, the central government empowered local governments to monitor infections and decide which public health measures to enforce.<sup>3</sup> Strong leadership boosted trust in government and nurtured stronger bonds of community solidarity, both essential to encouraging compliance with public health measures.

In the second half of 2021, new daily cases spiked from a few hundred to over 10,000, hitting economic

centres such as Hanoi. Growth forecasts for 2021 fell as the country battled its fourth wave of infection. Conscious of the socio-economic strain faced by its people, Vietnam has since adjusted its policy to one of living with COVID-19.

While effective leadership and continued sense of community solidarity remain important, adapting public health and social and economic policies are now key. As national vaccination numbers steadily increased, strict restrictions were removed from October 2021 onwards. Businesses were allowed to open according to their level of risk based on case numbers, while still observing fundamental precautions such as testing, contact tracing, and quarantine.

In December 2021, with over 80% of the adult population fully vaccinated, factories and industrial centres opened up. Vietnam’s borders fully opened in March 2022. Vietnam's handling of the pandemic is reflected in its CGGI ranking for Leadership and Foresight (60th), which is relatively high compared to similar-sized economies.



A man is tested for COVID-19 in Vung Tau, Vietnam, November 2021.



 **UAE**

The UAE has been noted for its consistently successful pandemic response, in particular its vaccine rollout, which has reached over 92% of its population.<sup>4</sup> With strong institutions and leadership, the UAE has succeeded in combating vaccine misinformation; its leaders were among the first in the country to be vaccinated, engendering public trust. The government worked closely with religious leaders to reassure the public that the vaccine was safe and permissible in



Citizens queue for the COVID-19 vaccine in Al Wasl, Dubai, UAE, March 2021.

Islam. Through a robust media campaign, officials provided factual vaccine information in the major languages spoken in the country: Arabic, Urdu, Filipino, Mandarin, and English.

In an early effort to build vaccine confidence, the UAE partnered with Sinopharm to complete Phase III trials as early as July 2020. A strong healthcare system and logistics capabilities for efficient vaccine distribution allowed health authorities to quickly approve and administer the vaccines as they became available.

As a major financial and commercial hub, the UAE also worked hard to keep its borders open. It remained one of the most open countries in the world throughout 2021, maintaining its Global Influence and Reputation. Open borders and logistics capacity led the UAE to be a major contributor to the COVAX scheme, facilitating the global movement of vaccines by building freezers to store vaccines transiting through Dubai and Abu Dhabi. Unsurprisingly, UAE ranks very highly for Coordination (3rd) under the CGGI's Strong Institutions pillar.<sup>5</sup>

### Innovative Social and Economic Policies

Governments have played a crucial role in mitigating the strain on social and economic life caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, Helping People Rise despite the obstacles to work and education presented by lockdowns and border closures. As the pandemic disrupted economic activity and livelihoods, many countries provided a safety net to vulnerable groups and supported small businesses and local industry.

Strong Institutions, Robust Laws and Policies, and Financial Stewardship in the years prior to the pandemic laid the foundations for these social protections to be extended, allowing countries to maintain collective solidarity in a crisis.<sup>6</sup>

 **POLAND**

In March 2020, the Polish government instituted the Tarcza Antykryzysowa (Anti-Crisis Shield), a series of measures across five areas to alleviate the impact of COVID-19, protecting jobs and people:

1. protection of workplaces and employee safety, including wage subsidies, temporary exemption from social insurance contributions, and lockdown

allowances for people on civil-law contracts and the self-employed;

2. financing entrepreneurs, including supporting liquidity and preferential loans, loans for companies operated by the self-employed;
3. health protection;
4. strengthening the financial system;
5. public investment.

In the latter half of 2020 the Anti-Crisis Shield was further updated to provide more support for different sectors and groups, such as the self-employed and those in the hospitality and tourism sectors.

To reduce bureaucratic barriers, the government also introduced simpler measures for social assistance claims. Extra cash benefits were given to vulnerable groups and those with disabilities. The government also suspended evictions and introduced rent subsidies.

Poland's relatively strong positions in the CGGI for Robust Laws and Policies (37th) and Strong Institutions (23rd) reflect its systematic ability to introduce and implement effective legislation to aid its people at a time of need.





South Africa’s social relief distress fund supported incomes of vulnerable groups not covered by other social grants.

 **SOUTH AFRICA**

The pandemic exacerbated South Africa’s already high rates of unemployment and poverty, pushing it into a recession in 2020.<sup>7</sup>

The government quickly recognised that its strict lockdown was putting a strain on the vulnerable, and took action to disburse grants rapidly, drawing on existing social assistance grants systems to provide relief.<sup>8</sup>

South Africa’s social benefits system provides unemployment insurance through income contributions to protect against job loss, and social assistance grants to the poor who cannot easily access the job market.

In March 2020, South Africa introduced a temporary social relief distress fund (SRD) to support incomes of vulnerable groups not covered by other social grants. While SRD was discontinued in late 2021, it had provided a safety net to millions of households.



 **URUGUAY**

In the Americas, Uruguay stands out for both its public health response and its comprehensive social support in the pandemic.

The government tapped the expertise of doctors, epidemiologists, and other specialists to successfully contain the virus. It also set up a COVID-19 Solidarity Fund aimed at covering the cost of public health emergency measures and payments of disability insurance and unemployment insurance benefits provided by the Social Security Bank (Banco de Previsión Social, BPS).

The Fund was partially financed through contributions (of between 5% and 20%) from the salaries of 15,000 public officials earning above a certain salary threshold. Private firms also made contributions to the fund, helping to bolster the government’s pandemic social support.

With an already strong social welfare system, the government focused its efforts on making policies flexible and broadening access to benefits. This allowed Uruguay to exercise fiscal



Healthcare workers explain vaccinations to a boy in Montevideo, Uruguay, January 2022.

prudence, enabling it to provide comprehensive social support while reducing the strain on the national coffers.<sup>9</sup>

## Planning for the Future

Planning for unforeseen crises is an important capability for governments; all the more so in the wake of a devastating pandemic. Such future-oriented planning leads governments to better identify emerging risks, spot systemic vulnerabilities and blind spots, and design inclusive policies for a more resilient society. In the CGGI these governance capacities are reflected under Pillar 1: Leadership and Foresight and Pillar 7: Helping People Rise.

Some countries are already thinking ahead to how they may become more attractive marketplaces by readying themselves for major market transformations, such as digitalisation, accelerated by the pandemic. By improving government coordination, preparing effective emergency preparedness plans and practising prudent financial stewardship, governments can build up their economic and social resilience, ahead of the next crisis.

### SINGAPORE

Decades of strong financial stewardship have afforded Singapore the wherewithal to soften the blow of the pandemic for businesses and households, through a range of assistance schemes.

In a series of pandemic budgets, Singapore provided differentiated wage support to companies by subsidising wages depending on the impact of the pandemic on an industry. Businesses were supported through measures such as tax rebates and loan support programmes, with the government taking on the majority of the risk for loans to companies.

At the household level, support measures ranged from universal cash payouts and additional cash grants to the less privileged, the elderly, and the self-employed, to job support schemes for recent graduates and those seeking work. Households received subsidies on utilities and children from low-income households received meal support. These measures helped minimise adverse long-term economic effects of the pandemic.<sup>10</sup>

Planning for a post-pandemic future, Singapore has also boosted investment in areas such as agri-business, as well as in ongoing digitalisation and innovation across various sectors. In the deep tech sector, the government pumped SGD 300 million (USD 221 million) into the Startup SG Equity scheme,

**By improving government coordination, preparing effective emergency preparedness plans and practising prudent financial stewardship, governments can build up their economic and social resilience, ahead of the next crisis.**

which works with the private sector to invest in Singapore-based start-ups that have intellectual property and global market potential.

During the pandemic, the government sought to accelerate the uptake of digital services. It focused on small businesses, students, and the elderly. The Ministry of Education brought forward its plans to provide all secondary school students with digital devices. Singapore's fourth pandemic support budget also included incentives to encourage residents, particularly the elderly, to acquire digital devices and learn digital skills.

Singapore's use of resources to mitigate the pandemic while building capacity for future growth speaks well of its long-term planning. It also ranks global 1st for Financial Stewardship in the CGGI this year.



Singapore-based Sesto Robotics is an autonomous mobile robot fleet management startup, which benefitted from the Startup SG Equity programme. Photo: Sesto Robotics.





Denmark's government invested more into telemedicine to help widen instant access to medical assistance.

 **DENMARK**

Known for its good government and strong healthcare and social care sector, the pandemic proved to be a test for the Danish government's risk anticipation and management capacities.<sup>11</sup> Formal evaluations indicated that existing government-wide pandemic preparedness plans were inadequate and out of date. Early in the pandemic, Denmark had to reconsider its first responses and modify its plans.<sup>12</sup>

Prior to the pandemic, Denmark's main legal framework for pandemic response was the Act on Measures against Infectious and Other Communicable Diseases (Epidemics Act). It called for a decentralised response to epidemics and proposed ad hoc commissions in each of the regions in Denmark, so that responses would be tailored to local conditions. This decentralised approach was difficult to carry out in practice as COVID-19 spread through Denmark. The government was moved to amend the Act and transfer decision-making authority to the Ministry for Health and the Elderly. The Act directed relevant ministries and departments such as law enforcement, aviation, environment, hospitals, and food security to assist the Minister in executing their responsibilities.

Additionally, the government set up a new agency in the Ministry of Justice, to ensure sufficient supply of medical stocks.<sup>13</sup>

As part of the EU's unprecedented and coordinated response to COVID-19, Denmark launched its recovery and resilience plan in mid-2021. The plan underscored Denmark's commitment to the green transition, digitalisation, and building economic and social resilience. The government has since further invested in telemedicine to help widen instant access to medical assistance.<sup>14</sup>

Denmark's approach to the pandemic is a reflection of its Strong Institutions, for which it ranks 3rd in the CGGI.

**Conclusion**

The various country insights above show that, confronted with a devastating global pandemic, countries of varying sizes and capacities were able to mount a strong and coherent response to contain the outbreak, minimise suffering, and prepare for the future. In doing so, they have drawn or built upon key capacities fundamental to good governance, as the CGGI indicates. Such capabilities offer countries and their governments the best chances of navigating a crisis, and subsequently a quicker recovery.



# Attracting Talent and Investment in Challenging Times

**S**killed labour and foreign investment are vital to the economic competitiveness and growth of many countries. They contribute to national income, enable high-quality technical innovations in new fields, and help create jobs for locals. These benefits have driven an increasing number of governments to enact labour market reforms; streamline laws, procedures, and costs for businesses; improve government transparency and reduce corruption; and to improve their general living standards: all in a bid to become ever more attractive to talent and investment from abroad relative to their peer countries.

In 2021, border control measures and a global economic downturn provoked by the COVID-19 pandemic complicated measures to cultivate talent and entice investors—already difficult tasks for many nations at the best of times. Apart from sectors most immediately impacted, such as tourism and global supply chains, the pandemic has also disrupted the global trade in services—closely linked with attracting and retaining foreign talent.<sup>1</sup> With the pandemic persisting into its second year, countries have had to learn to adapt while maintaining measures to attract the talent and investment they need to thrive. The governments

that have been particularly successful this past year in keeping their countries competitive are those that have made strides in areas reflected in the CGGI pillars, such as Robust Laws and Policies, Financial Stewardship, Attractive Marketplace, and Global Influence and Reputation.

Governments with already robust laws and policies that support the upskilling of the workforce and the inflow of investment were better placed to weather the pandemic.



Countries that had been prudent with public finances were more able to direct government spending towards tackling the pandemic, while keeping up innovative investment programmes and infrastructural development to boost investor confidence. Creating favourable conditions that encourage talent and investors to remain, despite the tumult of the pandemic, has helped successful countries enhance their allure as attractive marketplaces, ultimately advancing their global standing. In the past year, countries with good track records and innovative policies in these directions have included Israel, Rwanda, Mongolia, and Canada.

In examining the relative success of these four countries, two clear themes come to the fore. The first relates to adaptation: how policymakers have been able to look both inwardly and externally, enacting policies and regulations that boost investor confidence in their markets, while developing a workforce equipped to adapt to changing demands at work and adjust to mitigate significant skills gaps. The second is the way in which governments have been able to keep pace with the changing nature of work and innovation, given prevailing shifts in the values and needs that matter to both investors and skilled labour.

2021 has been a challenging year globally, but these countries have shown that drawing on strong policies and planning from pre-pandemic years, adapting them to meet the “new normal” of work, skills, and industry demand can future-proof the workforce and bolster economic growth. The stories behind the CGGI rankings demonstrate that countries, regardless of income and resources, can innovate to remain competitive.



 ISRAEL

## Revamping Its 'Start-Up Nation' to Boost Investor Confidence

Even before the COVID-19 pandemic, Israel's booming tech sector, a driving force of its economy, had been facing headwinds. Policymakers have had to adapt to changing needs as successful companies matured and the need for skilled workers burgeoned.<sup>2</sup> Although healthy late-stage investments in health, cyber and fintech industries were still flowing in, and increasing year on year, the total number of new start-ups and seed funding had been declining since 2015.<sup>3</sup>

Israel has also sought to diversify and decentralise the workforce in the tech sector—predominantly older and male—which accounts for about 10% of Israel's salaried employment and a quarter of tax revenues, to mitigate income inequality in the long term.<sup>4</sup> Israel's National Program for Increasing Skilled High Tech Personnel has created opportunities for more workers to transition to the sector, through industry-supported skills-focused coding camps for those seeking a career change.<sup>5</sup> The government, working with the private sector, has taken steps to train more people from historically underrepresented minority populations for the sector. It has also provided more opportunities, through job placements and other targeted programmes, to cultivate tech talent among women.<sup>6,7</sup> The Ministry for Social Equality's "Digital Israel" project also incentivises start-ups with minority representation, as well as those based outside typical commercial centres, to develop technical solutions to public sector challenges through sizeable grants.<sup>8</sup> Industry has been moved outside major cities to support both economic development and promote inclusion. Further measures by the country's Ministry of Welfare and Social Affairs include reintegrating older programmers into the fast-changing high-tech industry by opening up training opportunities.<sup>9</sup>

Rejuvenating tech sector talent has prompted Israeli policymakers to plan for shifts in work culture and preferences. Even before the pandemic, the Ministry of Environmental Protection established a committee to consider a nationwide remote work policy.<sup>10</sup> The



Tel Aviv is the start-up capital of Israel—one-third of the country's startups are located in the city.

committee found, for instance, that more people working from home led to a fall in costs associated with road congestion.<sup>11</sup> Such findings were further updated during the pandemic.

Attention to facilitating both local and international investment has fortified the tech sector, ensuring an abundance of employment opportunities that require effective policy mechanisms to fully realise.

A key to cementing Israel's position as a global leader in technological innovations, it seems, is its ability to adapt and evolve policies in light of changing circumstances. Fostering a healthy investment landscape, together with policies responsive to changing work trends, has set the country up for success in attracting and sustaining talent, now and in the future. The effectiveness of Israel's adaptive policymaking is reflected in the CGGI ranking for its capability in Attracting Investments (9th).

 **RWANDA**

## Upskilling the Workforce to Meet New Demands

For many years, the Rwandan government has worked to create conditions favourable to foreign investment, and to position the country as an attractive market for investment and business in East Africa.<sup>12</sup> These efforts continued even during the pandemic's initial impact.

Decades of good governance since the 1990s have led to successful policies addressing economic and development issues that have enabled inclusion in the workforce and nurtured a skilled and capable workforce for a range of industries.<sup>13</sup> A National Strategy for Transformation has also sought to bolster foreign direct investment and set Rwanda on a course for steady gains into the future.<sup>14</sup>

The country's National Skills Development and Employment Promotion Strategy, along with its predecessor the National Employment Program, aligns with the broader national development strategy, building skills and promoting employment to support economic transformation.<sup>15</sup> Structured across 11 schemes, the Strategy connects enterprises and public agencies, increasing opportunities to help close skills gaps.<sup>16</sup> By matching skill supply and demand, policymakers aim to support those already in the workforce, as well as young people entering it, in particular those enrolled in technical and vocational education and tertiary education. This represents a proactive and integrated approach to bolstering the nation's workforce as a key factor in attracting foreign direct investment and strengthening the small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) that make up a majority of firms in the Rwandan economy.<sup>17</sup>

The COVID-19 pandemic presented a formidable challenge. Rwanda's tourism industry, which had been witnessing steady growth, was devastated by the global collapse in travel.<sup>18</sup> The government's response to this crisis was swift and methodical. Rwanda's Chamber of Tourism quickly started training programmes for those in the hospitality sector who were placed on forced leave. The training enabled participants to acquire future-oriented skills, remain employable, and reintegrate into the workforce.<sup>19</sup> The government's skills

development approach focused on supporting SMEs, and enabling linkages with European and African investors. In addition, Rwanda took steps to leverage immigration policies to encourage the in-flow of highly skilled workers to fill demand gaps, with immigrants tending to enter high-skilled occupations at a faster rate.<sup>20</sup> In 2021, the country also opened up citizenship to anyone with special skills or talents determined to be in demand or of national interest.<sup>21</sup>

To attract foreign direct investment, the Rwandan government developed the Kigali Innovation City (KIC) in 2020, a commercial zone inspired by Silicon Valley, to promote development across technology and biotech firms in partnership with private investors and major universities.<sup>22</sup> In tandem, it also developed the Kigali International Financial Center (KIFC), to position Kigali as a premier financial centre, and established a framework of laws and regulations to promote the development of talent and the creation of leading technologies. In particular, these new policies promote the growth of start-up and medium-sized enterprises, while appealing to investors in high-tech industries through transparent schemes that incentivise the management and governance of investments.<sup>23</sup>

The KIC and the KIFC, backed by a new investment law launched in 2021, herald for Rwanda a new development approach that promotes a diverse private sector and start-up ecosystem while growing the relevant talent pool. These, along with further support measures such as adjustments to taxation, interest rates, and labour laws, set Rwanda on a durable course for the long-term attraction and retention of both talent and investment.<sup>24</sup>

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***Rwanda ranks 28th in this year's CGGI in its capability to serve as an Attractive Marketplace.***

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Rwanda ranks 28th in this year's CGGI in its capability to serve as an Attractive Marketplace. Its progress and decisiveness in response to rapidly changing circumstances, including the pandemic, signal the benefits of well coordinated, mutually reinforcing policies as key expressions of effective governance.




**MONGOLIA**

## Upholding the Rule of Law for Ease of Business

Mongolia has historically maintained clear regulations that promote free and fair foreign investment in the country. It has also aligned its policies with internationally accepted legal frameworks as a way to uphold the rule of law and provide confidence to foreign investors. The country acceded to the Washington Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes in 1996 and has been a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) since 1997.<sup>25</sup> Mongolia has been commended by WTO member states for its open trade and investment regime,<sup>26</sup> and is a signatory to the Agreement on Mutual Protection and Promotion of Investment together with over 40 countries. Publicly listed Mongolian companies abide by International Financial Reporting Standards.<sup>27</sup>

Between 1990 and 2012, Mongolia attracted over 12,000 foreign companies from 112 countries, injecting billions into the country, with a majority of investments in the mining sector.<sup>28</sup> Changes in policy, including a requirement for a minimum amount for foreign investment, have led to a decline in foreign investment since that time.<sup>29</sup>

To increase investor confidence, the government has taken steps to boost the robustness of its laws and policies. Mongolia's recently amended Investment law provides for a legal regime that gives both local and international investors freedom to invest in every sector of the economy.<sup>30</sup> In addition, the Investor Protection and Support Council and the Public-Private Sector Consultative Committee, now allows investors to bring complaints and grievances to the government for resolution.<sup>31</sup> These mechanisms ensure that investors' claims are fairly heard by an independent referee and boost investor confidence in both the judicial system and governance structures by ensuring a free and fair playing field that preserves the rights of all parties.

Attractive markets can often be undermined by regulatory procedures that may be burdensome to investors and create unnecessary barriers. Mongolia has responded to this by creating a consolidated system to support prospective and existing investors—

the Invest in Mongolia One-stop Service Center.<sup>32</sup> This facility simplifies processes and reduces barriers to investment, providing services that range from general information and advice on immigration, taxation, and other legal requirements, to maintaining an investor response e-system for grievances related to public services.<sup>33</sup> It also disseminates information about minor changes in policy or procedures relating to investment that may occur from time to time. Mongolia has also simplified the process of setting up a new business.<sup>34</sup>

Mongolia's efforts to promote good governance through clear and robust laws and policies have opened the door to foreign investors who need to depend on transparency, accountability, and consistency in the rules governing investments. These include assurances that local laws will abide by international legal standards and mechanisms, and that information about how to invest, as well as avenues for raising questions and concerns, are easy to navigate for foreign investors.

These efforts to strengthen its rule of law, financial stewardship and other factors supporting long-term economic growth are reflected in Mongolia's rankings in the relevant CGGI governance indicators, especially when compared with other similarly sized economies.



Mongolia's capital Ulaanbaatar is home to half of the country's population.





The Future Skills initiative offers upskilling opportunities to match workforce skills with future-oriented needs.

 CANADA

## Facilitating Immigration and Adapting Its Workforce to Stay Competitive

Canada's policymakers have long been assessing the technical skills needed to fully leverage the Fourth Industrial Revolution. Recognising the importance of skilled immigration for sustaining industrial development and an attractive marketplace,<sup>35</sup> Canada had already been revamping its immigration policies to better suit the evolving needs of the private sector, since before the pandemic. With a shortage of domestic talent in high skilled professions, especially in high-tech domains such as artificial intelligence and software development tools. Canada has seen a rise in foreign talent to fill the gap.<sup>36</sup> The resilience of the Canadian tech sector to the impacts of COVID-19 has further affirmed the need to maintain immigration policies that feed the growing demand for talent.<sup>37</sup>

In 2017, the Canadian Government launched its Global Skills Strategy, which was designed to increase the supply of skilled talent. The program significantly cut processing times for skilled workers in target sectors, provided a short-term work authorisation route for select workers entering the country, and

created a new work authorisation route for universities and research firms to hire researchers for 120-day periods.<sup>38</sup> The scheme also identified general skills in demand as well as unique talent needs of particular companies and industries, and dedicated a channel to employers bringing significant investment into the country.<sup>39</sup> Canada also embraced an immigration policy enabling international students graduating with in-demand credentials to stay and work in Canada. Around 27% of international students who study in Canada become permanent residents, with permission to live and work in Canada long term.<sup>40</sup>

A shift in overall demand from middle to high-skill workers, with automation challenging the labour market in Canada, has led to new initiatives to support workers retraining and transitioning to high-skilled professions. One such move is the Future Skills initiative, which offers upskilling opportunities, focusing on the requirements of small and medium enterprises,<sup>41</sup> and partners with universities and the private sector to match workforce skills with future-oriented needs.<sup>42</sup> Other innovative government measures include the Tech Diversity Online scheme, which taps into the skills of those living with a disability by lowering the barriers of entry into the sector.<sup>43</sup>

Canada's measures to prepare workers for future industry needs, alongside clear and efficient policies to streamline skilled immigration, bolster its ability to maintain an Attractive Marketplace (CGGI 22nd), despite prevailing global challenges.





A view of the Herzliya business district, which has attracted many major global high-tech company offices, Israel, August 2018.

## GOVERNANCE IN PRACTICE

# Innovation as Natural Resource: Israel's Journey



**URI GABAI**  
CEO  
Start-Up Nation Policy Institute

*Uri Gabai is CEO of Start-Up Nation Policy Institute, an independent think-tank focusing on Israel's innovation ecosystem.*

**E**ra-defining events are usually difficult to recognise when you're part of them. Yet, even in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic, it is abundantly clear that it is an historical event. While the death toll alone is overwhelming, the pandemic's effects have already far exceeded the realm of healthcare.

Quarantines, lockdowns, and fear led the world, for the first time, to treat digital and online as the default. E-commerce is accelerating at an unprecedented

pace, routine online check-ins with our doctors are becoming common practice, and hybrid modes of work are becoming standard in many industries. The cultural change brought about by the pandemic is bringing us closer to predictions from the early days of the internet that envisioned a world in which physical distance is far less important. It is therefore not a coincidence that during this period Facebook launched its vision of the metaverse, a totally virtual world. In retrospect, the pandemic will mark the beginning of the "real digital age".

This transition from physical to digital will further accelerate the global innovation race in which countries and regions compete to build technological innovation ecosystems that attract ideas, businesses, and talent from around the world. Strong innovation ecosystems will spearhead the efforts to meet the rising global demand for technologically innovative solutions that will form the new digital world.



### A Surprising Outlier

At the forefront of this race for innovation are regions and cities like Silicon Valley, London, Beijing, Tokyo, and Boston. One name stands out on this shortlist. It is that of a small island-like country of fewer than 10 million people, far from any substantial markets. A surprising outlier in the innovation sphere, Israel leads the world in R&D investments (4.9% of GDP) and start-up density (one per 1,700 people).

Israel's tech ecosystem emerged from the pandemic with unprecedented performance. In 2021, Israeli tech companies raised USD 27 billion in venture capital funding, two and a half times more than in 2020 and four times more than the average of 2017–2019. As a result, Israel—whose population represents only 0.1% of that of the world—has more than 5% of the world's tech unicorns (private companies with a value of over USD 1 billion).

### Israel's Secret Sauce

How has a country like Israel achieved this innovation miracle? Many compelling answers have been proposed: mandatory military service, the elusive Jewish entrepreneurial gene, or the famous Israeli "chutzpah". All fail to provide a convincing answer to why the Israeli innovation journey began when it did—until the 1990s Israel was a rather average

nation when it came to innovation—and why countries with similar cultural characteristics have not achieved the same level of success.

My professional experience in the Israeli government, and especially in Israel's Innovation Authority, have led me to think that Israel's "secret sauce" lies in bold yet pragmatic innovation policies. In fact, I believe that Israel is one of the best examples of how public-private partnership (PPP) can create and nurture a leading innovation ecosystem.

From the 1980s, Israel advanced an industrial R&D policy that was to pay off in the early 1990s. The rise of the internet—for which Israel had unique capabilities which were fostered in the army's intelligence unit—and an influx of highly skilled immigrants from the former Soviet Union, combined to create the ideal conditions for the emergence of strong technological activity. The Israeli government catalysed the high-tech sector with seminal schemes like Yozma and the Incubators Program, which supported entrepreneurship and venture capital investment.

The PPP model in which Israel has excelled was built on three pillars: forming a consensus around a clear and ambitious vision, creating an execution mechanism in the form of a government entity with the mandate and capabilities to advance policy measures to achieve the vision, and the continuous adaptation of the policies to the needs of the ecosystem. This "policy trio" of vision–execution–adaptation transformed Israel into an innovation powerhouse in just a decade.

### Laser-Focused Policy

Despite its success, the Israeli innovation model is far from perfect. In fact, as every policymaker knows, there are no perfect innovation models or flawless policies; every policy measure is a trade-off. Israel's innovation policy in the last few decades is no exception. It was a one-dimensional policy that preferred some activities over others. The vision–execution–adaptation policy trio focused almost exclusively on increasing entrepreneurship and industrial R&D. The Office of the Chief Scientist (OCS)—the execution mechanism that led Israel's innovation policy—launched many programmes over the years but their emphasis on R&D was a constant.

This laser-focus proved quite efficient: Israel's civilian investment in R&D jumped from 2.2% of GDP in 1991 to 4.1% a decade later and has remained above 4%

almost every year since. In comparison, the OECD average during this period was less than 2.5% of GDP. Moreover, the share of R&D performed by the private sector rose steadily from 50% in the beginning of the 1990s to 89% in 2018.

### The Flip Side

Unfortunately, other aspects of the ecosystem didn't evolve quite as smoothly. Although Israel became an expert in launching tech start-ups—earning itself the justified “Start-Up Nation” brand—it fell short in scaling these companies up. The standard success story of an Israeli start-up ended with an acquisition by a tech giant, leaving the founders rich but the ecosystem lacking. This was the story of path-breaking companies such as Waze, which pioneered driving navigation apps and was acquired by Google in 2013 for more than USD 1 billion. PrimeSense, the company behind Microsoft's Kinect device, one of the fastest-selling electronic devices in history, met the same fate when it was acquired by Apple to boost its face recognition technology.

These acquisitions led to another challenge. In many cases, they were the cornerstone for the acquiring company's presence in Israel. The result was that Israel gradually became the world's “tech lab”, where multinational companies clamoured to open R&D centres. In the 2010s, the number of R&D centres in Israel more than doubled, totalling 380 in 2020. While this is a sign of the ecosystem's excellence, it also made Israeli high-tech less Israeli. The multinationals helped foster cutting-edge technologies in Israel, but at the same time curbed the potential of these technologies to ever become the core of scaled-up Israeli tech companies.

Another troubling aspect has been the gradual formation of a dual economy: a high-productivity, dynamic and engaging tech industry, well connected and widely respected globally, with the rest of the economy by and large low in productivity. This widening gap isn't accidental. In a small economy like Israel, most innovative and high-productivity resources are attracted to the sector that is most visibly succeeding. So, investments and talent are drawn to the big tech-magnet in the centre of the country, leaving other sectors and regions behind. The 10% of the labour-force engaged in the high-tech industry is now earning three times the average salary, and the gap is constantly growing. Add to that the fact that

most tech employees are young men who reside in the centre of the country, and this becomes a matter of social inequality.

This would be less troubling if the quality of life for all Israelis improved as a result of the booming tech industry. But in reality, spillovers from advanced technologies developed by the Israeli tech industry are very limited. For example, despite developing cutting-edge smart transportation solutions, Tel Aviv is one of the most congested cities in the world. The picture is similar in financial services: Israel accounts for more than 5% of global fintech venture capital investments, but its financial institutions are far from innovative. Despite strong digital health and advanced manufacturing R&D, most Israeli innovation in the healthcare and manufacturing sectors only targets markets abroad.

While all these challenges vary by nature, they have one thing in common—none of them can be solved exclusively by the “traditional” innovation policy focusing on government R&D grants.

### Changing Course

In the mid-2010s, the Israeli government, and especially the OCS, recognised the gap between the economy's needs and the policies enacted since the 1990s. This wasn't easy to acknowledge. During that period, I served as the Head of Strategy at the OCS, and I can attest that most policymakers did not see the sense in changing a policy that was so successful. However, under the leadership of several forward-thinking policymakers, especially the then Chief Scientist Avi Hasson and the then Minister of Economy Naftali Bennett (currently Israel's Prime Minister), the necessary strategic shift took place. It resulted in the foundation of the Israel Innovation Authority with a wider mandate and a more diverse set of policy tools.

The Innovation Authority gradually expanded its focus from R&D to innovation and productivity. It recognised that without enabling larger parts of the population to work in innovative firms, the tech industry would not grow, and Israel's productivity would not catch up with leading nations. The Innovation Authority also turned more of its attention to facilitating the growth of Israeli companies, celebrating IPOs over being acquired by multinational companies.

The last major policy shift was acknowledging that innovation is Israel's “natural resource”. And



The Israel Innovation Authority and Turin, Italy, announce a strategic collaboration to promote and develop innovative projects. Pictured: Ami Appelbaum, Chief Scientist and Chairman of the Board of Israel Innovation Authority (left), and Chiara Appendino, then Mayor of Turin, 28 November 2019.

although innovation is primarily evident in the high-tech industry, it can and should be the engine of every industry and sector in the Israeli economy.

#### Bottom Line

Establishing, growing, and nurturing an innovation ecosystem is a journey. Israel's journey is indeed unique, but it is a good model for other countries to learn from too. As Israel started its innovation journey well before other nations, it can serve as a canary in the coalmine, signalling what may lie ahead for other countries in their innovation ecosystem's evolution.

That said, Israel's own journey is far from over. Changing the course of innovation policy was just the beginning. It will take many more years of trial and error before the government strikes the right balance. This is the nature of innovation policies which try to accommodate slow-moving government operations with the shifting sands of the global technological arena. But without trying, there is no hope of leading the global innovation race and reaping the fruits of the digital age.

I believe that governments can and should be bolder, especially in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic. The challenges ahead are immense—from dealing with the implications of artificial intelligence and autonomous machines, to updating education systems to fit modern employment needs and addressing climate change. Only strong public-private partnerships can unleash the animal spirits of the private market, while directing some of these spirits towards global and humanitarian challenges.

In this, the public sector needs help. NGOs and civil society must play a bigger role in crafting the future. Paraphrasing Clemenceau's famous quote: technology and innovation are too important to be left to tech companies. Start-Up Nation Policy Institute, which I lead, was established to help Israeli policymakers steer the country's innovation journey in the right direction. Our vision is to turn Israel's technological miracle into an economic and social one. We try to do this through data-backed policy recommendations and open and honest debate around innovation-related issues. It is our hope that this contribution will aid in the discourse.

## GOVERNANCE IN PRACTICE

# Realising Public-Private Partnerships



**VŨ QUỲNH LÊ**  
Deputy Director General  
Public Procurement Agency,  
Ministry of Planning and Investment

Vũ Quỳnh Lê is involved in attracting private investment in public infrastructure and services through public-private partnerships (PPP). She has participated extensively in efforts to draft the legal documents relating to Vietnam's PPP framework, including: the National Assembly's PPP Law, the Government's PPP Decree, and her Ministry's PPP Circular. Her role also involves proposing and preparing bidding regulations for investor selection; these will become part of the Law on Procurement, which is under revision.

Vietnam needs infrastructure development to promote economic growth. Mobilising private investment in this area is challenging. In my experience, there is a good level of private sector interest, with significant investments made, but there are still some shortcomings to address.

## Challenges and Opportunities

PPPs are rewarding but challenging relationships to manage. Success requires both the public and private sectors to know and be capable of carrying out their respective roles.

For instance, public servants may not always understand how the private sector does business. They need to at least grasp some basic financial and economic principles. Sometimes there might be views presented to avoid market competition, because it is regarded as a more cumbersome and inefficient process, compared with simply appointing a trusted vendor or partner—even though that may not be the



Planning and Investment Minister Nguyen Chi Dung addresses the annual Vietnam Business Forum, Hanoi, February 2022.

most effective or accountable solution. The fact is, PPP projects are more prone to disputes, which need to be managed carefully.

A number of training courses and other activities have attempted to raise awareness among public agencies and civil servants about the differences in mindset between the public and private sectors, but their content and the skills they seek to develop need to be made more directly relevant to participants' daily work. We are always looking to involve experts from the private sector to engage in dialogue with the public sector, including those with legal and financial experience, so that together we can find our way to an appropriate culture of partnership.

## Public-Private Partnerships: Balancing Priorities

Vietnam has introduced a number of laws, which are being further enhanced, to resolve some of these issues and to offer a better balance between the public private sectors. Taken together, these laws lay a solid groundwork for medium- to long-term partnerships that are PPP contracts.



For example, the PPP Law 2020 has provisions to require:

1. a feasibility and project impact study that consults with affected communities and professional societies;
2. that service providers treat all users of public services equally, with none denied service.
3. that PPP projects will be overseen by the constitutionally established Vietnamese Fatherland Front.

Vietnam's 2013 Procurement Law also stipulates that one of the criteria for investor selection is that it should benefit the State and society.

These provisions, which balance the priorities of private enterprise with the public good, are embedded in our legal documents and contracts at all levels. Such goals speak to Vietnam's aim to develop a market economy with a socialist orientation.

In terms of implementing these goals, we are working to prepare and promote PPP investment

opportunities/projects, build up appropriate capacity for PPP implementation, and make better use of the PPP legal framework. The current priority of the Public Procurement Agency is to upgrade the national online bidding platform to make government procurement transactions faster and more efficient. In parallel, we are revising our Law on Procurement to further resolve technical issues, and make procurement processes competitive, fair, and transparent, with tangible economic efficiencies.

With the strong endorsement and leadership of our current Prime Minister and the Cabinet, there are many promising opportunities ahead of us.

### Making a Real Difference

In the past year, with the COVID-19 outbreak, we have seen different ways in which strong partnerships across sectors have made a difference to Vietnam. While the various aid packages have helped, the real leverage has come from the genuine desire and effort of businesses and citizens to face the pandemic and to solve problems together. Everyone pulled together to face this crisis.

For instance, many provinces worked hand-in-hand with private companies to promote and arrange quarantine and safe distancing measures, so that production lines could continue safely. The labour unions helped to resolve labour conflicts during this difficult time. On my part, although we could not meet our partners or one another face to face, we tried to resolve our cases in as timely a manner as possible, despite the rising and urgent workload. Many of my colleagues (and sometimes I was part of these efforts) were in government working sessions, chaired by top Ministry officials or Cabinet members, that went on until midnight.

When I first received my examination results allowing my entry into my Ministry two decades ago, my parents said the job would suit my character. My career has been in procurement, which is a government function where the risk of corruption is generally considered to be higher. But I have always kept to one principle: never step past the red line.

I see this role as a chance to do good and advance my country's development. While the pay may not be as good as the private sector, the outcome of one's efforts as a public servant is incomparable.

# Effective Governance in the Digital Age

**T**he COVID-19 pandemic has given us a glimpse into the digital future. It has driven many businesses, public services, and schools to operate online. Millions of people are now meeting, working, studying, and shopping using digital tools. Track-and-trace mobile applications help governments to monitor and manage the spread of the virus. Digital disruptions are transforming societies and economies, bringing new complexities that governments must navigate.

The global economy is clearly headed towards a digital destiny, but the rewards will be unevenly spread. Digital divides, along socioeconomic, gender, and geographical lines, present new forms of inequality and social challenge. As the online world has grown, it has also become less trustworthy, as security breaches, scams, and misinformation proliferate, and social media amplifies polarisation. While the early days of the internet were largely unregulated, many countries are now implementing

their own versions of digital sovereignty. Data has been touted as the new oil of the global economy, over which there are ongoing debates around access, use, and ownership. Yet even as concerns coalesce around the massive market, technology, and information power wielded by tech giants, new opportunities, business models, and products and services are unfolding as economies digitalise.

Digital by default—a term popularised by the UK’s Government Digital Service—has become an overriding imperative for governments everywhere. Digital technologies allow governments to better serve their citizens, lower the burden and costs of transactions, and enhance public trust, especially as new generations of digital natives emerge. They offer reform-minded governments new opportunities and tools to engage citizens and businesses, enhance transparency and accountability, and to counter corruption and fraud.

Governments face two distinct but interrelated aspects of digital transformation: they have to effectively deploy digital technologies in service of public governance, while also practising good governance over digital technologies,<sup>1</sup> managing the digital space appropriately. In a digital age, effective governance matters more than ever.

## Deeper Dive into Government Digitalisation

The digital transformation of governments continues further as the public sector shifts from an efficiency-oriented e-government approach—using digital technologies to improve services but without fundamental changes to government operations—towards a more open, collaborative, and innovative digital government that is rethinking and redesigning its interactions with citizens.

Digital technologies are being embedded throughout, from front-end public service delivery to back-end government operations. Countries are at various points in this journey, and the quality of government leadership, institutions, and laws and policies, are crucial in making this transition successfully.







Many of Estonia's citizens have grown up alongside the country's early commitment to digital innovation. Photo: e-estonia.com.

## ESTONIA

Estonia, ranked third in the 2020 United Nations (UN) E-Government Development Index (EGDI), is considered a “Stand-Out” country in the Digital Evolution Scorecard which categorises 90 economies into four zones based on their current state and momentum of digitalisation.<sup>2</sup>

The government has been honing its “e-Estonia” digital governance and digital society approach for some time, reinforcing its strengths in government Leadership and Foresight pillar (CGGI 12th), especially Strategic Prioritisation (1st) and Innovation (2nd), and its Strong Institutions (9th), especially in terms of Implementation (1st), Coordination (9th), and Data Capability (9th).

As early as 2002, it launched digital e-signatures and digital IDs for residents. It adopted a “once-only” principle of asking citizens only once for the same information—other government agencies must obtain the information from the agency that holds it. Beyond convenience to citizens, this innovation has also encouraged data-sharing within the Estonian public sector, with various government agencies serving as custodians of data and a single source of factual information. This principle has since been adopted as EU-wide policy.

***As early as 2002, Estonia launched digital e-signatures and digital IDs for residents. Beyond convenience to citizens, this innovation has also encouraged data-sharing within the Estonian public sector, with various government agencies serving as custodians of data and a single source of factual information. This principle has since been adopted as EU-wide policy.***

Estonia has continued to innovate in service delivery. It redesigned its family benefits system to take a more citizen-oriented life-event approach, rather than a traditional department-based approach. The Social Insurance Board (SIB) automated its IT systems in 2019 to allow it to regularly search for relevant data in various government databases, such as new births from the Estonian National Population Register, and parents' income and employment status from the Tax and Customs Board. The exchange of data is based on the digital identity system and adheres to the once-only principle.




**CHILE**

Within Latin America and the Caribbean, the Chilean government has emerged as the region's top performer in the CGGI. In the Leadership and Foresight pillar, Chile outperforms countries like NZ, Norway and Singapore, particularly in Innovation (2nd) and Strategic Prioritisation (8th). Chile's public sector institutions are also noted for their capabilities in cross-agency Coordination (9th) and Implementation (7th) under the CGGI's Strong Institutions pillar (18th). It is also a GovTech Leader in the World Bank's GovTech Maturity Index, which looks at how 198 economies are performing across core government systems, public service delivery and citizen engagement.<sup>3</sup>



A mobile office run by Chile's Instituto de Previsión Social (IPS) arrives in Panguipulli in the south of Chile, February 2021. Photo: IPS official site.

The Chilean government recognised early the strategic advantage of digitalising the public sector. It linked its digital government strategic plan to the broader 2012 Agenda of State Modernisation. ChileAtiende, which launched in the same year as a cross-governmental single point of contact for 25 public services using a digital platform, alongside a call centre and physical offices. This initiative represented a key effort to redesign processes to be citizen-centric, improve access to services, and cut costs. The government also established an institutional framework that would support its digital ambitions.

A Digital Government Division was created within the Ministry General Secretariat of the Presidency to spearhead digitalisation, giving it political impetus. The division's participation in the Committee of the State Modernisation Programme helped ensure that digitalisation would permeate Chile's public sector modernisation initiative.

These efforts have been sustained in subsequent digitalisation plans. For instance, the Agenda Digital 2020, launched in 2015, improved the digital channels of ChileAtiende, expanded mobile services, further simplified procedures, and pushed for a single authentication mechanism for citizens. In late 2019, Chile enacted legislation obliging the government to take a digital-first approach for public services. All of its government services are expected to be digitalised by 2023.

### Enhancing Government Accountability and Citizen Engagement Through Digital Inclusion

The expansion of digital governance is helping countries to deepen and broaden their engagement with citizens and businesses. While digital tools can help improve transparency, monitor service quality, combat corruption and tackle fraud, digitalisation must work in concert with institutional capacities and incentives to change behaviours.

Digital access has improved globally, but more than a third of the world's population, or 2.9 billion people, remained offline in 2021.<sup>4</sup> Even among those who are connected, internet access may be of poor quality and infrequent. Access remains still relatively low in many developing countries despite improvements in income, often because of a lack

of investment in digital infrastructure. The digital divide is also gendered—in the least developed countries, only 19% of women are online compared to 31% of men.<sup>5</sup>


**AUSTRIA**

Among developed economies, Austria has made significant improvement in engaging with citizens and businesses digitally. Between 2018 and 2020, it leaped from 45th to 6th place in the UNE-Participation Index (EPI), which considers how governments use online services to provide information, consult, and involve citizens in decision-making. In the CGGI's outcomes-based pillar, Helping People Rise, Austria ranks highly particularly for Satisfaction with Public Service (8th) and Social Mobility (10th).



Residents of Vienna took part in a digital consultation to contribute ideas on how tech could improve life in the city.

The City of Vienna launched its Digital Agenda Vienna in 2016 as an e-participation initiative to engage directly with the public in the policy-making process. In 2019, Vienna embarked on a new Digital Agenda Vienna 2025 with the aim of establishing the city as Europe's capital of digitalisation. The city developed an electronic participation tool to seek ideas from citizens, the business community, research institutions, and city administration employees on how the use of technology could improve life in Vienna. This yielded eight flagship projects for the city, such as the mobile app Sag's Wien, for citizens to communicate easily and quickly with the city administration.

Digital Agenda Vienna is positioned as an "open working document" where the city's digitalisation priorities continue to evolve.

## VIETNAM

Vietnam has narrowed its digital divide in recent years, thanks to significant investments in infrastructure for mobile data availability and coverage. For example, Vietnam was one of the most improved countries in the 2021 Roland Berger Digital Inclusion Index, which assessed 82 countries in terms of accessibility, affordability, ability (digital literacy), and attitude (trust and enthusiasm for information and communications technology (ICT)).<sup>6</sup> Vietnam also ranks 40th for Long-Term Vision, compared to its 56th overall ranking in the CGGI.

The government has ambitious plans for digitalisation, with a target for the digital economy to contribute about 30% of GDP and raise productivity by an average of 7.5% annually. With digital disruptions accelerating job displacement, such as the loss of lower-cost manufacturing jobs, improving digital inclusion will better prepare the Vietnamese people to meet challenges such as shrinking Vietnam's gender and income gap and strengthening education.

The government has committed to providing universal connectivity coverage throughout the country, rolling out the first universal service programme costing VND 5 trillion (USD 219 million) between 2005 and 2010. Since then, the government has invested another VND 7.3 trillion (USD 319 million) in broadband infrastructure nationwide, so that 99% of communities

that have access to electricity, especially remote, isolated areas and disadvantaged areas, can also have broadband access. Compared to other developing countries, the rural-urban divide in internet access is smaller; though only 38% of the population is urban, internet penetration in Vietnam is more than 70%.

Vietnam also has a relatively Attractive Marketplace (34th). Competition among telcos in its growing mobile data market is helping to drive down prices and improve affordability. Spending on education is also improving digital literacy through schools, industry partnerships and placements. One approach adopted by the government is to develop public private partnerships with companies such as Microsoft to roll out digital skills training and promote digital inclusion for rural students and ethnic minorities.



The government develops public private partnerships to promote digital inclusion for rural students and ethnic minorities.



## Safeguarding Trust Online and Managing Data Flows

Trust is in short supply online. The 2022 Edelman Trust Barometer suggests that distrust proliferates as people come to rely on a hyper-partisan, tribal framework for decision-making, and algorithms that serve up information reinforce partisan tendencies.<sup>7</sup> While an initially laissez-faire approach has allowed private companies to hyperscale digital platforms and hoover up data, governments are now seeking to impose national or regional rules on digital flows and assets, with implications for the cross-border digital trade. At the heart of this tussle lie questions of access to ownership of, and control over, the ever-growing volumes of data generated digitally.

### FINLAND

Finland, a country of 5.6 million, has one of the highest internet penetration rates globally. Yet it also has the highest overall level of trust in their country's news media, at 65%, among countries surveyed in the Reuters Institute's Digital News Report 2021.<sup>8</sup>

The Finnish government has a multi-pronged, cross-sector approach to prepare citizens for the complexities of today's digital media landscape. They have positioned the fight against misinformation as the responsibility of every Finn. An anti-fake news initiative was launched in 2014 with courses aimed

at educating residents, students, journalists, and politicians on countermeasures to false information. The government also reformed the education system to promote critical thinking.

In 2018, the Finnish courts became the first in the EU to prosecute those responsible for disinformation campaigns in a case involving a smear campaign against a Finnish journalist. For the 2019 parliamentary elections, the Prime Minister's Office, the Ministry of Justice, and the Security Committee collaborated to launch a communications campaign to raise public awareness of potential election interference.

These policies have positioned Finland at the top of the Media Literacy Index, which measures society's resilience to fake news and disinformation in 35 European countries.

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***The Finnish government has positioned the fight against misinformation as the responsibility of every Finn and reformed the education system to promote critical thinking.***

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Finnish children are encouraged from an early age to examine information from more than one angle.

## SOUTH KOREA

The government of South Korea has drawn up a framework of laws and treaties over the past two decades to try to address the data governance dilemma—ensuring data protection for citizens (such as data localisation which requires data, especially personal data, to be stored and accessible within a country’s borders) on the one hand and facilitating cross-border information-sharing and digital trade on the other.

One of the world’s most connected countries—about 96% of the population has Internet access—the Korean government is a world-leader in online services provision. It was the UN EGDI’s top ranked Asian country in 2020. It also topped the OECD’s 2019 Digital Government Index, which assessed the maturity of digital government strategies in 33 OECD member and partner countries. South Korea’s government has performed well in the CGGI’s rankings for Leadership and Foresight (17th), especially in Strategic Prioritisation (8th), as well as Regulatory Governance (1st), Data Capability (1st) and the Coordination (9th) of its institutions.

The key legislation governing privacy and data protection in Korea is the Personal Information Protection Act (PIPA), which references the OECD’s Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data. Described as “Asia’s toughest data privacy law”,<sup>9</sup> PIPA imposes constraints on companies or government agencies when transferring personal data outside of Korea, such as requiring consent before providing personal information to third parties abroad. The Act has attracted some criticism that such strict data protection laws may impede innovation in Korea.

In the absence of overarching international digital trade agreements governing privacy, data protection, and cybersecurity, trade-dependent economies like South Korea are exposed to various data laws in other countries, such as the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), the California Consumer Privacy Act, and China’s new Personal Information Protection Law. To deal with the differing restrictions on cross-border information flows, the Korean government has adopted the principle of reciprocity—it does not allow personal information to be transferred to foreign ICT service providers

**One of the world’s most connected countries—about 96% of the population has internet access—the Korean government is a world leader in online services provision.**



When South Korea’s Personal Information Protection Act (PIPA) passed in September 2011 it became one of the strictest data privacy laws in the world.

based in a country which restricts the transfer of personal information abroad. Several of Korea’s free trade agreements also include data localisation provisions, especially with respect to the location of computing facilities for financial services.

In 2020, the PIPA was amended to incorporate more up-to-date data governance concepts like pseudonymisation and has become more aligned with the EU’s GDPR. Korea has since joined a small group of countries that have met the GDPR’s adequacy criteria, which recognises the laws in those countries as providing adequate data protection and allowing personal data to move from the EU to Korea without requiring further authorisation. Korea also participates in other regional initiatives to develop more widely accepted data governance rules, such as the Cross-Border Privacy Rules (CBPR) system of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC).



### Turbo-Charging the Digital Economy

Estimates about the size of the digital economy—which uses digitalised data as a key factor of production—vary from 4.5% to 15.5% of world GDP.<sup>10</sup> As the digital economy grows, governments like the US and China are cracking down on tech giants, using antitrust laws and other regulations including cybersecurity and taxation, due to growing concerns about antitrust and lack of accountability.

#### CHINA

China has made blazing progress in digitalisation in recent years. The Digital Evolution Scorecard calls China an outlier even among “Break Out” economies;<sup>11</sup> despite its size, China’s digitalisation outpaces the rest, including countries such as India, Indonesia, Russia, and Saudi Arabia. China’s technology ambitions have also sparked a keen rivalry with the US. Among the G20 nations, it made the most gains between 2018 and 2020 as measured in the Digital Riser 2021 report, while the US has lost ground.<sup>12</sup>

Although the government has reined in China’s big tech companies on multiple fronts, the digital economy remains a key priority. In its 14th Five-Year Plan for 2021–2025, the government outlined ambitions for the digital economy to account for 10% of its GDP by 2025, up from 7.8% in 2020.

The government projects that gigabit broadband users will rise from 6.4 million in 2020 to 60 million in 2025, emphasising proliferating internet connections and faster speeds. China is further promoting the installation, commercialisation, and large-scale use of 5G network capabilities. The government is setting the stage for 6G, with plans to increase R&D in next-generation 6G technology, and to participate in the formulation of 6G international standards.

***Already a global leader in digital payments, China’s central bank has been working on the digital renminbi since 2014 and is poised to be the first central bank to roll out its digital currency.***

China is also encouraging innovation in what it sees as socially beneficial digital services, such as online healthcare, and AI-enabled smart transportation and autonomous driving. Already a global leader in digital payments, China’s central bank has been working on the digital renminbi since 2014 and is poised to be the first central bank to roll out its digital currency.


The Chinese government has established a network of pilot cities, national demonstration zones, and manufacturing innovation centres, while hundreds of smart manufacturing industrial parks focusing on areas like big data, cloud computing and new materials have sprouted. The implementation of “Made in China 2025” and related industrial policies is centrally coordinated, with each region focusing on a particular area of tech development.

To close the technology gap in foundational technologies such as semiconductors and new materials, the government is investing heavily into R&D, spending a hefty 2.14% of GDP in 2018.<sup>13</sup> Industrial policy has been backed by state funding—to the tune of USD 300 billion—combined with various state financing and subsidies, including tax incentives, SME financing, and direct funding for pilot projects. Complementary strategies, such as “China Standards 2035”, aim to set global standards for emerging technologies like 5G internet, the internet of Things (IoT), and AI, making China a leading nation in digital governance.



A robot assembles a car at Smart China Expo in Chongqing, China, August 2019.

# Connecting the Dots: Blended Innovation and the Art of Digitalisation in Governance



## REUBEN NG

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*Dr. Reuben Ng spent 16 years in government, consulting, and research. In government, he was in the Prime Minister's Office driving evidence-based policymaking through data analytics and Singapore's Smart Nation strategies. In consulting, he co-built the advanced analytics practice at a top firm, and implemented complex analytics capabilities across industries and functions. In research, he specialises in quantitative social sciences and social gerontology, and has created innovative techniques to measure societal perceptions that are applied to strategic policy communications. Reuben delivers masterclasses on Innovation that blend Data Analytics, Behavioural Insights, and Design Thinking; he also serves on advisory boards in finance, education and sustainability.*

## Implementation Matters in Policymaking and Governance

I am a psychologist by training, and I try to apply psychology and principles of human behaviour across different fields. I pursued my research interests in the US, working on projects regarding ageing and health. It was during the Obama administration, when the focus was to bring down healthcare costs while increasing healthcare outcomes. One of the ways to do this was through prevention—because prevention is typically cheaper than a cure.

Most of the time, prevention programmes do not work very well, because they tend to take a one-size-fits-all approach, even though people are very different. To address this, we worked with a concept called precision prevention or personalised prevention. This approach uses data to try to identify different behavioural segments in the community, to give us an idea of how to tweak programmes, their implementation, or communications to be as effective as possible to these different groups.



When I returned to Singapore, I transited to consulting with one of the big firms that was starting up its data and artificial intelligence (AI) practice. Most of our clients were governments in the Asia-Pacific. Later, I joined the Smart Nation Programme Office and Prime Minister's Office's Strategy Group before landing at the LKY School.

My experiences in these projects have taught me the importance of not being in a methodology silo: that we need to blend different approaches and data. I have come to realise that we sometimes try to get all the models right, but it is not just about the science of analytics or of AI. There is a craft to implementation that matters. We need to communicate, to convince senior management, to manage the change process. All these are part of the art of analytics as well, and vital to success.

### Thinking Differently About Governance in the Digital Age

This goes to the skills we will need in ten, 20 years' time. We think about making the workplace future-ready, and about the regulation of new technologies. But relatively less work has been done on the skills we will need, especially in the public sector. In my view, there are a few common denominator skills governments could look at, to set civil servants up for the future.

The first is the notion of co-creation. Most of the time when we think about what people need, it is very policymaker centric. We think that is what other countries are doing, and we must keep up; or we think that is what citizens will need, so we create it for you. But we often forget to ask people what they need.



Co-creation needs to be the approach from the start—a part of this process, not an afterthought. This will be vital as governance goes digital.



The same goes with international organisations that we have worked with, such as the World Bank. We have the resources and the plans, but it is critical to find out what the real needs are first. There was an example in a developing country where we were rolling out youth entrepreneurship programmes. They were not very successful, because the young people there just wanted to be good employees; not everyone wants to be an entrepreneur. Fundamentally, if we had understood and co-created with the local government, we could have used the money for many different pathways for the young people to be successful, rather than prescribing one track and putting all the funding into it.

So, there must be a thoughtful, skilful process of assessing needs. Co-creation needs to be the approach from the start—a part of this process, not an afterthought. This will be vital as governance goes digital.



***Just because data is important does not mean everything can be solved with data. Instead, what I do is to take people through a problem case and see how approaches can be blended to solve it.***



Another point is that the way governments make and implement policy tends to be quite siloed. There is not enough collaboration across the chain, and as a result we can get caught out and must react to things that happen which had in fact been anticipated by others long ahead of time. A fundamental question for the future is: how to build these bridges across different parts of the value chain? One way forward is to set up a policy sandbox, to try out some ideas and potential policy responses, so we can be more proactive than reactive. This will be important in managing new technologies.

It will also be important to take a blended innovation approach. Usually when we build capacity in government, it is about the flavour of the year. A couple of years ago it was design thinking, and now it might be behavioural insights. Next could be programme evaluation.

#### **Blended Innovation: Using the Whole Toolkit to Solve Real Problems**

A blended innovation approach simply means that we have an innovation toolkit that incorporates all the different tools we have acquired over the course of our careers, including the tools we have now. We do not just send people for “data” classes; we need to tell people what the data class is for, and how it connects with the earlier ideas and approaches we sent them to class for. This integrated perspective is often lacking. If you have a hammer, everything becomes a nail. Just because data is important does not mean everything can be solved with data. Instead, what I do is to take people through a problem case and see how approaches can be blended to solve it.



A design thinking approach can offer unique insight into what the greatest potential risk factors of an activity might be.

Here is an example. One of the bigger issues in healthcare in Singapore is seniors falling. Singapore has one of the highest community fall rates in the world; the incidence rate is about one in four. Some 80% of A&E visits by people aged 65 years and above is because of a serious fall. So, we want to address this and decrease the risk of people falling.

If we take a pure design thinking approach, we might choose two or three older adults, and follow them through the day to find out what the risk factors are for falls, and then think about how we might address them. Using a blended innovation approach I start instead with data. I use behavioural segmentation along with data analytics to understand how many types of older adults have fallen. Some of these cases might be because of the effect of medication, or because of the built environment. If there are three behavioural segments, for example, or three unique groups of older adults who may be susceptible to falls, then I will pick one or two in each segment and then do a design thinking patient journey with them. This gives me a better understanding of what the greatest potential risk factors are. Then I look for these risk factors in the data set, and I put them into my model.

The design thinking approach helps me come up with hypotheses of what to test in the data. The data tells us what the actual risks are, and which are modifiable.

Then from there, I use behavioural insights to change what is modifiable. This is an example of how I have blended data, design thinking, and behavioural approaches. This blending is critical to producing an optimal solution. But these approaches are not often taught this way.

### Connecting the Dots: From Knowledge to Application

Apart from the natural silos between departments, agencies, and disciplines, when we go for training, we do not often take an application-based approach. As a learner, I must join the dots myself, and sometimes I am at a loss: it is what I call the Friday–Monday chasm. You go for your courses on Friday, and you are done. You are psyched up and then on Monday you go back to work, and you realise you cannot apply what you have learnt. That is poor return on investment (ROI) for the money spent on training.

To bridge this Friday–Monday chasm, I have started what we call a policy innovation or data innovation lab, where the training focuses on not only equipping learners with skills, but also getting them to come up with proposals on how they can solve a particular problem or achieve an aspiration or stretch goal in their work, using the skills learned. Then they work for two to three months to produce a prototype or policy brief.

In the age of data, sometimes what is important is connecting the dots and telling the story. For instance, many good open data sets are out there, but people perceive them not to be open. One reason is that the story of the data and its significance has not been told, and so others form their own narratives based on their own impressions. For this reason, I have been encouraging our policymakers to tell our own Singaporean story, with data. If we do not do that, then there'll be people outside of Singapore telling our story, probably without data, and we may not like it.

To be able to tell a meaningful story, using data, is part of what I call the art of digitalisation. The rest—the hardware and technical side of digitalisation—are hygiene factors.

### Getting Good at the Art of Digitalisation

The art of digitalisation involves capabilities to do with co-creation, and with contextual needs assessment. We need design thinking to help us look at things from a citizen-centric perspective across processes and touch points. Behavioural insights are important, to help us understand and frame the messaging to increase uptake. These capabilities are taught—but often not in programmes to do with digitalisation. Take cybersecurity: very often, systems are less robust because of human behaviour. So, there is a need to think about how to get people to practise better cybersecurity behaviours, which could make use of these other approaches.

***In the age of data, sometimes what is important is connecting the dots and telling the story.***

Digitalisation should be looked at from the iceberg perspective. Sometimes, digitalisation is the tip of the iceberg; below the surface are all these undercurrents of culture and context. As an example of how complex digitalisation can be, take Central Asia which has a huge mining industry. I was consulted on digitalisation for the entire system in one country. Initially, the focus was on the science and tech aspects. But we realised later that there was tremendous resistance to the digitalisation. Partly, it was because of corruption: If you digitalise, almost everything becomes transparent: it becomes more difficult to be corrupt. This is why it is always important for me to go onsite to understand some of the human impediments to digitalisation. Focusing on the technical aspects is not enough.

I think governments should not just chase after the latest trend. What is the latest and greatest may not in fact be the most appropriate for your context. Technology needs to be purpose-driven; a means to an end, rather than an end in itself.



Technology needs to be purpose-driven; a means to an end, rather than an end in itself.



# Sustainability and Governance in an Age of Climate Challenge

**T**he past seven years have been the warmest on record, according to the World Meteorological Organization.<sup>1</sup> Climate change is now widespread, rapid and intensifying, and some impacts have become irreversible,<sup>2</sup> contributing to a worldwide increase in catastrophes such as wildfires, floods and drought, and a record rise in global sea levels.<sup>3</sup>

Extreme weather events affect labour, land, capital, and natural capital. Businesses, households, and the finance sector will face transition risks in pivoting to low-carbon activities. Although all the developing economies combined produce fewer emissions that contribute to global warming than the five biggest emitters, they are often both more vulnerable to the impacts of climate change and less equipped to adapt.

The huge economic costs of climate change will not be faced by developing countries alone. According

to the Swiss Re Institute, the world could lose almost 10% of total economic value by 2050 if climate change maintains its current trajectory.<sup>4</sup> The Network for Greening the Financial System (NGFS) group of central banks estimates the loss as up to 13% of global GDP by 2100.<sup>5</sup> While projections of the cost of climate change vary, and its effects differ from country to country, the message is clear—the cost of inaction would be unbearable.

It is apparent that national governance must now consider the long-term sustainability of a country's activities and consider how it might mitigate or adapt to the potentially catastrophic impacts of climate change. At the same time, there are fresh opportunities to be harnessed as the world transitions to greener energy sources, innovative technologies, and new economic activities. For some countries, these transitions will be part of an ongoing development strategy that goes beyond climate concerns, as they




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***Oceans, which absorb most of the earth's accumulated heat, heated up by about 14 zettajoules—more than 20 times the total energy used by everyone in 2019.***

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seek ways to make the most of precious natural resources to improve the lives of their people.

Just as with the COVID-19 pandemic, addressing these challenges calls for a multifaceted approach involving many different aspects of governance.

#### **Encouraging More Sustainable Energy Use**

Electricity generated by burning other fossil fuels, gas, and coal is a serious impediment to climate action.<sup>6</sup> The UN Development Programme has estimated that governments worldwide spend an astonishing USD 423 billion each year subsidising fossil fuels, including oil. Hence, one of the key focus areas of the UN's COP26 talks in 2021 was the phasing-out of inefficient fossil fuel subsidies. Implementing tough climate-related policies such as rolling back fossil fuel subsidies or introducing carbon taxes calls for a combination of Strong Institutions and Financial Stewardship.



India embarked on fossil fuel pricing reforms to raise prices for diesel gradually from September 2012, until formal price decontrol in 2014.

## INDIA

In 2004, the Indian government imposed price controls on publicly owned oil marketing companies, which account for most domestic fuel sales. These were backed by fuel subsidies, which grew year on year, along with consumption demand. By 2011–2012, the subsidy for diesel (the most widely used petroleum product) amounted to about USD 13 billion, with its share of India's total fuel subsidy expenditure ballooning from 19% a decade earlier to 57%.

Faced with expanding fuel expenditure and deteriorating fiscal conditions, India raised prices for diesel gradually from September 2012 until formal price decontrol in 2014. Despite the initial public outcry, business associations supported the move, which was seen as a sign of the government's commitment to economic reforms. The rolling back of price controls took advantage of periods when

international oil prices were lower, tempering some of the retail price rises. The subsidy reform for diesel, together with a similar reform for gasoline in 2010, reduced the government's energy subsidies bill by USD 15 billion between 2014 and 2019. At the same time, the government provided more targeted support for those in need, such as a direct benefit transfer to households for domestic LPG, the most common cooking fuel in India.

Addressing long-term energy needs, India has created an attractive marketplace for renewables in the world's sixth-largest economy by adopting a more liberal foreign investment policy for the renewable energy industry. Up to 100% of foreign direct investments (FDI) in the renewable energy sector qualifies for automatic approval and does not require prior government approval. This has drawn in private sector investments, in particular FDI, and has helped India to reach its NDC (Nationally Determined Contributions) target of generating 40% of installed power capacity from non-fossil fuel energy sources by the end of 2021, far ahead of its 2030 deadline.

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***Addressing long-term energy needs, India has created an attractive marketplace for renewables in the world's sixth-largest economy by adopting a more liberal foreign investment policy for the renewable energy industry.***

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In terms of Spending Efficiency, the extent to which public spending translates into outcomes and services with minimal wastage, the CGGI places India (13th) ahead of developed countries such as Sweden, the UK, and Japan. India has also done relatively well in Coordination (26th), an indication of the government's ability to balance interests and objectives and ensure that multiple government agencies act coherently. These strengths are reflected in India's energy governance.



### Forging Ahead with Progressive Climate Policies

Countries that have substantive and credible plans to reduce their emissions tend to display strong leadership and foresight, as well as robust laws and policies, and strong institutions to back them up. Similarly, environmental and climate policies often work in concert.

Governments that have performed well in the CGGI's Environmental Performance outcomes—including smaller countries such as Costa Rica, Singapore, and those in Scandinavia—have put in place robust environmental protections and demonstrated greater seriousness about decarbonising. They also tend to do well in climate protection as measured in international rankings such as the Climate Change Performance Index (CCPI), which monitors countries' performances in greenhouse gas emissions, renewable energy, energy use, and climate policy.<sup>7</sup>

### DENMARK

Seen as one of the most progressive countries in climate policy, Denmark has a long history of tapping renewable energy such as bioenergy, wind, and solar power. It has set a target for a 70% reduction in carbon emissions by 2030 (compared with 1990s emissions) and net zero by 2050.

Prompted by a citizen petition in 2019, the following year Denmark passed an ambitious climate law,

which made its emissions targets legally binding. The Danish parliament is required to assess annually whether the government's global and national climate strategies comply with climate legislation. Such a climate law avoids the short-termism of governments and obliges the current government to put into place effective policies to meet the country's emissions targets.

Although it is currently one of the largest oil and gas producers in Europe, Denmark has also taken concrete steps to end its fossil fuel production. It has partnered with Costa Rica to form the Beyond Oil & Gas Alliance (BOGA), aimed at phasing out fossil fuel exploration and extraction among national and sub-national governments. Under this alliance, Denmark has banned new North Sea oil and gas exploration and committed to ending its existing production by 2050.

Denmark's climate laws and policies send a strong signal that the government is taking firm steps to meet its emissions target. When the corresponding regulatory changes are more predictable, businesses and investors can plan ahead and make adjustments with greater certainty. Notably, Denmark places high in the CGGI for its Stable Business Regulations (7th). Its sound regulatory approach to sustainability and climate action reflects Denmark's strong general placing in the CGGI for Leadership and Foresight (2nd), Robust Laws and Policies (4th), and Strong Institutions (3rd).



Costa Rica and Denmark launch the Beyond Oil & Gas Alliance at COP26 on 11 November 2021 in Glasgow, Scotland. BOGA is an alliance of governments determined to set an end date for oil and gas exploration and extraction.

## COSTA RICA

Costa Rica, a nation of about five million, was among the first to turn its climate pledges into detailed plans and policies. In 2019, the government unveiled a national decarbonisation plan to achieve carbon neutrality by 2050. The plan focuses on building a green economy and infrastructure that protects the climate.

A key ambition is to decarbonise the transport sector, responsible for more than half of Costa Rica's emissions. The government expects to electrify 70% of its buses and taxis by 2035 and reach full electrification by 2050. It is also urging citizens to opt for more climate-friendly private transport such as electric vehicles and car-sharing.

About 95% of Costa Rica's electricity is generated from renewable sources, especially hydropower—and it plans to raise this to 100% by 2030. One of the first tropical countries to reverse deforestation, Costa Rica's decarbonisation plan also aims to increase forest cover from the current 52% to 60% by 2030.

Costa Rica's strong legal system and regulatory governance enable it to implement its climate policies—the country ranks 22nd in the CGGI's Robust Laws and Policies pillar and shares 1st place in Latin America with Mexico for Regulatory Governance. For its efforts, Costa Rica won the UN Environment Programme's Champions of the Earth award in 2019.



Costa Rica plans to decarbonise its transport sector by electrifying its buses and taxis.

On the international stage, climate negotiations can be a platform to expand and exert global influence, especially for smaller nations. Countries such as Denmark and Costa Rica (discussed above) often punch above their weight in international climate negotiations, taking the lead in setting the benchmarks in climate policy. In a similar vein, Singapore (ranked 29th in the CGGI's Global Influence and Reputation pillar), has built an international reputation as an honest broker, and has been able to access strategic opportunities in international climate talks. With limited renewable energy options in the small city-state, international carbon markets offer Singapore another channel for lowering its emissions

and align well with the country's aspirations as a carbon services and trading hub.

### Preparing and Planning for Climate Resilience

An important response to climate challenges is climate resilience, which involves developing adaptation capabilities to prepare and respond in good time to the anticipated effects of climate change. Unlike mitigation measures such as reducing fossil fuel use, there are no internationally agreed outcome-based goals for adaptation, as needs vary significantly across regions: coastal areas may need to prepare for sea-level rise, for instance, while agricultural zones may need to adjust for changing weather patterns.



***On the international stage, climate negotiations can be a platform to expand and exert global influence, especially for smaller nations. Countries such as Denmark and Costa Rica often punch above their weight in international climate negotiations, taking the lead in setting the benchmarks in climate policy.***

The UN Environment Programme has found that while almost three out of four nations have some adaptation plans, financing and implementation lag far behind.<sup>8</sup> Countries that have strong leadership and foresight, especially long-term vision and adaptability, are also often the ones that have put in place comprehensive and long-term adaptation plans.

#### SINGAPORE

The low-lying Southeast Asian island-state is especially vulnerable to the threat of rising sea levels and more extreme rainfall. Faced with the prospect of sea levels rising up to 1 m by 2100, Singapore lacks higher ground to retreat to—about 30% of Singapore lies fewer than 5 m above mean sea level.

The CGGI leader in Long-Term Vision and Adaptability (1st), Singapore has recognised that preparing for climate change impacts requires consistent planning and effort over the long term. The government initiated climate change adaptation plans early, introducing a resilience framework to guide its efforts over the long-term in the next 50 to 100 years.

Singapore's adaptation plans included measures such as raising the minimum land reclamation level in Singapore in 2011 from 3 m to 4 m above mean sea level; some key infrastructure such as the new terminal of its international airport which is under construction is built at even higher platform levels. To mitigate flood risks from more intense rainfall, the design standards for stormwater drains have been

increased, and the government is investing heavily into upgrading and maintaining the drainage system.

Coastal protection will be a long-term and large-scale endeavour for Singapore—one that could cost SGD 100 billion (USD 72.5 billion) or more over the next 50 to 100 years. The government is considering various potential responses, including nature-based solutions such as using mangroves as barriers to inundation, as well as engineering approaches like building polders (tracts of land lying below sea level) along Singapore's eastern coast, or even reclaiming a series of offshore islands there.

To ensure that the endeavour is fiscally sustainable when the time comes for implementation, the Singapore government established a Coastal and Flood Protection Fund in 2020—with an initial injection of SGD 5 billion (USD 3.6 billion) to be topped up from time to time—to cater for the expected capital outlay in future.



The National Parks Board of Singapore employs nature-based solutions for coastal resilience. A 400 m low rock revetment was erected to reduce wave energy and encourage accumulation of sediments at Kranji Coastal Nature Park. Photo: NParks.

### Tapping Into New Opportunities

A country's economic transition to becoming more sustainable and climate-friendly requires the participation of the private sector. Countries with robust regulatory governance, attractive marketplaces, and strong financial stewardship often find it easier to mobilise private sector participation and investment in developing low-carbon technologies and green infrastructure. This can also be a strategy to deepen domestic business, industrial and technological capabilities, and talent, allowing the economy to benefit from a growing global market for green products and services.

#### ■ MOROCCO

The energy sector generates about two-thirds of Morocco's emissions, and as the only North African country without domestic oil resources, it imports most of its fossil fuel. However, Morocco has great potential to produce solar and wind energy. The government has expanded the country's renewable energy capacity from a low base to about 35% currently, with a target of 52% by 2030. It has since emerged as a renewable energy leader in the Middle East and North Africa region.

In 2009, Morocco embarked on a major shift in energy policy to prioritise renewable energy and energy efficiency, cut its CO<sub>2</sub> emissions, improve its energy security, and shore up its economic competitiveness. The Moroccan government has leveraged the private sector in this transition by reforming its economic policies and industry regulations and adopting a public-private partnership approach. For example, changes to the renewable energy legislation in 2010 allowed companies to develop renewable energy projects, including self-generating up to 50 MW and selling any surplus to Morocco's National Office of Electricity and Drinking Water (ONEE). Independent renewable energy producers are also allowed to sell directly to end-users.

The country has developed several renewable energy projects with the private sector through a Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) model: concessions allowing the private sector to develop facilities and sell the electricity generated to the government at an agreed price over a certain period. It has also employed Power Purchase Agreements (PPA), which provide government-guaranteed incomes that help

***A country's economic transition to becoming more sustainable and climate-friendly requires the participation of the private sector. This can also be a strategy to deepen domestic business, allowing the economy to benefit from a growing global market for green products and services.***

to secure financing for projects. Bidders are also encouraged to promote local manufacturing, such as through local content requirements which create local economic spill-overs and jobs, and boost business, manufacturing, and engineering skills.

This approach has enabled Morocco to develop the world's largest concentrated solar park, the 500 MW Noor Ouarzazate complex, which spans 3,000 hectares in the northwest of the country. Building on its successes in renewable energy, Morocco is also positioning itself to become a clean energy exporter to Europe and West Africa.

Morocco's strong political backing and government efforts to create an attractive marketplace and manage excessive risk for private sector participation is reflected in the CGGI ranking for its Macroeconomic Environment (5th) and Stable Business Regulations (15th).



Technicians install solar panels on the roof of a house in Rabat, Morocco, April 2021.



A worker engaged in producing photovoltaic circuit boards at a green energy technology company in Jiujiang, Jiangxi province, China, January 2021.

## CHINA

China is at the forefront of the climate tech market. It leads the world in the deployment of renewable energy, with sizeable and globally competitive solar PV and wind industries. Chinese manufacturers, for instance, dominate the solar PV supply chain. It is also rated the second most attractive renewable market after the US in the latest edition of EY's Renewable Energy Country Attractiveness Index.<sup>9</sup>

Besides solar and wind energy, green hydrogen is another fast-growing segment in China. Several provinces and municipalities in China have already included hydrogen as a key economic priority. China's large emitters, especially state-owned enterprises, are emerging as major drivers of green hydrogen development. For instance, Sinopec, a state-owned oil company, is developing the world's largest solar-to-hydrogen electrolyser facility in Xinjiang. The government has also increased its R&D spending in hydrogen technology, while local governments are teaming up with enterprises and universities to set up industry funds to invest in the development and application of hydrogen. The government is also promoting the domestic

development of fuel cell electric vehicles with tax incentives and subsidies, as well as infrastructure for hydrogen production and refuelling.

In 2015, the central government signalled its push for green finance through high-level plans including the 13th Five-Year Plan. China is already one of the largest markets for green credit and bonds, and its growing green finance sector includes green funds, insurance products, exchange traded funds, and asset-backed securities. Led by its central bank, the People's Bank of China, China's top-down reforms in green finance include developing green taxonomies—harmonised standards for defining what counts as green—for green loans, green bonds, and green industry.

China has also set up pilot zones for green finance innovation in selected cities, allowing the government to draw policy and regulatory lessons for the rest of the country. Some provinces offer financial grants and tax incentives to reduce costs such as certification fees and debt interest. The public sector also plays an important role in the green finance market. By some accounts, at least 51% of China's green financing is driven through state-owned enterprises, policy banks and other state-owned banks.<sup>10</sup>



## GOVERNANCE IN PRACTICE

# Cultivating Natural Capital: Working Together to Make a Decisive Difference



**ANN JEANNETTE GLAUBER**

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## **S**triking a Balance between National Development and Addressing Climate and Sustainability Needs

Economies and communities thrive only in the presence of a healthy environment. Yet many measures of economic progress do not accurately capture the state of “natural capital”: the natural assets that are the basis for economies and livelihoods. This is why the World Bank supports countries to develop natural capital accounts to track performance and inform policy decisions. Countries should move beyond GDP to consider natural capital as they do “built” assets such as manufactured and financial capital, or social and human capital.

In recent years, countries have started acting on this perspective as they experience the direct costs of climate change stemming from natural resources' degradation. What's significant about this change is that national choices are being driven by a combination of domestic self-interest—avoiding the severe costs of climate change—and international market and financial incentives. Vietnam, Indonesia, Lao PDR and Fiji, for instance, being home to globally significant natural resources, have signed Emission Reductions Payment Agreements (ERPAs) with the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) administered by the World Bank, unlocking payments of up to USD 216 million for 43.2 million tons of verified emission reductions by 2025—equivalent to the annual emissions of 11 coal-fired power plants.

These agreements have the potential to bring in finances to make a significant contribution towards national climate mitigation targets. But beyond being underpinned by ambitious emission reductions programs led by local jurisdictions (provinces or states), the agreements also hold potential to improve communities' livelihoods and reduce poverty, with inclusive benefit sharing plans developed through extensive consultation processes to ensure that participating stakeholders are recognised and fairly rewarded for their role in reducing emissions.

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***What we can learn from these countries is that they leverage their unique assets—in the cases above, it is their rich natural resources—to be managed sustainably not only for climate change mitigation purposes but also for communities' livelihoods and economic growth.***

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President Joko Widodo, joined by Satu Kahkonen, World Bank Country Director for Indonesia and Timor Leste and ambassadors from different countries, visited Tarakan, North Kalimantan to observe efforts of Indonesia's National Mangrove Program on the ground and plant mangroves. Photo: Bureau of Press, Media, and Information Affairs of Presidential Secretariat.

Another example comes from Indonesia, home to the third largest tropical forests and the largest mangroves area. Last year, Indonesia announced an ambitious goal to turn its Forests and Land Use (FOLU) sector into a carbon net sink by 2030. In achieving this target, Indonesia is thinking about not just reducing emissions, but also the affected communities' livelihoods and economic growth. The National Mangrove Rehabilitation Program, aimed at rehabilitating 600,000 hectares of mangroves by 2024, will not only contribute to Indonesia's carbon net sink target, but also will work closely with local communities, providing short-term incentives for participation through cash-for-work approaches and long-term opportunities by training local communities and facilitating access to markets and starting and expanding businesses. The country will also develop mechanisms to leverage blue finance from the carbon stored through mangrove rehabilitation.

What we can learn from these countries is that they leverage their unique assets—in the cases above, it is their rich natural resources—to be managed sustainably not only for climate change mitigation purposes but also for communities' livelihoods and economic growth.

### **Effective Government Coordination is Key in Meeting Climate and Environmental Challenges**

Complex environmental challenges often require a whole-of-society approach. The latest IPCC 2022 Report on Climate Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability has again underscored that climate change already threaten many sectors: food security, livelihoods for millions of people, water insecurity and even public health, given that higher temperatures increase the spread of vector-borne diseases. In fact, most environmental issues come from "other" sectors, such as urbanisation, transportation development, agriculture or industrialisation. Therefore cross-sectoral coordination—between ministries and agencies, with private sectors, CSOs and other actors—is critical.

While it isn't sexy, good coordination is critical to address many of the most pressing environmental challenges. In Indonesia, for instance, addressing the causes of unsustainable natural resource management and meeting multiple land-related goals has called for an integrated and cross-sectoral approach. With an integrated approach to landscape management, stakeholders from multiple sectors can come together to balance competing land use demands in a way that is best for human wellbeing and the environment.

This means creating solutions that consider food and livelihoods, finance, land rights, restoration and progress towards climate and development goals.

The Sustainable Landscape Management Program (SLMP) in Indonesia aims to do just that: promoting activities across multiple sectors and collaborates with stakeholders from the national and provincial government, private sector, civil society, and communities through three main components: improving land administration and governance, managing forests resources sustainably, and mobilising financing for landscape management.

In the Strengthening Rights and Economies of Adat and Local Communities Project, for instance, Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities (IPLCs) collaborate closely with governments, civil society organisations and researchers to advocate for the official recognition of their status as a customary law community (an Indonesian legal term for indigenous peoples) as well as their rights over customary areas and forests. Such recognition helps IPLCs to protect their livelihoods, conserve their forests, and provide them with incentives to invest in sustainable, long-term management of their land and forests.



SLMP supports the government of Indonesia to reduce deforestation and forest degradation and to promote more equitable growth through the sustainable use of forest resources.

### Good Governance Makes a Difference in Addressing Climate Change

There is no silver bullet to addressing climate change: it requires a whole-of-government and whole-of-society approach, as earlier mentioned. But if I were to pick three key capabilities that governments should cultivate to be ready for the challenge, I would choose:

1. **Long-Term Vision:** Given that climate change requires addressing many of the fundamental elements of how our society and economy operates, it will require a long-term commitment to meaningfully respond. Thus, leadership will have to focus on setting a vision, and outlining the targets and steps for the country to get there over an extended period.
2. **Coordination:** To meaningfully reduce emissions requires actions by various parts of government—those working with energy, agriculture, land use and forestry, transport, industry, planning, and finance, just to name a few!—takes effective coordination among various agencies to balance the various interests and objectives of the different sector actors, and to ensure that multiple government parties agencies act coherently and in a collaborative manner to achieve the desired outcomes.
3. **Effective Implementation:** Good plans without implementation are just words. If we are going to have meaningful shifts in behaviours and outcomes, governments must have the ability to execute its stated policies and meet those policy objectives.

### What the World Bank is Doing to Help Countries be More Sustainable and Climate Resilient

The World Bank Group is one of the world's largest sources of funding and knowledge for developing countries with a commitment to reduce poverty, increase shared prosperity, and promote sustainable development. We provide financial products and technical assistance, and we support countries in sharing and applying innovative knowledge and solutions to the challenges they face. In doing so, we place emphasis on multi-stakeholder partnerships as an increasingly important aspect of World Bank engagement. The World Bank's Country Partnership Framework, for instance, identify the most important challenges and opportunities a country faces in advancing towards the Bank's twin goals through consultations with a range of stakeholders.



PROBLUE is part of the World Bank's overall Blue Economy program, which takes a multi-pronged, coordinated approach to ensuring the protection and sustainable use of marine and coastal resources.

Over the years, the World Bank partnerships have taken the form of information sharing, policy dialogue, strategy consultation, as well as more importantly, operational collaboration and institutional partnerships. In addition to administering the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF)—a global partnership of governments, businesses, civil society, and Indigenous Peoples focused on REDD+, the Bank also houses major trust funds and global partnerships, such as PROBLUE and PROGREEN that support the integrated and sustainable development of marine, coastal and forests resources. As an example, the Forest Investment Program (FIP) under PROGREEN provides grants and low-interest loans to help governments, communities, and business stakeholders work together to address the drivers of deforestation and forest degradation. We have seen this in action in countries like Indonesia, Lao PDR, Thailand and more.

### **Hope for the Future in the Face of Environmental and Climate Challenge**

As a global community, the environmental issues we are facing are tremendous. Issues like large-scale loss of nature and biodiversity, pollution of air, water and soil, climate change and its wide-ranging impacts on the natural systems we depend on for

life on this planet—these are extremely complex; for many, even overwhelming.

Aside from my family, I cannot think of anything more important than nature. Sitting on a mountaintop looking at the forest expanse at my feet. Listening to the wind in the trees, the birds, and the insects. Staring into a crystal-clear lake and watching the fish, the water bugs, and the ducks do their thing. Diving along a coral reef, watching giant turtles, manta rays, and schools of fish swim slowly by, the light shining through the water.

The idea that without major shifts in the way we live that by 2050—less than 30 years from now—many of these systems will be in dire shape. Living coral reef systems are expected to be largely gone with 1.5 degrees of warming—a future that is now almost certain. We are witnessing collapsing sea ice which models show to be a tipping point for sea level rise. Can we just sit by and let it happen?

Fighting to give my kids opportunities to live on such a vibrant planet is for me deeply motivating. We truly must rise and act now to protect the amazing world in which we live.

## GOVERNANCE IN PRACTICE

# Developing Vietnam's Marine Resources Sustainably


**LUU ANH-DUC**

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Vietnam has tremendous potential for marine (blue) economic development. It has an expansive sea area about three times larger than its land area, with a coastline extending over 3,260km, an exclusive economic zone, and a continental shelf rich with marine ecosystems and diverse natural resources. There are thousands of islands in the East Sea area of Vietnam, where there is a dynamic network of sea freight.

However, in the past few years, Vietnam has faced many challenges to the sustainable development of its marine economy. Plastic waste pollution has become an urgent problem. The marine ecosystems have shrunk and their biodiversity has declined. Some marine resources are overexploited. Science and technology, basic research, and human resource management have not yet become significant factors in the sustainable development of the marine economy.

Recognising the importance of the marine economy for the sustainable development of the country, The Communist Party of Vietnam has adopted a National Strategy on Sustainable Development of Vietnam's Marine Economy for 2030, with a vision towards 2045.

Following this National Strategy, we have advised the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment

and the Prime Minister of Vietnam to promote a number of policies aimed at realising an important solution: actively strengthening foreign relations and international cooperation on the sea. Among these policies is the Decision on International Cooperation Project on sustainable development of Vietnam's marine economy until 2030. The Decision is the basis for promoting international cooperation to effectively mobilise and use resources, knowledge and experience, and to take full advantage of the support of other countries, international organisations and partners to serve the needs of the community for the sustainable development of the marine economy. It eases the implementation of guidelines and orients the Party and State towards playing a pioneering role in the region to solve the problem of plastic waste in the ocean, while contributing to building and successfully implementing a circular economy model, effectively managing plastic.

## Protecting the Marine Environment

As we all know, plastic pollution is a global crisis. It represents a big challenge to Vietnam. Recognising the importance of addressing marine plastic pollution, the Government of Vietnam has paid special attention to creating and implementing policies and laws for environmental protection. These include:

- Passing the Law on Environmental Protection 2020, legislating plastic waste management, reuse, recycling, treatment and the development of a circular economy model for plastics
- Issuing a National Action Plan on marine plastic litter management till 2030
- Strengthening activities to raise awareness on the consumption and disposal of plastic products; promoting scientific research, innovation and technology transfer; and establishing public-private partnership mechanisms to address plastic pollution
- Participating in international forums, and in the spirit of "Vietnam—a responsible member of the United Nations", continuing to affirm political commitments, to be actively involved





Nam Du island is heavily polluted by domestic and plastic waste, Kiên Giang province, Vietnam, May 2018.

(with the international community) in developing a global framework of agreement to tackle marine plastic pollution

- Conducting in-country preparations with a project approved by the Prime Minister to fully establish the necessary conditions and resources, as well as a coordination mechanism for relevant ministries, sectors, and localities. These will support Vietnam's negotiation of and participation in the Global Agreement, ensuring the country's rights and interests in the prevention and control of marine plastic pollution.

On 2 March 2022, Vietnam, along with the Heads of State, Ministers of Environment and other representatives from 175 nations, endorsed a historic resolution at the UN Environment Assembly (UNEA-5) in Nairobi, titled "End Plastic Pollution: Towards an International Legally Binding Instrument".

### Developing the Blue Economy

Vietnam has tremendous potential to develop its marine (blue) economy, according to the goals set out in the National Strategy. However, fast-paced development of the blue economy in recent years, without effective

management and cooperation among stakeholders, poses a threat to the sustainability of marine ecosystem and risks degrading its resources.

At the same time, legislation for the development of the blue economy is not yet robust enough to promote a sustainable blue economy in the country and maintain a balance between economic development and marine resource conservation. Moreover, Vietnam's blue economy still lacks major investment and international participation in its development. Thanks to several donor-funded programmes and associated training, there is already some interest and expertise in Vietnam's blue economy. However, the necessary knowledge and skills, while available, are also dispersed and not always accessible where they are most needed.

Some form of blue economy partnership will be necessary to ensure the sustainable development of Vietnam's marine economy in the future. Realising this, we have advised the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment to form a Partnership Framework for the blue economy in Vietnam, to enhance the knowledge base, encourage information-sharing and promote resource mobilisation, collaboration and coordination among relevant stakeholders. This is another reminder that appropriate intervention and policy design that respond to requirements on the ground can be an important factor in determining the success of any policy measure.

### Making a Difference in the Public Sector

I believe that the public sector offers a wide variety of genuinely challenging and fascinating work. It exposes us to many challenges and opportunities for growth. We all want to leave our mark; the work we do in the state management of natural resources and environmental protection of our seas and islands helps us to make a difference because it is for the benefit of humanity.

Always abiding by the law is of course an important principle in carrying out public administration and implementing state interventions. But there is one more thing I always keep in mind: competence helps us get things done, but establishing deep relationships and effective communication with people is crucial to enduring success. I try every day to do my best at work—to help those in need and inspire positive action. I have learnt to be humble, to talk less, to listen more, and to live in harmony with and be kind to those around me.



## Towards Fair and Inclusive Societies

**T**he COVID-19 pandemic has exacerbated social inequalities in the past year. Women and girls around the world in particular faced a disproportionate domestic burden, as lockdowns kept them at home and out of school and the workplace. Global public health measures to arrest the spread of infection, including business closures and lockdowns, also deprived many lower-income groups of their livelihoods. Fiscal measures to reduce the economic impact of the pandemic tended to be directed towards those in formal employment and housing; the most vulnerable in the informal workforce or the homeless risked being excluded.

While vaccine programmes offer hope of taming the virus itself, the lingering fallout from the pandemic, including the prospect of a lost generation of young people deprived of schooling and work in their most crucial years. This affects not only their immediate wellbeing, but also their opportunities to make a better life for themselves and their families in future. Systemic social inequality has therefore emerged as one of the most significant policy challenges for governments in the wake of the COVID-19 crisis.

In the CGGI, tackling inequality is best captured through its Pillar 7 of governance:

Helping People Rise, which assesses outcomes—how effective policies have been in bettering people’s lives. Astute policy-making to address inequality is also reflected in key capability pillars such as Leadership and Foresight, Robust Laws and Policies, and Strong Institutions.

Countries that lacked robust policies to address inequality prior to the pandemic—including investments in public health and education, or social protections for workers—felt the impact of the pandemic to a greater degree.

However, governments that had made strides towards closing income, gender, educational, and health gaps could rely on these policy tools to address acute needs when the pandemic struck. They were able to strategically roll out well-planned national programmes targeted at widening the safety net for vulnerable groups and in particular use education as a means of addressing systemic inequality.

Governments that had the vision to prioritise tackling inequality were thus in a stronger position to address the pandemic’s effects, and position their societies to recover quickly and to thrive after the crisis.



Crowds in Vilnius celebrate Lithuania's Independence Day on 16 February 2022. Lithuania is one of the fastest-growing economies in Europe.

## LITHUANIA

Lithuania's government has introduced a range of government strategies and policies to fight inequality in recent years.

Among them, the National Progress Plan (2021–2030) includes, as a foundational principle, the notion of equality in the use of services, infrastructure, and transport as well as opportunities for all to participate in public life irrespective of their gender.<sup>1</sup> This policy framework aims to increase inclusion, social well-being, and health outcomes across the population. A key aspirational goal is to create environments that help families thrive and enable increased participation in the labour market.<sup>2</sup>

The government has also released data on average wages of employees by gender. The was made available on the State Social Insurance Fund portal in 2021, and also made available to universities.<sup>3</sup> Such transparency in reporting demonstrates a commitment both to reducing gender pay disparity and to allowing public and private organisations to clearly measure how they stand in relation to each other.

Lithuania has also addressed income inequality over the last several years. Effective economic management and a liberalised investment environment have improved incomes overall, which has contributed to mitigating inequality.<sup>4</sup>

One of the fastest-growing economies in Europe, Lithuania faces both an opportunity and a challenge.

On the one hand, rising numbers are gaining access to quality education as well as high-skilled and well-paid work. On the other, many are not able to keep up with the pace of development. As such, the country faces a significant inequality gap with a Gini coefficient that is one of the highest in Europe.<sup>5</sup>

To tackle this challenge, lawmakers have enacted a number of strong measures in recent years, including laws on cash assistance for those in poverty, and child benefits.<sup>6</sup> Overall, these steps have led to increases in the minimum wage, the threshold for non-taxable income, and social insurance pensions, as well as the introduction of a universal child benefit scheme—all instigated before the onset of global pandemic in 2020.<sup>7</sup> When the pandemic hit the country, these provisions could be harnessed to provide swift social support.<sup>8</sup>

Such initiatives, together with increased investment from the European Union, led to positive GDP growth in Lithuania throughout 2021 as it navigated the impacts of the COVID-19 crisis.<sup>9</sup>

Lithuania's example shows that targeted public spending can contribute to reducing inequality while benefiting the economy. Challenges remain, but the country is clearly on a solid footing to tackle inequality as part of a coherent, multifaceted approach to strengthening the economy.

Lithuania's governance has seen it doing well in the CGGI, where it ranks 4th in the Gender Gap indicator, and 18th in the Strong Institutions pillar.



## ETHIOPIA

While Ethiopia does not rank highly overall in the CGGI, it has strategically prioritised inequality as an issue to address. It has steadily increased its budget allocation for public services in the education and healthcare sectors.<sup>10,11</sup> In fact, Ethiopia spends the second-highest proportion globally of its national budget on education;<sup>12</sup> during the pandemic it also ramped up health spending. This spending has had a noticeable impact on reducing poverty.

The government is also pursuing a major development roadmap, Ethiopia 2030: The Pathway to Prosperity from 2021–2030. Although the 10-year plan is a comprehensive development approach that covers all aspects of the country’s development from industry to education, it prioritises health and education, which are two important areas for addressing inequality.<sup>13</sup>

The government carried out a comprehensive review of the education system in 2018, which resulted in a roadmap introduced in 2021. It refocuses education spending to invest more in early childhood years—a significant contributor to reducing inequality. The plan also calls for education to be expanded, primarily through building more schools.

A major target population for educational initiatives in Ethiopia is the pastoralist community, whose members have struggled to access quality education due to their nomadic lifestyle. Programmes tailored to mobile communities, such as distance-learning and more integrated adult education, have contributed to reducing some inequalities in educational outcomes. The number of primary and secondary schools has also considerably increased over the past decade, which has improved access.

The government recognises that health inequality is a major barrier to overall development and progress, and has made significant investments in the sector. Ethiopia is currently faced with internal conflict, the pandemic, low vaccination rates and a high infant mortality rate. However, it continues to prioritise healthcare spending, particularly for children and infants.

Notably, Ethiopia’s government has focused healthcare spending in rural areas. It has initiated



College students taking lessons outdoors in Gambella, Ethiopia, February 2021.

a voluntary, community-based health insurance programme, where members pool payments into a fund to cover basic healthcare costs at local clinics. The government covers the premium cost for the poorest segment of the population.<sup>14</sup>

In 2019, Ethiopia passed a labour law that increased paid maternity leave to 120 days and made paternity leave of three days compulsory in the public sector. The country has also set up a wage board, consisting of trade union members, government representatives and employers, to explore the minimum wage. Gender and labour protections enshrined in law demonstrate Ethiopia’s commitment to prioritising policies for social protection and equality.<sup>15</sup> Such comprehensive policies across sectors that target inequality outcomes help to rank Ethiopia well for Income Inequality in the CGGI (35th) relative to its peers.

## MEXICO

Following Mexico's economic crisis in 1994, the government sought to reduce inequality across a range of population segments, through an array of social programmes.<sup>16</sup>

One area of inequality addressed by Mexico's policymakers is education. Faced with the challenge of only around 59% of students completing secondary school, the government had to conceive of programmes that target the root causes of economic inequality. One of the most well-known examples of these was the Prospera initiative, which pioneered conditional cash transfers to mitigate poverty and boost participation of poor students in school.<sup>17</sup>

Another initiative is the Benito Juárez Scholarships for Well-being, which aims to create more inclusive and equitable education outcomes by focusing on creating opportunities for children in poverty or in vulnerable conditions.<sup>18</sup> Providing grant scholarships contingent on continuous study, the programme targets geographic areas with high poverty and vulnerability rates. It also gives priority to indigenous populations and marginalised communities as well as areas with high rates of violence.<sup>19</sup>

The programme is carried out in conjunction with the State Coordination of Integral Development Programs, the Secretariat of Public Education, State Education Services, and the National Council for Educational Development.<sup>20</sup> This collaboration ensures that while educational inequality is addressed through economic means, there is also close integration with broader government policies and interventions.

Through a tailored policy approach based on decades of experience, Mexico is finding success in addressing entrenched inequalities, delivering creative interventions that take a cross-cutting approach to minimising the effects of income and education inequality.

In 2019, Mexico passed a law that called for gender parity for all candidates in elected office and top posts in the judicial and executive branch of government. Following this, in mid-2021, it instituted a constitutional mandate, known as "gender parity in everything".

With the 2021 governor elections, Mexico became the first country in the world to stipulate that women be included in nominations for the election race.<sup>21</sup>

These efforts to reduce educational inequality and close the gender gap are reflected in Mexico's improved ranking in the CGGI pillar, Helping People Rise.

### Conclusion

Addressing inequality will continue to be a major policy challenge for governments, especially as the long-term effects of the pandemic and its devastating impacts continue to ripple through. A fairer and more inclusive society may still result in unequal outcomes, due to differences in skill and effort. Nevertheless, what countries have done as part of their national plans to address gender, health and educational inequalities will help to mitigate the setbacks brought about by the pandemic.

In the years ahead, as countries move towards recovery, continued emphasis on targeting entrenched inequalities through comprehensive social strategies drawing on robust laws and policies, strong institutions and the right leadership will be important capabilities for governments to develop and draw upon.



Students display their grant scholarships provided by Benito Juárez Scholarships for Well-being. Photo: Coordinación Nacional de Becas para el Bienestar Benito Juárez.



## GOVERNANCE IN PRACTICE

# Why Property Rights Matter to Good Governance



**TIM HANSTAD**  
CEO, Chandler Foundation  
and Co-Founder, Landesa.

*Before leading the Chandler Foundation as its CEO, Tim Hanstad was the co-founder and CEO of Landesa, the world's leading land rights organisation.*

## Why do Property Rights Matter for a People's Wellbeing?

I grew up in a farming community, and as a child spent my summers working in the fields shoulder-to-shoulder with poor, migrant labourers from Central America. Getting to know some of these fellow labourers, I was left with two impressions: they were the poorest people I had ever known, and they were the hardest workers I had ever observed. Reconciling those two impressions challenged the worldview I had absorbed—that the pathway to upward social mobility was primarily through determined individual effort.

Over the years, as I reflected on the plight of these earnest, hardworking migrant labourers, I realised the great “opportunity gap” they faced due to the arbitrariness of the country in which they were born. It was the most important explanation of their dire economic circumstances. I began to wonder what might be done to change the conditions in their home country so such hard-working people could prosper there. In particular, I imagined if they had owned their own land and farm back home—like my immigrant grandparents—their trajectory might be much different.

In college, I was introduced to the writings and work of an American law professor who argued that



Landesa works with governments in over 50 countries on reforms to provide secure, legal land rights to citizens.

landownership was a primary differentiator between the world’s “haves” and “have-nots”. This professor, Roy Prosterman, had been working with several low-income country governments to help them provide landownership to people and communities living on the margins. I became fascinated with the topic—and eventually found my way to the law school where Professor Prosterman taught and, later, working as his research assistant.

In this role as a law student in the 1980s, I learned that most of the world’s poorest people had two things in common: they made their living from the land, and they did not have secure legal rights to that land. Also in this role, I was given the opportunity to travel to the fields and slums of many poor countries and spend countless hours and days with many people living on the margins. Speaking with them—learning from them—about their aspirations and challenges, I was continually struck that their aspirations were similar to mine. They wanted a better life for themselves and their children. But their opportunity



to realise those dreams was not nearly the same as mine—in large part because they did not, and often could not, own land.

Several years after law school, Professor Prosterman and I co-founded Landesa, a social good organisation, by taking the property rights research, advisory, and advocacy work he had been doing part-time as a professor outside of the university. From the beginning, Landesa’s work recognised that defining and enforcing land property rights—the legal relationship between people and land—was the monopoly of the government. Thus, improving land property rights—making property rights more robust and inclusive—required working directly and constructively with governments.

Property rights are public goods that governments have to define and protect. In fact, land and natural resources are among the most valuable and important assets for a government to steward, and the land policy decisions governments make are crucial to the well-being of that country’s citizens. The path to

peace and prosperity for any country is integrally tied to whether and how it creates property rights systems that are clear, strong, transparent, and inclusive.

### How do Land Rights Relate to a Country’s Wealth?

How do countries go from being poor to prosperous? Most start their developmental path relying primarily on agriculture and other land-based industries. Gradually, if the agricultural sector realises success, the country and its labour force gradually transitions to higher-value activities in industry or services. In those early stages of development while much of the labour force is in agriculture, the relationship between farmers and the land is crucially important. Land is the foundational asset for agriculture, and having strong and clear rights is crucial for making long-term, productivity-enhancing investments. Strong property rights to land are a prerequisite for healthy land rental and sale markets, which are necessary to facilitate an effective transition from agriculture to higher-value sectors.

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***They wanted a better life for themselves and their children. But their opportunity to realise those dreams was not nearly the same as mine—in large part because they did not, and often could not, own land.***

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As the non-farm business sector grows, effective property rights systems are crucial for buying, leasing, and improving land for businesses. Such systems are also perhaps the most effective form of facilitating the credit systems necessary to accumulate the needed capital for development. And, of course, land effective property rights systems are the foundation for safe and affordable housing.

One can trace the pathway to prosperity for most countries based on their ability to develop an effective property rights system. Achieving long-term prosperity and peace requires much more than just an effective and inclusive land property rights system; but no country has achieved it without such a system.



A strong property rights systems should be designed and developed to work for a country's most marginalised citizens.

One can often also trace the pathway to prosperity (or poverty) for any family using a property rights lens. Owning land or not owning land, buying land, selling land—we can all find aspects of our own family history where the ability (or not) to own land, buy land, sell land made a significant contribution to our family's inter-generational socio-economic pathway.

Those aspects of our family history related to land property rights will vary substantially from country to country. If we live in a country that has an effective, well-developed, and equitable system for defining and enforcing property rights, we can easily take it for granted. Unfortunately, much of our fellow world citizens cannot take it for granted. Those migrant labourers with whom I worked as a child certainly could not. Even today, the World Bank estimates that only 30% of the global population has legally registered rights to their land and homes. In high-income countries today, home and land ownership is the primary driver of household wealth. Growing this wealth is not possible without an underlying system of property rights.

### What Determines a Good System of Property Rights?

Over the years, as Landesa grew from a 2-person organization to one of the world's Top-10 Social Good Organizations, we had the opportunity to work

with and learn from government leaders from more than 50 countries across the world. And over that time and with those partners, we developed the following list of ten characteristics common to effective land property rights systems:

1. Rights are clearly defined.
2. Rights are both legally and socially recognised.
3. Rights are inclusive—including equally available to women and men.
4. Rights are ultimately enforceable by the government.
5. Rights appropriately balance societal rights with private rights.
6. Rights are long-term.
7. Rights withstand changes in structure of families and communities.
8. Rights are appropriately transferable.
9. Rights are documented in an information system that is open by default.
10. Rights are governed by departments that are capable, fair, honest, and transparent.

The list is simple. The process for achieving the characteristics is anything but simple. And each country has to find its own path based on its unique social, political, historical, and cultural characteristics. There is no one single way to achieve an effective property rights system that comprises these characteristics. However, there are certain principles that have proven fundamental for building good systems. Those include clearly understanding the ground realities for the citizens for whom the system is to serve, particularly those who are at the margins. If a strong property rights system is designed and developed to work for a country's most marginalised citizens, it will also work for those with privilege and power. A clear path to prosperity requires no less.

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*Landesa is a Social Good Organisation that works with governments and other local stakeholders to help develop strong, effective, and inclusive land property rights systems through research, technical assistance, training, and advocacy. Starting as a 2-person team in 1992, Landesa has grown over the years to become a global Top-10 NGO, working with governments in over 50 countries on reforms that have provided secure, legal land rights to over 150 million poor citizens.*





ADVANCING GOOD GOVERNANCE IN A TIME OF CRISIS

## GOVERNANCE IN PRACTICE

# Nurturing a New Culture of Integrity in Armenia



**HAYKUHI HARUTYUNYAN**  
Chair, Corruption Prevention  
Commission, Armenia

*Haykuhi Harutyunyan has over 15 years of experience working with civil society organisations on rule of law, judiciary, and human rights issues. In 2019, she was elected to chair the Corruption Prevention Commission (CPC) of the Republic of Armenia, a newly established independent body that develops and implements the country's corruption prevention policies.*

## **R**ebuilding the Armenian System

Although Armenia has been an independent country for more than 30 years now, the legacy of the Soviet era continues to pose challenges. These include lack of judicial and administrative independence, corruption, territorial conflict and so on. Armenia inherited a government rife with oligarchs and patronage, a system in which the government did not actually lead or govern; it worked only to benefit an elite group.

With independence, the struggle in civil society was to try and dismantle this old system and make democracy work. This is what inspires my generation, which saw the transition to independence. We want to build up a new Armenia—not the one our parents lived in, but one where our children will have a different understanding of the country. A country we can be proud of.

In 2018, a peaceful revolution led the government to resign. The new government immediately announced that fighting corruption and preventing the old system of political patronage would be a top priority on their agenda. At the time, I was a human rights lawyer in civil society, working on policy issues at local, regional, and international levels. In 2019, I was invited to be a candidate for a newly established institution, the Corruption Prevention Commission of

the Republic of Armenia (CPC). Five members of the Commission were voted in by Parliament, and among them I was elected as Chair.

I see this as a vital role because it demonstrates to the country an enduring will to fight corruption, and to change society so that it can resist corruption. It is based on a firm belief in the rule of law; that state institutions can and must lead and bring about this societal change.

My first priority was to ensure the creation of a strong and independent institution, with an effective regulatory framework to prevent corruption—and in doing so demonstrate that Armenia can overcome its past difficulties and create a new future. The Commission had to start from scratch, from less than zero, because we were working not from nothing, but with a system that was already actively doing harm. We could not let the existing system continue because that would exacerbate the problem, taking us away from our goal. So, we had to create an alternative.

When the CPC started, we were only five people: now, after only two years, we have 45 staff members. We have six departments with a very broad mandate to fight corruption, using a range of tools.

## **Preventing Corruption: New Priorities**

An important priority of the CPC is to regulate how Armenia's public officials declare their assets and potential conflicts of interests annually. Beyond a certain amount of expenditure, public officials—as well as their family members and those who interact with them regularly—must declare what they have spent money on, to ensure that every transaction is lawful. From 3,500 people making annual declarations, we now have over 35,000 people doing so.

This procedure is very important to ensure the accountability of public officials. We impose sanctions whenever there is any kind of inconsistency or incomplete information in the declarations. Whenever



Haykuhi Harutyunyan, Chair of the Corruption Prevention Commission of Armenia (second from left) meets Alexander Sokolovsky, Deputy Director of the USAID Washington Office (centre), to discuss the US Government's long-term commitment to assist the Commission and anti-corruption reforms in Armenia, November 2021.

there is a reasonable suspicion that the wealth, or a change in wealth, of a public official cannot be justified by their lawful income, we send the case to the Prosecutor General's Office.

In the past year, some important criminal cases have been initiated based on our findings. Even judges have been removed from their positions after investigation, and members of the executive branch of government have been sanctioned for not submitting full declarations.

These moves send a signal to all public officials, and to society in general, that impunity and illegitimate dealings will no longer be tolerated in Armenia. They uphold a principle of the rule of law: that everyone, no matter how important or well connected, is equal before the law, and will face the same appropriate sanctions as anyone else who has violated the law. These actions are signs that we have something that really does work, and that the country is on the path to change.

Another new but important aspect of our work is integrity checking. We have established a new system, based on a methodology developed with the

support of the Council of Europe, to verify a person's background before they are appointed to a particular position. We look at the individual's previous work behaviour, wealth, and connections, to ensure they have not been using their connections or family relations for unlawful gain.

Since 2020, we have submitted more than 100 opinions on candidates ranging from judicial nominees and public prosecutor nominees to anti-corruption and law enforcement officials. These have included some negative assessments, for it was crucial that some of these candidates not be appointed to the positions for which they were applying. This also signals to newcomers that the old system of relying on family connections or other undue influence for an official position is no longer acceptable.

Going forward, we will broaden the positions for which we conduct integrity checks. We will also raise more awareness because prevention is different from punishment; prevention requires long-term investment in training and education. We also need to raise public awareness about the harm corruption does and empower citizens and civic groups to act against it.

### Leveraging Technology

When we started this Commission, we had an intuitive understanding that we would receive a large amount of data that would not be possible to analyse manually. So, we looked into an automated approach, in particular for asset declarations.

We are developing a platform using artificial intelligence and algorithmic decision-making that will both manage the data collation process and automate reporting to the public. It will allow us to analyse the data and immediately identify gaps, or trends; for example, it may flag any unusual change in the wealth of a particular public official. Technology can not only help us to manage the massive amounts of data, but also use it to predict trends and anticipate potential wrongdoing. It will thus have a truly preventative function.

In the process of building this system, we have been partnering with the private sector, and developing a code of conduct for them as well. Conflict of interest, equal opportunity, and rules-based management needs to be in place in the private sector too. In this way, the development of digital technology will help to improve norms in society at large.



Armenia's Corruption Prevention Commission has grown quickly in the two years since its establishment. Photo: Corruption Prevention Commission

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***We have a young staff, and one of my tasks is to make sure that everyone goes home after work each day with a clear answer to the question: what have I done for the country? I hope this can have a multiplier effect that will ripple through society at large.***

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### Changing Societal and Professional Norms

The CPC's work is to ensure that the state has an institutional and systemic approach to preventing corruption, and that the institutions themselves will be resilient against corruption. We are targeting all the areas where corruption traditionally took hold and where there was a high degree of impunity to act improperly. We are also working to change attitudes, so that the societal norms themselves will evolve, and this new culture that respects the rule of law can be sustained.

The Commission represents a new kind of public institution. It may sound simple, but to have a new institution led by women, where there is a majority of women in positions of authority and leadership,

is already a game changer. It is not what Armenian society, where institutions are most often led by men, is accustomed to. It immediately shifts attitudes, not always in a positive way, but it already offers the image of a new way of doing things.

Once that happens, you then go on to provide the substance, you act with that change as part of the way you conduct yourself, and that is how you change the rules of the game that everyone used to play. After a time, the new norms are accepted as if they were always in existence.

There are already behavioural changes you can notice among public officials. They have become much more careful, because they know we are serious about our



regulations and our sanctions. They realise our checks have real consequences for themselves and their careers, and word gets around. Today, we have more confidence that our work is being taken seriously.

Apart from behavioural norms, it is also important to improve our professional standards. A legacy of the Soviet era is that we have formal institutions that are designed to benefit the regime, not the state. We are trying to change them, so that they operate more professionally, and ensure that the rule of law is based on clear regulations that are relevant, effective, and serve people. This is a huge and complex task that requires changing the existing legislation, and it is all interlinked: you change one small piece, and the rest of the system is affected.

### **Finding the Right People to Enable Change**

We were fortunate that the five original commissioners of the CPC are professionals in our own right, with expertise in specialised fields such as law, economics, auditing and banking. Our combined experience makes a difference in trying to change how state institutions operate.

Initially, we struggled to find suitable staff with the right professional expertise. Then we shifted our approach and decided instead to recruit good young people who have potential, and then train them up on the job, based on our own professional experience.

Not everyone can make it: learning by doing requires a certain capacity, such as adaptability and the ability to act on several different issues at the same time. When we can, we also offer professional training. This developmental approach then becomes an incentive for others to join us. At the same time, we are also trying to persuade the government to offer better salaries and to adopt a more specialist approach to hiring.

### **Inspiring Change and Keeping the Momentum Going**

Of course, all this is just the beginning of a long, slow process. We are working against entrenched interests. What always comes to mind is, with the limited time one has, how quickly one can deliver real results.

But this challenge also keeps us going. To even plant the seeds of change is already a result, which was not possible before. When you work against the system, sometimes shaking or tearing it down, you can end up with chaos, failure, and noise. That too is a consequence of change. The beginning of such a process is always painful, when the dirty work must be done. We should not be afraid sometimes of failing. And every day brings some sign, however small, that things are changing, that change is possible. At the end of the day, when you see the change you've made, that also motivates you to carry on the next day.

I hope our work inspires others and becomes a source of further change. We have a young staff, and one of my tasks is to make sure that everyone goes home after work each day with a clear answer to the question: what have I done for the country? I hope this can have a multiplier effect that will ripple through society at large.

I tell my staff that we may not see the results of what we do immediately. To build a country is not an easy task. But it is an honour, and a privilege. They can be proud being part of the change, in setting up a new institution with a new approach, to ensure a bright future for those who will come after us.

GOVERNANCE IN PRACTICE

# Responsive, Coordinated and Competent Public Service



**PETER POGAČAR**  
 Director General, Public Sector Directorate  
 Ministry of Public Administration, Slovenia

*As Director General of the Public Sector Directorate, Peter Pogačar is responsible for the systemic regulation, organisation, operation and modernisation of Slovenia's public sector. He is also Chief Government Negotiator for the public sector.*

**R**esponding to a Crisis  
 Although Slovenia has a strong tradition of public service, those outside the public sector did not always know or appreciate what we do. This changed with the COVID-19 pandemic. People realised that the public sector was continuing to provide essential services even during our lockdown: from hospital and healthcare to online education, document applications and so on. These were services we simply could not shut down, even during a crisis. It showed that our public administration could be resilient to shock.

The night the pandemic was declared in Slovenia, a new government had just been appointed. I had a new Minister who had just come in. Our measures to deal with the pandemic had to be written overnight.

My office's mission was to provide public services, and we spared no effort. We worked through the night: we were on the line 24/7 with our Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Social Affairs. We made arrangements and provided the legal, financial, and other incentives so civil servants could be reallocated to areas where they were most needed and could be compensated for doing higher-risk work. We worked



with the trade unions and business owners to ensure that all this was done with the consent of the workers. It was good to see union leaders, who have a powerful voice in Slovenia, come together with us to reach the necessary agreements quickly and communicate these to their members.

A year later there have been legal experts and scholars looking over the technical implementation of these pandemic measures and how they could have been conceived differently. But at the time, they had to be written literally overnight. Indeed, it was a surprise to some people how committed civil servants were: we were working 18-hour days from home to get the provisions ready for government approval.

**Improving Institutions**

The pandemic has changed perceptions about the public service. In fact, we at the Ministry of Public



Participants attend a conference as part of the Partnership for Change project, an exchange programme to promote collaboration between the private and public sectors. Credit: Public Sector Directorate, Ministry of Public Administration, Slovenia.

Administration (MPA) have been working hard to improve the quality of our public sector.

The public sector-wide project for the implementation of the Common Assessment Framework (CAF) tool is one example. The CAF model is based on the business excellence model of the European Fund for Quality Management and is intended for integrated quality management and development in the public sector. In the process of performing assessments using the CAF model, organisations learn how to improve the quality of their management and performance.

Another programme we have, called Connectivity, Openness, Quality, aims to improve the management and transparency of public administration using new tools and methods, and greater interconnectivity. It will reduce the cost burden of using information technology systems in central administration, ensure

their functional coverage, and optimise public sector business processes. One of the projects under this initiative is the national open data platform, OPSI (<https://podatki.gov.si/>), which provides free and easy access to open government data for any (profitable or non-profit) purpose.

### **Nurturing Public Sector Competencies and Talent**

Competencies are another area of priority in our efforts to enhance the public sector. Four years ago, we established a framework of civil service competencies. What's important is that these were developed from the bottom up, by civil servants. They were guided through the process to form a competence model, comprising core leadership and work-related competencies. The next project in the pipeline is the establishment of a Competency centre, which will provide systematic support for the use of the competency model, assist managers and HR services in personnel processes such

as recruitment and employment, employee training and development, as well as succession planning and intergenerational cooperation.

When any of our 14 Ministries and 58 administrative units open a vacancy, they each have to conduct their own selection procedure, with their own criteria. The establishment of a Competency centre will help streamline recruitment, so there can be a unified entry point, with compatible standards across public agencies, including a psychological evaluation and so on. Ministries will then only be able to hire someone who has passed these basic entry requirements. This approach would also limit political influence in the selection process, so only those who are qualified, not just those with close ties to the politicians, will be able to take on positions in the public sector. Indeed, for the past 20 years, senior civil servants such as myself already have to be thoroughly evaluated by a special council before being appointed to office, for the same reasons.

Another advantage of having a competency framework is that it can make job rotations within the civil service much easier. Job rotations matter, because when people stay in one role for too long, they become an expert in that field, but cannot see the bigger picture. They can develop what is a problem

in many public sectors: a silo mentality. To address this, some public administrations in Europe, such as the UK and France, have mandatory rotations. While Slovenia's is too small to make rotations mandatory, we are still trying to increase them.

There is a real benefit to job rotations in the public sector. For 10 years, I was Director General at the Ministry of Labour, responsible for the labour market and pension system. When I came to the Ministry of Public Administration, I could use that experience in my work: I knew the system from another angle and also who to call at the Ministry of Labour, for example, to get things done.

Next year, we plan to introduce an information system that will support certain HR processes in the central administration. One of the modules provided within the information system is a form of internal labour market within the central administration. So civil servants will be able to choose to switch from say the Ministry of Public Administration to the Ministry of Labour, without requiring a new contract: because the Republic of Slovenia is still the employer. Using an app, they will be able to input their education and skills to see the roles they qualify for; organisations can also find people who are available, based on what competencies are needed.



### Partnership for Change

To establish closer ties between the private and public sectors, the Ministry started an initiative called Partnership for Change, where exchanges of employees from the private and public sector are organised. For example, an employee from a financial or IT company can spend a few days working in a Ministry, and vice versa.

This initiative helped to break down stereotypes about each other's work, to build trust, and to demonstrate that collaboration between the public and the private sectors is possible and can lead to innovative outcomes. For instance, the programme has led to the prototyping of new ideas, such as job rotations in the public sector.





Four scenarios resulted from a strategic foresight exercise to explore alternative futures for Slovenia's talent management system. Photo: Observatory of Public Sector Innovation.

Apart from unified and rigorous entry criteria, we are also raising the competencies of our people. An organisation is only as effective as its employees. Therefore, investing in employees, their training and education are some of the fundamentals for the success of an organisation. My directorate oversees the Administrative Academy, which trains civil servants. In the past, most of the training programmes were knowledge and content-based, focusing on the wage system and so on. We are now also emphasising training for development of soft skills, including digital skills. When the competency model is more established, we will be able to assess which competencies are lacking and emphasise that area of training.

We are also trying to change our work culture, which in the past has not valued lifelong learning. Civil servants over 45 don't feel the need to gain any more training. One of my ambitions is to follow the Finnish example and implement several hours of mandatory training per month for civil servants, in any kind of skill. Besides, with online platforms, training no longer needs to mean an absence from the office.

This is also a matter of retaining people. Many civil servants leave once they fulfil their retirement conditions not because they lack knowledge of their area of work, but because they lack the current skills to make use of that knowledge.

### Attracting and Managing Talent

One area in which there is room for improvement is our compensation, which is still based on seniority: older workers will always get more promotions and

a higher salary than younger ones. Whereas in fact, quality talent is distributed across age groups. In my opinion, there is not enough room in our pay system for performance-based rewards: only 2% of gross salary can be performance-based.

That said, attracting talent is not just about pay. In many areas, we cannot compete with private sector wages. But there are other benefits we can offer. Despite popular perceptions, public sector work can be really interesting and diverse.

Attracting and retaining talent is also about career development and finding the right motivational factors that matter to people. We need to find out what else is attractive to Slovenians who want to do something for the country that is rewarding.

For example, we can help look after their life needs, such as housing in a relatively expensive city like Ljubljana. The stability of the civil service is still a draw: if a company shuts down you will lose your job but that is less likely in the civil service. There is better work-life balance overall, even though there are periods of intense work, such as during the pandemic lockdown. These advantages help at the entry level, but later we will need to build career plans based on their future goals, helping them to realise their ambitions. These are things we can do without placing a severe strain on our budget.

Of course, in the public sector you are also helping your fellow citizens with your work; you are earning an emotional salary.

One of the things about running a good institution is to have a good positive organisational culture and good working conditions. We should make the public service a friendly workplace that provides employees with necessary skills and training, as well as tools, equipment and infrastructure to work well. And in tough times, it is their co-workers and leaders who keep people going, who provide support and motivation.

### The Role of Leaders in the Public Sector

When I give lectures to top managers, I always say that our main responsibility is not to type memos—others can do that—but to manage people. It's our core job.

It's also our job to act as a buffer between our people and the politics: we need to filter and protect our people so they can get the job done.

Leaders must listen. They must enable working environments where it is possible to try out new things and sometimes to fail in doing so. People working under a leader need to believe that they can make a difference, improve things.

Working in public administration gives me the opportunity to make systemic changes. That is also one of the motivating factors at my job—to be able

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**Leaders must listen. They must enable working environments where it is possible to try out new things and sometimes to fail in doing so.**




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to co-create the development and improvement of public administration governance. My current position enables me to influence the solutions for challenges in human resource management and development in the central administration.

In turn, my colleagues are the ones that give me the motivation that I need to continue the work in my position. We have a working environment where we support and learn from each other, not only to be better public employees but also to grow as people. And that is the true added value.

As I like to say: it's all about the people.

### Co-Creating Future Talent Management Strategies For The Public Sector

The Ministry of Public Administration decided to tackle the challenges of the changing nature of work and an ageing population through anticipatory innovation with the guidance of the OECD Observatory for Public Sector Innovation.

Through a series of workshops, the participants, which included specialists from different organisations, were guided in using strategic foresight methods to envision what the future of the public sector in Slovenia will be in 10 years, what kind of HR management we want at that time and how we can prepare for this envisaged future now. This exercise led to a set of innovative proposals for the future.

An important aspect of this exercise was to ensure adequate and appropriate participation. Because this anticipatory innovation was mostly unknown to the majority of civil servants, effort had to be put into convincing them to participate, on top of their usual work obligations.

Feedback from the participants has been mostly positive, with many of them excited that they were trying out a new way of thinking and working.

Such exercises encourage working together across organisations and professions, helping to break down the silo mentality.



Public service reform and transformation have become increasingly important functions within the Kenyan public sector. Photo: Ministry of Public Service, Gender, Senior Citizens Affairs and Special Programmes.

## GOVERNANCE IN PRACTICE

# Empowering Public Service Reform



### EMMANUEL LUBEMBE

Chai, Public Service Emerging Leaders Fellowship (PSELF) Steering Committee

*Emmanuel Lubembe spent over 30 years with Kenya's public service, rising through the ranks to become the director for its public service reform programme, and later, the head of the Kenyan government's public service transformation programme. Retiring from government service in 2013, he joined Deloitte & Touche as Director, Public Sector. Since 2018, he has been a private consultant on government-related policies and strategies, having worked with the World Bank and other multilateral agencies in Kenya.*

## **T**he Challenge of Public Service Reform

Some of my most enjoyable work in the public service has been in the field of public service reforms. When I joined the Office of the President, which

oversees reforms, Kenya had just developed a civil service reform and action plan to address deteriorating standards in service delivered to citizens. There was a certain lethargy: too much bureaucracy, and civil servants were not motivated. While public sector salaries were low, the wage bill was already very high, crowding out funding for operations, maintenance, and the actual delivery of services to the people of Kenya.

So, the government initiated a reform programme and action plan around 1994. For the next four to five years there was a focus on managing the wage bill, improving personnel management in the public service, and capacity building.

One of the main challenges was that the reform programme was not easily accepted in the public service at that time. There was no sense of ownership: it was seen as something driven from outside. The programme was also limited in scope. While it dealt with the civil service, the teaching service was not included and it kept employing more people and increasing the wage bill. In 1997–1998, the programme moved to the next phase to include all public sector institutions.

The major achievement of the earlier reforms was to raise awareness in the public sector of the need to change the way we do things. Getting demotivated public sector officers to own and embrace the reforms was not easy and took time.



In 2003, a new government came in and developed an economic recovery strategy for wealth and employment creation. To drive and implement that the government advocated the use of a Results-Based Management (RBM) approach, and the New Public Management model, which became a major initiative for driving reforms. This was also when we became more comprehensive. Every single ministry and the top levels of governmental agencies was required to have an internal reform unit.

We found a number of tools useful in supporting the reforms. One of these was performance contracts—where public agencies had to be accountable for specified results each year. Another was the rapid results initiative (RRI), where we took the results expected of each Ministry and cut them up into smaller 100-day requirements. This helped keep the agencies on track to achieve the targets set in their performance contracts. Because these tools enforced accountability from within each institution’s purview, they helped the public sector agencies own the reforms. What the central government oversaw was the coordination and capacity building.

### Devolving Power And Responsibility to Local Administrations

Devolution, enacted in Kenya’s Constitution of 2010 and implemented from 2013, brought new challenges. The aim was to decentralise power, resources and authority to move closer to the people. We first had to build up the structures, systems, processes and procedures to support devolution. Then we needed to ensure there were enough qualified staff in the devolved units.

Those in the counties often lacked the requisite skills and knowledge to run what amounted to a micro government at the local level. Although skilled civil servants were seconded from the central government to the local administrations, there weren’t enough officers to cover all of Kenya’s 47 counties. We still had to recruit and build up the capacities of public servants at the county level.

Much of the early work in the counties involved capacity building and developing structures, policies, strategies, procedures and processes. The local governments often borrowed policies from the national government and customised them to their needs and goals. Kenya is still a unitary state,



Citizens register for Huduma Namba, Kenya’s National Integrated Identity Management System, Nakuru Town.

not a federal state. There is therefore a need to strengthen intra-governmental relations; to link the nation, the national government, and devolved administrations. The understanding is that planning and policies in the counties should be aligned with national planning and policies.

Apart from facilitating the integration of planning at the national and local levels, the national government also serves an important function in capacity building to ensure the counties can carry out their roles, responsibilities, and functions. At the central government level, the Kenya School of Government (KSG) developed a capacity-building programme to support the counties in different areas of governance, including policymaking and human resource management. The KSG also developed new programmes to cater to the training needs identified in the different counties.

I spent a lot of time helping counties to understand how to develop and make use of institutional



frameworks and to strengthen their organisational design—functions that used to be carried out by the central government, but which were now the purview of the local administrations. I was also very involved in performance management—this was important to overcome the bureaucratic tendency of institutions to push paper rather than focus on results and outcomes. I have learnt that putting in place a proper performance management system, to ensure that results are produced for the people being served, is an important process.

While the national government has provided funding and resources to all 47 counties, they differ in terms of how quickly they have progressed in improving services to the people. In my opinion, this is a matter of the kind of leadership in those counties.

### **Leadership Makes the Difference**

In Kenya the public service commission recruits civil servants nationally, based on certain criteria and characteristics they have identified. Each of the

counties has their own equivalent public service board that identifies and recruits people. Civil servants are given an appropriate grounding, within a broader values framework, and as they receive the necessary training, potential leaders are identified and groomed. This process is based not on any predetermined criteria, but on a perception that a particular person will do well.

Nevertheless, context and grounding are important traits: some people may be skilled but not grounded, and once they are promoted to higher levels, may not be able to carry out the duties and responsibilities required of them. They may lack the proper understanding of the intricacies of public service: not only technical skills, but soft skills such as diplomacy and persuasion are also required to make sure you can obtain the necessary resources to deliver the outcomes expected. Indeed, the recent engagement with the Chandler Institute of Governance is the beginning of a process to help Kenya be more systematic and deliberate in identifying potential leaders.

### **Delivering Results that Matter to the People**

When you serve in the government, the outcome of your efforts affects the whole country. Thus, the satisfaction of achievement is greater than if you are in the private sector. Whatever you do is done for citizens, so it must be citizen-centric and results oriented.

When talking about reforms and transformation, the fundamental and sustainable change we mean is based on citizens' needs and aspirations. You start with citizens, define what kind of results you are looking for and ask yourself whether you have the capacity to deliver those results.

We should design service delivery around convenience to citizens, not to the agency's convenience. This is why, in Kenya, we learnt from other countries and came up with what we call the Huduma Centres, which provide physical one-stop service centres across the country. There is also an online service portal.

Starting with your citizens, you build the capacity to deliver the service they need, and then check back with the citizen to find out whether he or she is satisfied. We have the habit of assuming what citizens want without talking to them. But the best person to tell you whether you have done well is still the citizen.

## GOVERNANCE IN PRACTICE

# Contextual Capacity: How Countries Can Find Their Own Way to Good Governance

**KAMEL AYADI**

Member, Advisory Council,  
Chandler Institute of Governance

*Kamel Ayadi has served in ministerial level positions, including as Minister of Governance and Anti-corruption in the Government of Tunisia, then Minister to the Head of the State of Tunisia in charge of the high level Authority on Financial and Administrative Control (2016–2020). He is currently an international consultant on governance, ethics, and anti-corruption strategies. A member of the Board of Directors of the World Justice Project (Washington), he is also founding chairman of the World Leadership and Ethics Institute, and of the Global Infrastructure Anti-corruption Centre.*

**H**ow Governments can Make Good Use of Global Governance Reports and Indices  
Global indices, such as the CGGI, offer a perspective that local measures and indicators cannot. They give countries a sense of whether local policies are producing results, and of how these results compare with others: with neighbouring countries, with other countries that are similar, and with the rest of the world.

These results can stimulate change because the global ranking becomes a challenge. Countries are in competition with their neighbours—for foreign direct investment, for instance—and so they need to project the best image of themselves abroad, which their global rankings in such indices can offer. These indices have credibility because of their independence as well as the special expertise they offer.

Global indices are the lens through which countries are seen from abroad, and they exert an impact that countries cannot ignore. For instance, a country's

rating by Standard and Poor's (S&P) or Moody's can determine the credit-worthiness of a country, and whether it can borrow money from international banks or from another country. Investors wanting to know about a country's record in terms of its rule of law, governance, human rights, infrastructure, education levels and so on will refer to these indices.

Such indices can also help countries progress, and to develop a vision of where they want to be in future. The right indicators, coupled with appropriate training to help countries understand the underlying issues, can help governments to identify their own strengths and shortcomings, and improve their performance over time.

It may be easier to construct and publish a set of indicators than it is to help countries take advantage of it. The question, after first raising awareness of the issues underlying these indicators, is how to initiate reform to resolve them.

An important aspect of this is to complement global indices with local assessments tailored to the specific context of countries and regions being analysed. For example, if I want to use Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index to address corruption in a country, I cannot, because it cannot tell me in which sectors corruption has increased and where it has decreased. It may be that only one sector is compromised but has skewed public perception.

For this reason, we should develop new tools and data to help governments go further into the details, so that these indicators can be used not just as tools for advocacy, or for blaming and shaming countries, but to support improvement. We cannot, for instance, initiate an anti-corruption strategy without the means to find out what has worked well and exactly what needs



to be improved. So, we need more local indicators to complement the broader global measures that show you where you stand relative to other countries.

In the case of anti-corruption efforts, for instance, the trend now is to focus not on measuring corruption but on integrity. It is about defining and assessing your local integrity system, which is to say whether you have robust institutions to combat corruption; an independent and efficient judiciary, checks and balances, auditing bodies, as well as citizen participation, transparency, access to information and so on. So instead of saying whether a country is corrupt or not corrupt, what you look for are weaknesses in your system that may become an opportunity for corruption to increase. You combat corruption by building stable and robust systems and processes to maintain integrity.

#### **Integrity and Good Governance Go Hand in Hand**

The research I have done, based on different global indices looking at governance and the rule of law, indicates that good governance is strongly correlated with less corruption. They follow the same path. Accountability is associated with a high standard of governance; impunity implies a lack of accountability and leads to an erosion of trust. If you have bad

governance, you will have corruption. If you want to improve governance in your country, you must improve the rule of law and its systems of accountability.

Now, the rule of law often rests on the independence and effectiveness of the judiciary. If you lack that, then poor behaviour goes unpunished, and you will have impunity. But ending corruption is not just about sanctions, tough measures, and rules. You also have to work on prevention. This means you have to improve your administration in general so that corruption will become the exception and good governance the rule. Once that has become the norm, you can then fight instances of corruption with rules and punitive measures.

Having greater rule of law also gives you more opportunity to think about better prevention systems, which will reduce the incidences of corruption to a level that the system can address without being overwhelmed. What happens in many countries, as was the case in the past in Tunisia, is that corruption is so rife—you simply cannot prosecute and send everyone to jail. So, you have to come up with a different, transitional justice simply to cope, even as you build up more robust governance, including better audit systems, better controls, better investigation.

You also need to teach people what the right thing to do is, because sometimes they step out of line and find themselves in jail because they did not know the right rules. Developing good governance also implies that you work on your human capacity and expertise.

### Doing the Right Things Versus Doing Things Right

The most important factor in implementing reform is giving priority to human beings. The toughest obstacle to reform is human opposition to change. You can find resources, strategies and so on, but the most important question is how to turn that human resistance into a force for transformation.

When you are advancing reform, you need to have people on your side, not against you. You need to give them ownership of the project. In some countries, trade unions often try to stop reforms when they can. So, when you want to initiate change, you must consider how to persuade them to be on your side. Otherwise, you will have a strike the next day, and you will have failed as an official who is a good technician and technocrat but who cannot translate his knowledge and techniques into the local culture and political context.

Reform is not just about imposing rules and procedures; you can take the best rules, but they will be useless in the wrong context. For this reason, it is not appropriate to just copy and paste international best practice which was successful elsewhere into a different context. Each country needs to find its own way to do things, based on their context.


This is also why it is important to start by building local capacity. Local and international experts should work hand in hand, so that international knowledge can be assimilated and adapted for the local context. You need local experts who can understand the technical dimensions of the work, but also know how to consider the local culture and circumstances. We tend to forget that global tools and standards are intended for a different context.

I was part of an ISO expert panel drafting international standards. When I was a Minister in Tunisia I wanted us to be the first country to implement these standards, and I selected three state-owned companies to implement them. The experiment was not a success. What I realised was that experts tend to think all the time of the norms of the developed world, forgetting that these standards are also intended to apply to countries where there isn't the same culture of standardisation and normalisation.

We must never forget that governance does not only have to do with procedures, rules and standards and best practices, but touches on a very wide range of dimensions, including the cultural and the human. You can change the rules and procedures, but you cannot easily change human behaviour.

When I started in anti-corruption work in 2005, our main approach was to provide the government and companies with tools and instruments to fight corruption. Now, tools like the ISO 37001 anti-bribery management standard, which I helped produce, are powerful if you implement them correctly. But I also realised that tools alone are not sufficient to address corruption—you must also work on human behaviour. It is not enough to teach them to do things right; to be in compliance with rules and procedures. You must also teach people ethical behaviour, what it means to do the right thing. And that requires a completely different kind of training and education.

In the end, best practice in governance is not about blindly adopting what rules and standards have worked elsewhere. Best practice is about changing human behaviour; to develop a culture and attitudes that are aligned to the desired outcomes that we need. It is about cultivating a sense of meaning, purpose and the greater good.







BEHIND THE NUMBERS

# Building Public Sector Capabilities Through Training



**KENNETH SIM**

Dean, Chandler Academy of Governance

*As Dean, Kenneth sets the strategic direction for the Chandler Academy and oversees the design and delivery of its training programmes. Kenneth is an experienced practitioner with more than 15 years of experience in the Singapore Public Service, where he was formerly Special Assistant to the Deputy Prime Minister.*

**P**ublic sector capabilities matter to good governance. As the findings from the CGGI show, strong government capabilities and good outcomes, such as in healthcare and education, go hand in hand. Unlike conversations on political systems and ideologies, which can be slippery and divisive, capabilities provide a politically neutral and practical platform upon which to advance action on improving governance.

## Developing Public Sector Capability

If capabilities matter, what can governments do about them?

First, the capability development journey begins with an articulation of the specific capabilities that individual public servants need, usually in the form of a competency framework. This provides a common yardstick to measure the performance of individual public servants. Competency frameworks reflect a public service's values, ethos, and role in society, and how that service interacts vis-à-vis the political system. This is also why competency frameworks, especially those for public sector leaders, will vary across different countries and regions.

Second, governments need an effective system to appoint and reward the "right" people in public service. This includes a meritocratic system for appointments to public service roles, as well as a robust performance appraisal system that fairly and objectively measures individual performance



and the desired public service values. It also means having a system that rewards those who do well, that appropriately supports those who do not yet meet the required standards, and that firmly addresses those who do not endeavour to do so.

Third, governments need to nurture and empower institutions that support learning and development, such as the national schools of government. Beyond being important repositories of knowledge and capabilities, these institutions deliver practitioner-oriented training, and help reinforce public sector culture and ethos.

These components must be implemented in tandem, mutually reinforcing and complementing one another. For example, performance appraisal and training must be tied to the required competencies. Doing this well requires the different parties involved to coordinate closely, and establish systems and policies to ensure coherence in public sector capability development.

## Training Matters

Training forms a key component of learning and development, and therefore more broadly supports the overall capability development framework.

Training codifies knowledge, competencies, and values that are essential to public sector work, much of



which is often implicit and cannot be easily learnt by observation alone. Through this codification, training reinforces the importance of desired competencies and behaviours in public service.

Additionally, training provides a framework for individuals to contextualise knowledge and competencies, allowing them to make connections with what they practise and observe in their daily work and the competencies they need to develop. In doing so, training sets the stage for continual learning.

### What Does Good Training Look Like?

Globally, we have come very far from the days where public sector training was only about an outmoded and theory-based curriculum, delivered through didactic one-way informational lectures. Yet, there is scope for those of us in the space of public sector training to improve.

There are four key elements that, if combined and implemented systematically, can improve the quality and effectiveness of training.

First, the curriculum, while incorporating good practices internationally, must be locally contextualised. Policy challenges are often not unique, and this offers governments the opportunity to learn from one another across the world. But each country or region

also has its unique situation, and policy solutions can only work if they are informed by and tailored to an administration's specific political, economic, and social context.

Second, training must be practitioner-oriented. Policy implementation and service delivery happens in the real world, the success of which is influenced by myriad factors such as political feasibility, salience to individuals and communities, and the resilience of the execution systems embedded within government, to name just a few. It is important that training programmes codify practitioner wisdom and tradecraft in terms of what can work, as opposed to what should work. Good training programmes must therefore focus on the "how", beyond the "what" and the "why".

Third, the nature of training must systematically consider the skills and knowledge that public servants require at different stages in their careers. For example, training programmes for young public servants need to provide grounding in core skills in policy design and implementation, as well as in the ethos and values of public service. Programmes targeted at more senior leaders may need to focus on collective leadership and culture-building. Training should therefore be systematically curated for and aligned to different career milestones.



The Chandler Academy of Governance supports government partners in different countries with training programmes designed for local contexts.

Finally, training that leverages technology can reap dividends in terms of scale without sacrificing learner understanding and engagement. The COVID-19 pandemic has forced us to rethink how to conduct training, opening up opportunities to harness innovative delivery approaches, such as through blended or asynchronous learning.

### **The Chandler Academy of Governance**

At the Chandler Academy of Governance (CAG), which is part of the Chandler Institute of Governance, these considerations underpin the design and delivery of our training programmes.

Although we are based in Singapore, we ensure that our training programmes draw on international good practices that are locally contextualised. For example, we collaborated with local partners to design the curriculum for the Public Service Emerging Leaders Fellowship Programme in Kenya. This 12-month programme supports young Kenyan public sector leaders in acquiring foundational skills in policy design and implementation, developing the ethos of public sector leadership, and applying concepts and practices associated with citizen-centric service delivery. For further contextualisation, we have worked with our Kenyan partners to identify local trainers and facilitators.

We also ensure that our programmes are highly practitioner-oriented. CAG’s faculty and experts are typically practitioners or have significant experience in working with governments. For example, we

have worked with the Punjab Bureau of Investment Promotion to deliver a 4-day training programme on planning, developing, and managing successful industrial parks. Delivered by seasoned practitioners, the programme focused on the “how”, such as the core processes involved in industrial park development and cluster planning, and analysed elements of effective industrial park management.

As with many other training organisations, CAG has accelerated our move towards online learning following the COVID-19 pandemic. A large proportion of our programmes are now conducted remotely, facilitated by online technologies and pedagogies. We are also actively developing our capabilities and technological infrastructure to deliver blended and asynchronous learning more effectively. These innovations have great potential to scale CAG’s reach and offerings to more of our government partners globally, while maintaining high levels of learner engagement.

### **Building Public Sector Capabilities Through Training**

Through training programmes such as these, the CAG hopes to support governments in building their capabilities. While training is not the only factor in advancing good governance, thoughtfully designed training programmes can exert an outsized influence in developing and sustaining an effective and professional cadre of public servants—enabling them to truly make a difference to their countries and the billions of people they serve.

# Methodology and Indicator Updates

The CGGI is into its second iteration, and the methodology for the 2022 Index has largely remained the same as in 2021—most of the metrics used in the 2021 pilot have continued to be used in the 2022 edition.

Of the 53 metrics carried over from the 2021 edition, one metric has been swapped and a further three metrics have been incorporated into the CGGI methodology, bring the total number of metrics for the 2022 model to 56. The changes to the indicators are summarised below.



**Data Capability Indicator:** As announced by the World Bank, the Statistical Performance Indicators (SPI) will be replacing the Statistical Capacity Indicators. The SPI framework covers several of the same topics as the SCI, such as statistical methodology, data, and periodicity, but expands into new areas as well. The SPI measures several additional national capabilities such as infrastructure and resource components of statistical systems.



**Property Rights Indicator:** A new metric from the PRIndex Property Rights survey was included in the 2022 Index. This metric captures the level of physical property rights protection from the perspective of citizens. It complements the existing metric from WEF's competitiveness index, which captures survey responses from business executives.



**Passport Strength Indicator:** Despite COVID-19, the types of restrictions governments are putting on travel have little to do with passport strength. This year the world has learnt to live with the virus. Many countries have lifted travel restrictions and this is a reliable indication of the level of passport strength compared with when COVID-19 was high.



**Gender Gap Indicator:** We added a metric into the Gender Gap indicator that measures the differences in access to education between males and females. The country's ability to educate women and men is measured using literacy rates between women and men.

## Overview of Methodology

The Chandler Good Government Index is a composite Index that measures the capability and effectiveness of governments. Our framework and dimensions (pillars) of good governance are derived from interviews and research on what capabilities and characteristics are most important for a government to perform its duties and succeed.

The Index is designed as a practical tool that government institutions, leaders, and officers can use to support organisational learning and capability development. The Index also contributes to the rich global conversation on the meaning of good government and the importance of governance.

The graphic below depicts the Index's framework, which is made up of seven pillars and 35 indicators. The 35 indicators are made up of more than 50 metrics—of which 31 metrics are qualitative data sources (i.e. perception surveys, expert assessments, etc.).

The Index uses the most relevant metrics for each indicator, as determined by government and data experts, research on the pillars, and a set of selection criteria:

1. The metric must be distributed in a free-to-access form in the public domain and online. That is, an independent person must be able to access the data from a publicly accessible and free-to-use website. This supports replicability and widespread use.
2. The metric should as far as possible be actionable and should measure some quality or capability of governance that government leaders and officers can act on to improve performance.
3. The metric must be quantifiable and, if not directly collected and published as numerical data, there must be a way to convert the data into a clear and relevant numerical format.
4. The metric must provide data points for a large enough range of countries.



CHANDLER  
GOOD GOVERNMENT  
INDEX

PILLARS



\* Indicators in blue are not included in this edition of the Index due to data issues, and will be considered for future editions.

**Pillars of the Chandler Good Government Index**

The CGGI uses metrics that determine the capabilities of government, that affect the performance of government, and are within the control of government to influence and improve. In addition, the CGGI also includes several outcome indicators that act as a check, to see the extent to which government

capabilities, policies, and inputs generate valuable outcomes for citizens and society in general.

The Index is made up of 35 indicators, which are organised into a framework of seven pillars. The full list of the indicators can be found in Table 1. Those indicators listed in italics refer to metrics that were not included in the 2021 edition of the CGGI.

### Imputation

Missing data from the metrics are imputed via several methods:

1. Looking for another indicator or study that measures a similar concept or theme.
2. Finding the average values of peer countries after filtering for geography and income.

These are commonly used in many major global indices.

### Transformation and Normalisation

Each metric is normalised to a 0–1 scale to create a standardised scale for comparison and aggregation. Indicators that comprise more than one metric are weighted equally, aggregated, and rescaled again.

### Data Aggregation and Ranking

The final score of the Index is aggregated using a simple average of all 35 indicators. This means that each indicator in the Index has an equal weighting. Finally, countries are ranked.

### Index Country Coverage

The Index is globally representative and measures a total of 104 countries. The total population of the countries included in the CGGI represent approximately 90% of the overall global population (2020). We will continue to expand our country coverage as more data becomes available.

### Limitations and Challenges

The Index is composed of third-party open-source data. As such, the Index is subject to the robustness and methodologies of those data sources. We believe every indicator that is measured in the Index represents an important aspect of good governance, but have chosen not to include certain indicators due to data discrepancies and methodological challenges.

In some cases, a metric used does not provide data points for every country in our Index. Missing data points for countries that are not covered are imputed using standard statistical practices.

The CGGI measures several subjective qualities of government, such as how effective the leadership is in implementing policies, or how stable business regulations are in a country. These qualities of government tend to be assessed through expert assessments or surveys. We acknowledge the subjectivity in the data. We have made every effort to identify and use metrics where the methodology of expert assessments is robust and evidence driven. The CGGI ranks countries (overall, by pillar and by indicator) based on their scores to the third decimal place. We recognise the inherent limits and challenges of false precision. When the scores are displayed as rankings, these are ordinal in nature and may not reflect the actual scores of countries.

### Opportunities for Further Work by the Research Community

The CGGI calls upon the wider research community to work alongside us around several aspects of governance that we are considering for future iterations of the Index. These research areas include ways to measure:

- Ethical leadership
- Quality of government HR processes
- Central Bank independence
- Effective government communications (especially digital communications)

## Table 1: Indicator Definitions And Sources

### Pillar One: Leadership and Foresight

Indicator	Definition	Year	Type	Source
Anti-Corruption	Score on the Corruption Perceptions Index, which measures perceptions of corruption in the public sector. This is a composite indicator, and the scale ranges from 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (very clean).	2020	Survey	Transparency International—Corruption Perceptions Index 2020 <a href="https://www.transparency.org/cpi">https://www.transparency.org/cpi</a>
Long-Term Vision	Response to the survey question: "In your country, to what extent does the government have a long-term vision in place?" [1 = not at all; 7 = to a great extent]	2019	Survey	World Economic Forum—Executive Opinion Survey for the Global Competitiveness Index (Government Long-term Vision) <a href="https://www.weforum.org/reports">https://www.weforum.org/reports</a>
Adaptability	Response to the survey question: "In your country, to what extent does the government respond effectively to change (e.g. technological changes, societal and demographic trends, security and economic challenges)?" [1 = not at all; 7 = to a great extent]	2019	Survey	World Economic Forum—Executive Opinion Survey for the Global Competitiveness Index (Government's Responsiveness to Change) <a href="https://www.weforum.org/reports">https://www.weforum.org/reports</a>
Strategic Prioritisation	Response to the survey question: "To what extent does the government set and maintain strategic priorities?" [1 = worst; 10 = best]  Response to the survey question: "How much influence do strategic planning units and bodies have on government decision-making?" [1 = worst; 10 = best]  *The Bertelsmann Stiftung Transformation Index ranks countries based on the extent to which they are transitioning towards democracy and a market economy. Country scores in the BTI and SGI are obtained through an expert assessment of two experts per country and four levels of review. Further info can be found on their website: <a href="https://www.bti-project.org/en/methodology.html">https://www.bti-project.org/en/methodology.html</a>	2020	Survey	Bertelsmann Stiftung Transformation Index* (Prioritisation) <a href="https://www.bti-project.org/en/home.html">https://www.bti-project.org/en/home.html</a>  Bertelsmann Stiftung Sustainable Governance Indicators (Strategic Planning (Proxy)) <a href="https://www.sgi-network.org/2020/">https://www.sgi-network.org/2020/</a>
Innovation	Response to the survey question: "How innovative and flexible is the government?" [1 = worst; 10 = best] Response to the survey question: "To what extent does the government respond to international and supranational developments by adapting domestic government structures?" [1 = worst; 10 = best]  *The Bertelsmann Stiftung Transformation Index ranks countries based on the extent to which they are transitioning towards democracy and a market economy. Country scores in the BTI and SGI are obtained through an expert assessment of two experts per country and four levels of review. Further info can be found on their website: <a href="https://www.bti-project.org/en/methodology.html">https://www.bti-project.org/en/methodology.html</a>	2020	Survey	Bertelsmann Stiftung Transformation Index (Policy Learning) <a href="https://www.bti-project.org/en/home.html">https://www.bti-project.org/en/home.html</a>  Bertelsmann Stiftung Sustainable Governance Indicators (Adaptability (Proxy)) <a href="https://www.sgi-network.org/2020/">https://www.sgi-network.org/2020/</a>
Ethical Leadership	Response to the survey question: "In your country, how do you rate the ethical standards of politicians?" [1 = extremely low; 7 = extremely high]  <i>As this metric is discontinued, we will not be using it in this edition of the Index. It is included in the framework as ethics in leadership are an important factor for good government.</i>	2018	Survey	World Economic Forum—Executive Opinion Survey for the Global Competitiveness Index (Public Trust in Politicians) <a href="https://www.weforum.org/reports">https://www.weforum.org/reports</a>



## Pillar Two: Robust Laws and Policies

Indicator	Definition	Year	Type	Source
Rule of Law	This measures the perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence.	2021	Survey	Worldwide Governance Indicators – Rule of Law, The World Bank  www.govindicators.org
	This measures the rule of law based on the experiences and perceptions of the general public and in-country legal practitioners and experts worldwide. It provides scores and rankings based on eight factors: Constraints on Government Powers, Absence of Corruption, Open Government, Fundamental Rights, Order and Security, Regulatory Enforcement, Civil Justice, and Criminal Justice.	2021	Survey	World Justice Project—Rule of Law  <a href="https://worldjusticeproject.org/our-work/research-and-data/wjp-rule-law-index-2021">https://worldjusticeproject.org/our-work/research-and-data/wjp-rule-law-index-2021</a>
Quality of Judiciary	Response to the survey question: “In your country, how independent is the judicial system from influences of the government, individuals, or companies?” [1 = not independent at all; 7 = entirely independent]	2019	Survey	World Economic Forum—Executive Opinion Survey for the Global Competitiveness Index (Judicial Independence)
	Response to the survey question: “In your country, how efficient are the legal and judicial systems for companies in settling disputes?” [1 = extremely inefficient; 7 = extremely efficient]	2020	Survey	World Economic Forum—Executive Opinion Survey for the Global Competitiveness Index (Efficiency of Legal Framework in Challenging Regulations)  <a href="https://www.weforum.org/reports">https://www.weforum.org/reports</a>
Transparency	This indicator is the processes subdomain in Government and Civil Service Transparency for the TRACE Bribery Risk Matrix. It measures aspects of how transparent government regulatory functions are such as transparency in public procurement, transparency in government policymaking, publicised laws, and government data.	2020	Qualitative	TRACE Bribery Risk Matrix – Transparency Sub-indicator  <a href="https://www.traceinternational.org/trace-matrix">https://www.traceinternational.org/trace-matrix</a>
	The Index assigns countries covered by the Open Budget Survey a transparency score on a 100-point scale using a subset of questions that assess the amount and timeliness of budget information that governments make publicly available in eight key budget documents in accordance with international good practice standards. The eight key documents are: Pre-Budget Statement; Executive’s Budget Proposal and Supporting Documents for the Executive’s Budget Proposal; Enacted Budget; Citizens Budget; In-Year Reports; Mid-Year Review; Year-End Report; and Audit Report.	2019	Survey	Open Budget Survey  <a href="https://www.internationalbudget.org/open-budget-survey/methodology/">https://www.internationalbudget.org/open-budget-survey/methodology/</a>
Regulatory Governance	The Global Indicators of Regulatory Governance indicator explores how governments interact with the public when shaping regulations that affect their business community. The project charts how interested groups learn about new regulations being considered, and the extent to which they are able to engage with officials on the content. It also measures whether or not governments assess the possible impact of new regulations in their countries (including economic, social, and environmental considerations) and whether those calculations form part of the public consultation. It also captures two additional components of a predictable regulatory environment: the ability of stakeholders to challenge regulations, and the ability of people to access all the laws and regulations currently in force in one, consolidated place.  Main respondents are regulatory agencies: Ministries of Commerce, Ministries of Corporate Affairs, Ministries of Finance, Ministries of Trade and Ministries of Economy.	2018	Survey	World Bank—Global Indicators of Regulatory Governance  <a href="https://rulemaking.worldbank.org/">https://rulemaking.worldbank.org/</a>

## Pillar Three: Strong Institutions

Indicator	Definition	Year	Type	Source
Coordination	<p>Response to the survey question: "To what extent can the government coordinate conflicting objectives into a coherent policy?" [1 = worst; 10 = best]</p> <p>Composite score of coordination factors from Bertelsmann SGI: Cabinet Committees, Ministerial Bureaucracy, Informal Coordination, Line Ministries [1 = worst; 10 = best]</p> <p>*The Bertelsmann Stiftung Transformation Index ranks countries based on the extent to which they are transitioning towards democracy and a market economy. Country scores in the BTI and SGI are obtained through an expert assessment of two experts per country and four levels of review. Further info can be found on their website: <a href="https://www.bti-project.org/en/methodology.html">https://www.bti-project.org/en/methodology.html</a></p>	2020	Survey	<p>Bertelsmann Stiftung Transformation Index (Policy Coordination)</p> <p><a href="https://www.bti-project.org/en/home.html">https://www.bti-project.org/en/home.html</a></p> <p>Bertelsmann Stiftung Sustainable Governance Indicators (Inter-ministerial Coordination (Proxy))</p> <p><a href="https://www.sgi-network.org/2020/">https://www.sgi-network.org/2020/</a></p>
Data Capability	<p>The SPI framework assesses the maturity and performance of national statistical systems in five key areas, called pillars. The five pillars are: Data Use, Data Services, Data Products, Data Sources, and Data Infrastructure. The approach taken to the development of the SPI has been to start with a first best framework and then try and find suitable indicators to help measure progress against that framework.</p> <p>E-Government Development Index (EGDI) incorporates the access characteristics, such as the infrastructure and educational levels, to reflect how a country is using information technologies to promote access and inclusion of its people. The EGDI is a composite measure of three important dimensions of e-government, namely: provision of online services, telecommunication connectivity, and human capacity.</p>	2019	Quantitative	<p>World Bank—Statistical Performance Indicators (SPI)</p> <p><a href="https://datanalytics.worldbank.org/SPI/">https://datanalytics.worldbank.org/SPI/</a></p>
	<p>E-Government Development Index (EGDI) incorporates the access characteristics, such as the infrastructure and educational levels, to reflect how a country is using information technologies to promote access and inclusion of its people. The EGDI is a composite measure of three important dimensions of e-government, namely: provision of online services, telecommunication connectivity, and human capacity.</p>	2020	Quantitative	<p>UN E-government development index</p> <p><a href="https://publicadministration.un.org/egovkb/en-us/About/Overview/-E-Government-Development-Index">https://publicadministration.un.org/egovkb/en-us/About/Overview/-E-Government-Development-Index</a></p>
Implementation	<p>In response to the question: "How effective is the government in implementing its own policies?" [1 = worst; 10 = best]</p> <p>In response to the question: "To what extent can the government achieve its own policy objectives?" [1 = worst; 10 = best]</p> <p>The two metrics are aggregated, scaled using distance-to-frontier and weighted by 0.75.</p> <p>*The Bertelsmann Stiftung Transformation Index ranks countries based on the extent to which they are transitioning towards democracy and a market economy. Country scores in the BTI and SGI are obtained through an expert assessment of two experts per country and four levels of review. Further info can be found on their website: <a href="https://www.bti-project.org/en/methodology.html">https://www.bti-project.org/en/methodology.html</a></p>	2020	Survey	<p>Bertelsmann Stiftung Transformation Index (Implementation)</p> <p><a href="https://www.bti-project.org/en/home.html">https://www.bti-project.org/en/home.html</a></p> <p>Bertelsmann Stiftung Sustainable Governance Indicators (Implementation (Proxy))</p> <p><a href="https://www.sgi-network.org/2020/">https://www.sgi-network.org/2020/</a></p>
Quality of Bureaucracy	<p>In response to the question: "Assess the quality of the bureaucracy and its ability to carry out government policy." [0 = worst; 1 = best]</p>	2021	Survey	<p>Economist Intelligence Unit (Quality of Bureaucracy/Institutional Effectiveness)</p> <p><a href="http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/Home/downloadFile?fileName=EIU.xlsx">http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/Home/downloadFile?fileName=EIU.xlsx</a></p>
	<p>In response to the question: "Does the bureaucracy have the strength and expertise to govern without drastic changes in policy or interruptions in government services?" [0 = worst; 1 = best]</p>	2021	Survey	<p>Political Risk Services International Country Risk Guide (Bureaucratic Quality)</p> <p><a href="http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/Home/downloadFile?fileName=PRS.xlsx">http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/Home/downloadFile?fileName=PRS.xlsx</a></p>

## Pillar Four: Financial Stewardship

Indicator	Definition	Year	Type	Source
Government Debt	Index measuring the change in public debt, weighted by a country's credit rating and debt level in relation to its GDP.	2019	Assessment	World Economic Forum—Global Competitiveness Index (Debt Dynamics)  <a href="https://www.weforum.org/reports">https://www.weforum.org/reports</a>
Country Budget Surplus	Net lending (+) / net borrowing (–) equals government revenue minus expense, minus net investment in nonfinancial assets. It is also equal to the net result of transactions in financial assets and liabilities. Net lending / net borrowing is a summary measure indicating the extent to which government is either putting financial resources at the disposal of other sectors in the economy or abroad, or utilising the financial resources generated by other sectors in the economy or from abroad.  Countries are scored based on predetermined bands.	2020	Quantitative	IMF—Government Net Lending/Borrowing (5-year average)  <a href="https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/GGXCNL_NGDP@WEO/OEMDC/AD">https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/GGXCNL_NGDP@WEO/OEMDC/AD</a>
Spending Efficiency	Response to the survey question: "In your country, how efficiently does the government spend public revenue?" [1 = extremely inefficient; 7 = extremely efficient in providing goods and services]	2018	Survey	World Economic Forum—Executive Opinion Survey for the Global Competitiveness Index (Efficiency of Government Spending)  <a href="https://www.weforum.org/reports">https://www.weforum.org/reports</a>
Country Risk Premium	This measures government debt characteristics and repayment ability. Countries with high sovereign default risk need to issue bonds with higher coupon rates (i.e. premiums) to attract investors and buyers.  This is a composite indicator constructed with country credit ratings and credit default swaps. Data is taken from Moody's and S&P. Each metric is scaled to a 0-1 scale and then averaged to get the composite Country Risk Premium indicator.  Country credit ratings are assigned scores based on predetermined bands.	2021	Quantitative	NYU Stern—Country Default Spreads and Risk Premiums  <a href="http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/New_Home_Page/datafile/ctryprem.html">http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/New_Home_Page/datafile/ctryprem.html</a>

## Pillar Five: Attractive Marketplace

Indicator	Definition	Year	Type	Source
Property Rights	Physical Property Rights* Response to the survey question: "In your country, to what extent is property protected?" [1 = not at all; 7 = to a great extent]	2019	Survey	World Economic Forum—Executive Opinion Survey for the Global Competitiveness Index (Physical Property Rights)
	PRIndex Physical Property Rights* Response to the survey question: "In the next five years, how likely or unlikely is it that you could lose the right to use this property, or part of this property, against your will?" [1 = Very worried; 4 = Not worried at all]	2020	Survey	<a href="https://www.weforum.org/reports">https://www.weforum.org/reports</a>  Prindex—PRIndex Physical Property Rights
	*These two metrics are aggregated using simple average.			
	Intellectual Property Rights Response to the survey question: "In your country, to what extent is intellectual property protected?" [1 = not at all; 7= to a great extent]	2019	Survey	World Economic Forum—Executive Opinion Survey for the Global Competitiveness Index (Intellectual Property Rights)  <a href="https://www.weforum.org/reports">https://www.weforum.org/reports</a>
Macroeconomic Environment	Standard Deviation of Inflation* The component measures the standard deviation of the inflation rate over the last five years. GDP deflator was used as the measure of inflation for this component. When these data were unavailable, the Consumer Price Index was used.	2021	Quantitative & Assessment	Fraser Institute's—Standard Deviation of Inflation  <a href="https://www.fraserinstitute.org/economic-freedom/approach">https://www.fraserinstitute.org/economic-freedom/approach</a>
	Static Inflation* Inflation is normalised in a U-shaped function to capture the detrimental effects of high inflation and deflation. Countries with inflation rates between 0.5% and 4% receive the highest possible score of 100. Outside this range, scores decrease linearly as the distance between the optimal value and the actual value increases.			World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Index—Inflation  <a href="https://www.weforum.org/reports">https://www.weforum.org/reports</a>
	*These two metrics are aggregated using simple average.			
	Unemployment rate refers to the share of the labour force that is without work but available for and seeking employment.	2020	Quantitative & Assessment	International Labour Organisation, ILOSTAT database  <a href="https://ilostat.ilo.org/">https://ilostat.ilo.org/</a>
Attracting Investments	Foreign direct investments are the net inflows of investment to acquire a lasting management interest (10% or more of voting stock) in an enterprise operating in an economy other than that of the investor. It is the sum of equity capital, reinvestment of earnings, other long-term capital, and short-term capital as shown in the balance of payments. This metric shows net inflows (new investment inflows less disinvestment) in the reporting economy from foreign investors, and is divided by GDP.	2016-2020, 5-year average	Quantitative	IMF—Net Inflow of Foreign Direct Investment as % of GDP  <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.KLT.DINV.WD.GD.ZS">https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.KLT.DINV.WD.GD.ZS</a>
	Countries are scored based on predetermined bands.  The Index evaluates a variety of regulatory restrictions that typically are imposed on investment. Countries are scored poorly for inefficient and poorly implemented investment laws and practices.  The restrictions include: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• National treatment of foreign investment</li> <li>• Foreign investment code</li> <li>• Restrictions on land ownership</li> <li>• Sectoral investment restrictions</li> <li>• Expropriation of investments without fair compensation</li> <li>• Foreign exchange controls</li> <li>• Capital controls</li> </ul>	2021	Quantitative	The Heritage Foundation Index of Economic Freedom—Investment Freedom  <a href="https://www.heritage.org/index/">https://www.heritage.org/index/</a>

Logistics Competence	<p>This indicator is based on a worldwide survey of operators on the ground (global freight forwarders and express carriers), providing feedback on the logistics “friendliness” of the countries in which they operate and those with which they trade. The components measured are:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The efficiency of customs and border management clearance</li> <li>• The quality of trade and transport infrastructure</li> <li>• The ease of arranging competitively priced shipments</li> <li>• The competence and quality of logistics services—trucking, forwarding, and customs brokerages</li> <li>• The ability to track and trace consignments</li> <li>• The frequency with which shipments reach consignees within scheduled or expected delivery times</li> </ul>	2019	Survey	<p>World Bank—Logistics Performance Index</p> <p><a href="https://lpi.worldbank.org/international/global">https://lpi.worldbank.org/international/global</a></p>
Stable Business Regulations	<p>Response to the survey question: “In your country, to what extent does the government ensure a stable policy environment for doing business?” [1 = not at all; 7 = to a great extent]</p>	2019	Survey	<p>World Economic Forum—Executive Opinion Survey for the Global Competitiveness Index (Government Ensuring Policy Stability)</p> <p><a href="https://www.weforum.org/reports">https://www.weforum.org/reports</a></p>
Tax Efficiency	<p><i>This indicator records the taxes and mandatory contributions that a medium-size company must pay or withhold in a given year, as well as the administrative burden of paying taxes and contributions.</i></p> <p><i>The CGGI will not use this year’s data due to methodological issues highlighted by the data provider. We hope to use this metric in subsequent editions of the Index.</i></p>			<p>World Bank Doing Business—Paying Taxes</p> <p><a href="https://www.doingbusiness.org/en/reports/global-reports/doing-business-2020">https://www.doingbusiness.org/en/reports/global-reports/doing-business-2020</a></p>

## Pillar Six: Global Influence and Reputation

Indicator	Definition	Year	Type	Source
International Trade	Number of regional trade agreements (RTAs). RTAs are reciprocal preferential trade agreements between two or more parties and the database is a repository of the legal texts and annexes of all RTAs notified to the WTO, preferential tariff and trade data provided by RTA parties, and other related documents. The number of FTAs counted for each EU member state includes its bilateral trade agreements with other EU states. This approach recognises the value that each bilateral agreement has, as a platform and capability for encouraging trade between EU member states. These agreements collectively also enhance the EU's global influence as a single trading and economic actor. They hence represent a distinctive government capability of each EU member state that cannot be discounted.	2021	Quantitative	World Trade Organisation – Regional Trade Agreements  <a href="https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm">https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm</a>
	Trade freedom is a composite measure of the extent of tariff and nontariff barriers that affect imports and exports of goods and services. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Trade-weighted average tariff rates</li> <li>Qualitative evaluation of nontariff barriers including quantity restrictions, regulatory restrictions, customs restrictions, direct government intervention</li> </ul>	2021	Quantitative & Qualitative	The Heritage Foundation— Trade Freedom  <a href="https://www.heritage.org/index">https://www.heritage.org/index</a>
International Diplomacy	Number of Diplomatic Missions Abroad. Data is derived from Lowy's Global Diplomacy Index and desktop research on official foreign ministry websites and secondary sources.  Diplomatic missions include: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Embassies and High Commissions</li> <li>Consulate-General and Consulates, provided they are headed by a dedicated home-based head/chief of missions with accreditation in the host country</li> <li>Permanent missions and representations or delegations to multilateral organisations such as UN, EU, NATO, and OECD</li> <li>Representative offices or delegations to countries where there is no formal diplomatic relationship, provided they are headed by a dedicated home-based head/chief of missions</li> </ul>	2021	Quantitative	Number of Diplomatic Missions Abroad  <a href="https://globaldiplomacyindex.lowyinstitute.org/">https://globaldiplomacyindex.lowyinstitute.org/</a>
Nation Brand	This measures the accuracy of the strategic positioning of the national tourism organisations (NTOs) of all 198 countries and territories included in the ranking. The country brand receives a higher rating if that country's NTO focuses its strategic and promotion positioning on the tourism-related brandtags with the highest demand as measured by total online searches from international tourists.	2019	Quantitative	Bloom Consulting—Country Brand Strategy Rating taken from World Economic Forum Travel & Tourism Competitiveness Report 2019  <a href="https://www.bloom-consulting.com/">https://www.bloom-consulting.com/</a>
	This indicator measures the average number of international associations meetings held annually in each country between 2017 and 2019. These figures are based on the ICCA Association database, which includes meetings organised by international associations, matching the following criteria: a) take place on a regular basis, b) rotate between a minimum of three countries and, c) have at least 50 participants.	2017-2019	Quantitative	Number of International Association Meetings—The International Congress and Convention Association (ICCA)  <a href="https://www.iccaworld.org/">https://www.iccaworld.org/</a>
Passport Strength	Number of destinations passport-holders can access without a prior visa.	2021	Quantitative	Henley's Passport Index  <a href="https://www.henleyglobal.com/passport-index">https://www.henleyglobal.com/passport-index</a>

## Pillar Seven: Helping People Rise

Indicator	Definition	Year	Type	Source
Education	This metric measures the mean of years of schooling for adults aged 25 years and more and expected years of schooling for children of school-entering age.	2019	Quantitative	United National Development Programme—Education Index  <a href="http://hdr.undp.org/en/2020-report">http://hdr.undp.org/en/2020-report</a>
	Harmonised learning outcomes are produced using a conversion factor to compare international and regional standardised achievement tests. These tests include PISA, TIMSS, PIRLS, SACMEQ, LLECE, and PASEC. The harmonised learning outcomes score highlights levels of student learning in reading, mathematics, and science in over 100 countries based on data from four international learning assessments and three regional learning assessments. All mean scores were calculated on a scale with a centre point of 500 except 2004–2010 PASEC (0 to 100 scale), 1997 LLECE (250 centre point), and PIAAC (0 to 500 scale).	2018	Quantitative	World Bank—Harmonized Learning Outcomes  <a href="https://datatopics.worldbank.org/education/wDashboard/dqlearning">https://datatopics.worldbank.org/education/wDashboard/dqlearning</a>
Health	Life expectancy at birth indicates the number of years a newborn infant would live if prevailing patterns of mortality at the time of its birth were to stay the same throughout its life.	2019	Quantitative	United Nations Population Division World Population Prospects—Life Expectancy at Birth  <a href="https://population.un.org/wpp/">https://population.un.org/wpp/</a>
	Adult survival rate is calculated by subtracting the mortality rate for 15- to 60-year-olds from 1.	2019	Quantitative	United Nations Population Division World Population Prospects—Adult Survival Rates  <a href="https://population.un.org/wpp/">https://population.un.org/wpp/</a>
Satisfaction with Public Services	This measures the satisfaction with public transportation system, roads and highways, and education system.	2020	Survey	Gallup World Poll—Satisfaction with Public Services taken from Worldwide Governance Indicators  <a href="http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/Home/downloadFile?fileName=GWP.xlsx">http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/Home/downloadFile?fileName=GWP.xlsx</a>
Personal Safety	This indicator is an aggregate of Global Peace Index—Level of Violent Crime, Gallup’s Law and Order Report, and UNODC’s homicide rates and robbery rates.	2021	Survey & Quantitative	Economist Intelligence Unit (Level of Violent Crime) taken from Global Peace Index 2021
	Metrics are scaled and averaged.			<a href="https://www.visionofhumanity.org/maps/#/">https://www.visionofhumanity.org/maps/#/</a>  Gallup Law and Order Report  <a href="https://www.gallup.com/analytics/322247/gallup-global-law-and-order-report-2020.aspx">https://www.gallup.com/analytics/322247/gallup-global-law-and-order-report-2020.aspx</a>  United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)  <a href="https://dataunodc.un.org/">https://dataunodc.un.org/</a>
Environmental Performance	These indicators provide a gauge at a national scale of how close countries are to established environmental policy targets. Environmental performance is measured using the following metrics from the main index: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Sanitation &amp; Drinking Water—Unsafe drinking water</li> <li>Waste Management—Controlled solid waste</li> <li>Pollutions Emissions—SO<sub>2</sub> growth rate, NO<sub>x</sub> growth rate</li> <li>Water Resources—Wastewater treatment</li> </ul>	2020	Quantitative	Yale—Environmental Performance Index  <a href="https://epi.yale.edu/">https://epi.yale.edu/</a>

Income Equality	This indicator measures the extent to which the net distribution of income (that is, post-tax, post-transfers), among individuals or households within an economy deviates from a perfectly equal distribution. A Gini Index score of 0 represents perfect equality, while a score of 100 implies perfect inequality.	2020	Quantitative	Standardized World Income Inequality Database, Solt, Frederick.  <a href="https://fsolt.org/swiid/">https://fsolt.org/swiid/</a>
Social Mobility	This indicator is adapted from the WEF's Global Social Mobility Report, which focuses on policies, practices, and institutions that collectively determine the extent to which everyone in society has a fair chance to fulfil their potential, regardless of their socio-economic background, the origin of their parents, or the place where they were born.	2021	Qualitative & Quantitative	Social Mobility Composite Indicator
Gender Gap	This indicator contains three concepts: the participation gap, the remuneration gap, and the advancement gap. The participation gap is captured using the difference between women and men in labour force participation rates. The remuneration gap is captured through a hard data indicator (ratio of estimated female-to-male earned income) and a qualitative indicator gathered through the World Economic Forum's annual Executive Opinion Survey (wage equality for similar work). Finally, the gap between the advancement of women and men is captured through two hard data statistics (the ratio of women to men among legislators, senior officials and managers, and the ratio of women to men among technical and professional workers).  This subindex captures the gap between women's and men's current access to education through ratios of women to men in primary-, secondary- and tertiary-level education. A longer-term view of the country's ability to educate women and men in equal numbers is captured through the ratio of the female literacy rate to the male literacy rate.	2021	Qualitative & Quantitative	Global Gender Gap Index—Economic Participation and Opportunity and Educational Attainment  <a href="https://www.weforum.org/reports/global-gender-gap-report-2021">https://www.weforum.org/reports/global-gender-gap-report-2021</a>
Non-Discrimination	This indicator is taken from the World Justice Project – Rule of Law Index, Fundamental Rights pillar. It measures whether individuals are free from discrimination—based on socio-economic status, gender, ethnicity, religion, national origin, sexual orientation, or gender identity—with respect to public services, employment, court proceedings, and the justice system.  We recognise there is an overlap in this measure as it is also measured as part of the much broader Rule of Law indicator.	2021	Survey	World Justice Project—Rule of Law Index  <a href="https://worldjusticeproject.org/our-work/research-and-data/wjp-rule-law-index-2021">https://worldjusticeproject.org/our-work/research-and-data/wjp-rule-law-index-2021</a>



# The CGGI Advisory Panel



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**Prof Kent Weaver**  
Professor of Public  
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at Georgetown  
University

# The CGGI Website




The CGGI is designed to turn analysis into action.


The online version of the Index is a dynamic and engaging tool which allows users to dive deeper into the data.

All 104 countries featured in the Index can be individually explored on the website, with breakdowns for all 35 indicators. Users can use the interactive features to compare countries, or to customise the Index by increasing or decreasing the weightage of selected indicators. The website also features country profiles and stories about governance, including contributions by government practitioners, insights pieces, and further resources.

[www.chandlergovernmentindex.com](http://www.chandlergovernmentindex.com)



# CGGI Website Features



CHANDLER GOOD GOVERNMENT INDEX

ABOUT | REPORT | COUNTRY RANKINGS | COUNTRY PROFILES | CUSTOMISE THE INDEX | STORES

### CUSTOMISE THE INDEX

SELECT INDICATORS

10 categories of indicators are available for selection:

- Leadership & Foresight
- Robust Laws & Policies
- Strong Institutions
- Financial Stewardship
- Attractive Marketplace
- Global Influence & Reputation
- Helping People Rise

GENERATE RESULTS

CHANDLER GOOD GOVERNMENT INDEX

ABOUT | REPORT | COUNTRY RANKINGS | COUNTRY PROFILES | CUSTOMISE THE INDEX | STORES

### FINLAND

Mean Score: 8.48

Population: 5,520,314

GDP per Capita: \$48,782

Time Level: 10th

Income Level: High

#### Indicator Ranks

Indicator	Score
Leadership & Foresight	0.763
Robust Laws & Policies	0.87
Strong Institutions	0.85
Financial Stewardship	0.754
Attractive Marketplace	0.91
Global Influence & Reputation	0.79
Helping People Rise	0.88

CHANDLER GOOD GOVERNMENT INDEX


### Customised Ranking Results

Rank	Country	Score	Rank	Country	Score	Rank	Country	Score
1	Finland	0.848	18	United States	0.732	34	Bulgaria	0.583
2	Switzerland	0.839	19	Iceland	0.722	35	Croatia	0.577
3	Singapore	0.835	20	Belgium	0.717	37	Uruguay	0.576
4	Netherlands	0.828	21	South Korea	0.714	38	Mauritius	0.567
5	Denmark	0.825	22	Czech Republic	0.698	39	Romania	0.569
6	Norway	0.820	23	Slovenia	0.694	40	Costa Rica	0.567
7	Sweden	0.809	24	United Arab Emirates	0.680	41	China	0.558
8	Germany	0.806	25	Portugal	0.684	42	Thailand	0.559
9	New Zealand	0.771	26	Spain	0.669	43	Georgia	0.550
10	Canada	0.768	26	Israel	0.669	44	Kazakhstan	0.548
11	Ireland	0.761	28	Poland	0.663	45	Indonesia	0.545
12	United Kingdom	0.756	29	Lithuania	0.650	46	Serbia	0.538
13	Austria	0.754	30	Chile	0.640	47	Montenegro	0.538
14	Japan	0.742	31	Latvia	0.630	48	Russian Federation	0.527
15	Estonia	0.741	32	Malaysia	0.618	49	India	0.516
16	France	0.736	33	Hungary	0.584	50	Greece	0.516
17	Australia	0.736	34	Italy	0.583	51	Colombia	0.510
18						52	Mexico	0.509
19						53	Rwanda	0.508
20						54	Panama	0.507
21						55	Albania	0.506
22						56	Armenia	0.503
23						57	Vietnam	0.502
24						58	Burkina Faso	0.502
25						59	Philippines	0.500
26						60	Peru	0.495
27						61	Morocco	0.493
28						62	Jamaica	0.490
29						63	Turkey	0.485
30						64	Jordan	0.480
31						65	Ukraine	0.474
32						66	North Macedonia	0.472
33						67	Brazil	0.470
34						68	Argentina	0.468
35						69	Moldova	0.463
36						70	South Africa	0.444
37						71	Senegal	0.440
38						72	Ghana	0.438
39						73	Egypt, Arab Rep.	0.424
40						74	Sri Lanka	0.422
41						75	Turkmenistan	0.420
42						76	Namibia	0.419
43						77	Kyrgyzstan	0.418
44						78	Handbook	0.419
45						79	Zambia	0.419
46						80	Madagascar	0.418
47						81	Kenya	0.407
48						82	Mongolia	0.403
49						83	Tanzania	0.400
50						84	Uganda	0.397
51						85	Tajikistan	0.394
52						86	Cambodia	0.388
53						87	Ecuador	0.383
54						88	Guatemala	0.368
55						89	Nicaragua	0.262

The Chandler Good Government Index (CGGI) is an annual index that measures the effectiveness of governments across the world. It takes a non-biased and non-partisan view of governance.

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# About the Chandler Institute of Governance



**T**he Chandler Institute of Governance (CIG) is an international non-profit organisation, headquartered in Singapore. We believe in a world where citizens have a deep sense of trust in their governments and public institutions, and where nations are governed by principled, wise leaders supported by an effective civil service. Trust and effective governance serve as a solid foundation for national development and prosperity.

CIG supports governments in building government talent, leadership and public service capabilities through training programmes, projects and partnerships, and knowledge creation and sharing. We are not affiliated with any national government or political party, and we do not represent any partisan or commercial interests.



Mr Kenneth Sim, Dean, CAG, welcoming the fellows to the Public Service Emerging Leaders Fellowship (PSELF) Programme at the Kenya School of Government (KSG).



Mr Wu Wei Neng, CIG's Executive Director, conducting a working session for Vietnam's National Academy of Public Administration's (NAPA) lecturers.

## Training

The Chandler Academy of Governance (CAG) develops and delivers training programmes for government leaders. Our programmes are defined by a strong practitioner-focus, which seeks to codify and share practical tradecraft, and not the underlying theory alone. In addition, CAG partners with government leaders and organisations globally in delivering our training programmes. This allows us to draw on good practices globally, while at the same time ensuring that learning is customised to the local context. CAG adopts different learning pedagogies, such as blended learning, to cater to learners' needs, improve accessibility to learning, and maintain high learner engagement levels.

## Projects and Partnerships

CIG undertakes practical projects and works in close partnership with national and local governments, backed up by our network of public sector experts and practitioners worldwide, rigorous data and research, and a deep understanding of public administration.

We believe that different circumstances and contexts require different approaches. Hence, our approach is to facilitate goal assessment and strategic planning exercises, clarify institutional priorities, identify stakeholder needs, evaluate policy options, and identify concrete recommendations and action steps, to support decision-making by governments. We then work closely with our government partners to implement and see through initiatives and build internal capabilities for long-term ownership.

**Knowledge Creation and Sharing**

We believe that sound and non-partisan information support good decision-making. Hence, our knowledge and research products are designed for government practitioners—they are practical, relevant, and focus on the tradecraft of good government. Government practitioners can use them to support their work in policymaking, implementation, and capability building across various domains of governance. They range from Practice Guides to Case studies, ‘Greats in Governance’ histories, and Insights pieces.

In 2021, CIG launched our flagship **Governance Matters** magazine—a practitioner-focused annual magazine that features good practices and public sector tradecraft from government leaders and experts globally.

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Dr. Gyanendra Badgaiyan, Member of the Board of Directors at CIG, speaking with Provincial Civil Service (PCS) Officers at the workshops organised in collaboration with the Mahatma Gandhi State Institute of Public Administration (MGSIPA).

# Endnotes

## Index Insights

<sup>1</sup> The source data used in this Report was last accessed on 1 December 2021, unless otherwise stated. For Excess Deaths per 100,000 over 65, the source does not provide historical data: date last accessed was 28 February 2022.

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